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Abstract 
The Singapore Public Service, acknowledged internationally as highly-efficient 
and one of the least corrupt in the world, has often been overlooked by literature.  Yet, 
the strategic vision and political leadership of founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
and his People’s Action Party government, often attributed for Singapore’s success, 
still needed to be translated into practicable policies and implemented into programmes 
by the bureaucracy. A comprehensive examination into the role of the bureaucracy in 
Singapore’s modernisation is beyond the constraints of this doctoral thesis. This study, 
using archival research and oral interviews to construct an administrative history of 
executive development and training in the Singapore Public Service, plugs a gap in the 
literature and lays the foundation for a future holistic examination of the Singapore 
bureaucracy.  
This thesis argues that the Singapore Public Service used executive 
development training and as a medium of change to introduce reforms across the 
bureaucracy. In so doing, the bureaucracy was able to constantly adjust itself to help 
modernise Singapore.  In the 40 years between decolonisation in 1959 and 2001, when 
the training arm of the Singapore bureaucracy became a statutory board, training and 
development had been used firstly, to socialise the bureaucracy away from its colonial-
era organisational culture to prepare it for the tasks of state-formation and nation-
building. Subsequently, civil servants were mobilised, through training and 
development, into an ‘economic general staff’ to lead the Singapore developmental 
state in the 1970s and 1980s. The modus operandi in all this was to prioritise the 
training of the bureaucracy’s leadership corps, to groom an élite Praetorian Guard, who 
would then disseminate reforms across the bureaucracy. The Public Service for the 
21st Century reforms in the 1990s was the epitome in harnessing development and 
training for reforms across the bureaucracy. The study concludes, not be asserting a 
template for replication but, offering points of reference for bureaucracies aspiring 
reforms. The thesis is not an end in itself but offers a basis to start a conversation on 
scholarship in the fields of history, public administration and Singapore.  
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xi 
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amongst … civil servants.” 
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Administration and Management) and Civil Service College (renamed Institute 
of Policy Development).  
2001 CSC became a self-financing statutory board by act of Parliament. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Rationale for Study 
Singapore’s modernisation from a colonial outpost to one of the most liveable 
city-states has been truly spectacular.  In 1959 when it was granted self-government 
after 140 years of colonial rule, Singapore’s gross domestic product was just S$2.1 
billion and per capita GDP S$1,306.1 Among the population of 1.5 million, infant 
mortality was 36 per 1,000 live births, and literacy rate was 523 per 1,000 persons. 
Today, Singapore continues to be a small island (710 square kilometres), has no 
natural resources and relies on imports for all essentials. Its GDP has grown to S$370 
billion (A$317 billion), and per capita GDP rose to S$68,541 (A$58,645) even when the 
population expanded to five million.2 Unemployment is 1.9%; infant mortality 2 per 
1,000 live births and literacy is 97%. Its multi-racial population - ethnic Chinese majority 
and substantial Indian and Malay communities – live in harmony and crime rate is low. 
This stability and modern amenities rank Singapore among the most liveable cities in 
the world.3   
Singapore’s transformation is traditionally attributed to the strategic foresight 
and political will of founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew4 and his ministerial 
colleagues of the People’s Action Party (PAP).5 Even critics of Lee, the PAP and the 
1
 Singapore Department of Statistics (DOS), Economic and Social Statistics: Singapore 1960 – 1982 
(Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1983) 10-13. 
2
 DOS, “Latest Data,” Web 8 Apr 2014 http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest_data.html#1. 
3
 Singapore has consistently been listed as the top Asian city in Mercer’s survey of most liveable cities. 
Mercer, “2011 Quality of Living worldwide city rankings – Mercer Survey,” Web 7 Dec 2011, 
http://www.mercer.com/print.htm; 
jsessionid=572919tE3ThHq07ITSvbsA**mercer04?indContentType=100&idContent=1173105&indBodyTy
pe=D&reference=#Asia-Pac; Mercer, “Quality of Living worldwide city rankings 2010,” 26 May 2010, Web 
17 Aug 2011, http://www.mercer.com/press-releases/quality-of-living-report-2010. 
4
 Naming convention among the ethnic Chinese community in Singapore places surnames ahead of given 
names, hence Lee Kuan Yew’s surname is Lee, and given name is Kuan Yew. English names, when given, 
are placed before the surname, in keeping with Western practices, hence Harry Lee Kuan Yew. For clarity, 
all surnames in this thesis are underlined.  
5
 See for example, C.M.Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819 – 2005 (Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press, 2009); A history of Singapore, Singapore eds. Ernest Chew and Edwin Lee 
(Oxford University Press, 1991); John Drysdale, Singapore: Struggle for success (Singapore: Times Books 
International, 1984); Dennis Bloodworth, The Tiger and the Trojan Horse (Singapore: Times Books 
International, 1984); Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, Lee Kuan Yew: The man and 
his ideas (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998) 13; Lee’s Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard, eds. Lam Peng 
Er and Kevin Y.L. Tan (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1999); Tan Siok Sun, Goh Keng Swee: A portrait 
(Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2007); Irene Ng, The Singapore Lion: A biography of S. Rajaratnam 
(Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2010); Asad Latif, Lim Kim San: A builder of 
Singapore (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009).  
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Singapore political system acknowledged, explicitly or implicitly, the central role played 
by Lee and his PAP colleagues in Singapore’s modernisation.6 
However, since this doctoral study of training in the bureaucracy is concerned 
with a subject in the field of public administration in Singapore, it does not dwell on the 
country’s political system and the debates over it.  
Even so, this thesis argues that the vision and direction of the political élite 
depended on the bureaucracy to be translated into policies, and then implemented. 
The Public Service shouldered the heavy work of state-building following self-
government. From attracting foreign investment and building factories to create 
employment, to constructing public housing to alleviate overcrowded and unsanitary 
living conditions, to ramping up education to provide skilled labour for the fledgling 
economy, every ‘state-building’ task was imperative and urgent.  When Singapore 
suddenly became fully independent in 1965, the bureaucracy’s list of nation-building 
priorities expanded to include raising a defence force and setting up from scratch 
agencies of a sovereign state. The ultimate realisation of this grand political vision and 
strategic foresight rested on the shoulders of teachers, nurses, postmen and other 
frontline civil servants to be translated into actual public policies and programmes. 
The amateurish and perhaps inexperienced Singapore Public Service in 1959, 
reinaugurated from the colonial bureaucracy when the island became a self-governing 
state, did not inspire confidence. The newly-elected PAP government found the senior 
officers seriously disconnected from the population they were supposed to serve.7 
Conditioned to ruling by colonial fiat, these bureaucrats were mostly sequestered in the 
comforts of their offices and unaware of their milieu. Frontline civil servants were 
known among the population to be overbearing and corrupt: for instance, “people had 
to grease palms to obtain licenses, permits, immigration papers, public housing and 
coveted places in schools.”8 The prevailing bribe for a quick driving licence in those 
days, according to one recollection, was $100 to an officer in the Registry of Vehicles.9  
6
 See for some examples, Garry Rodan, “The Growth of Singapore’s Middle Class and its Political 
Significance,” Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s ,ed. 
Garry Rodan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 52-53; Ross Worthington, Governance in Singapore 
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2003) 1-3; Carl Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control 
(Routledge, 2006), pp. 124ff; Thomas J. Bellows, “Meritocracy and the Singapore Political System,” Asian 
Journal of Political Science 17(1), April 2009: 24-25.   
7
 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings 
and Times Editions, 1998) 319.  
8
 Sonny Yap, Richard Lim and Leong Weng Kam, Men in White: The untold story of Singapore’s ruling 
political party (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings, 2009) 555.  
9
 Cheong Yip Seng, OB Markers: My Straits Times Story (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2013) 296. 
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Today, however, the Singapore Public Service is regarded as ‘one of the most 
efficient and least corrupt in the world’10 by the United Nations and other international 
indicators.11 Singapore topped a 2013 survey of attitudes towards 12 Asian 
bureaucracies.12 Unlike counterparts in some post-colonial states, Singapore’s 
bureaucracy has not interfered in the political arena. Unique even to civil services of 
developed countries, the Singapore Public Service has gone beyond efficiency and 
integrity to position its officers to ‘anticipate, welcome and execute change’.13 From 
harnessing technology to deliver government services, it adopted concepts and tools 
like scenario planning and horizon scanning to prepare for unforeseen crisis that may 
arise in the future, a sign of growing sophistication. Efficient, incorrupt and faceless 
behind the political masters, the Singapore Public Service is quintessentially 
‘professional’ by Westminster standards. 
How did the Singapore Public Service professionalise itself? How did it adjust 
itself to the wide range of priorities through different phases of state- and nation-
building? How did the Singapore bureaucracy reform itself to remain relevant through 
the decades?  
This thesis argues, originally, that executive development and training was the 
medium through which change was introduced into the Singapore Public Service, 
leading to the reforms and professionalization of the Public Service.  It proposes that 
this professionalization allowed the Public Service to be in the position to carry out the 
policies and programmes to modernise Singapore. This is an original argument 
supported by original research and data collection.  
This use of executive development and training to successfully change, reform 
and professionalise a bureaucracy is not seen in any other jurisdiction. It has not 
featured in public administration literature. This thesis introduces into public 
administration literature the use of training as a medium of reforms and offers a model 
for other jurisdictions seeking to reform and professionalise their bureaucracies.  
10
 United Nations, “Republic of Singapore: Public Administration Country Profile,” Nov 2005, Web 2 Aug 
2011, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023321.pdf, 10. 
11
Under “Institutions,” Singapore ranked 1
st
 of 133 countries from 1999 to 2011. World Economic Forum,
The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, Web 2 Aug 2011, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ 
Global CompetitivenessReport_2009-10.pdf, 4 & 14; N.C. Saxena, Virtuous cycles: The Singapore Public 
Service and national development (Singapore: United Nations Development Programme, 2011) 2. 
12
 Political & Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd, “Bureaucracy: Asia’s Best and Worst,” Asian Intelligence No. 
885, 16 Oct 2013: 3. 
13
  Singapore Public Service Division (PSD), “Organisation Chart,” Web 4 Aug 2011, http://www.psd.gov. 
sg/AboutUs/ OrganisationChart/; Singapore Horizon Scanning Centre, “The RAHS Programme,” Web 4 
Aug 2011, http://app.hsc.gov.sg/public/www/content.aspx?sid=5.   
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1.2 Plugging a Literature Gap 
Despite its significance, the role played by the Singapore Public Service has not 
been fully explored or acknowledged in the growing scholarly literature discussing 
Singapore’s modernisation. Most accounts, even when acknowledging the contribution 
of the bureaucracy, have used it as a foil to accentuate the strategic vision and political 
will of Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP leaders.14 One analysis of state policy-making, for 
example, argued that civil servants were so firmly under the control of the political 
leaders that they had ‘lost their sense of mission and identity’.15 Even when 
complimenting the Public Service with faint praise as ‘competent’, Henri Ghesquiere 
attributed its ‘creation’ to the foresight and determination of the political leadership.16 In 
so casting the bureaucracy to highlight the political leadership’s contribution towards 
Singapore’s success, the crucial role of the Public Service became diminished and 
marginalised. 
On the other hand, Chan Heng Chee coined the phrase the ‘administrative state’ 
to describe the Singaporean bureaucracy’s pervasive role the state’s developmental 
activities. Civil servants were wielding ‘power and privilege without accountability to the 
public and who … become the real rulers of the country’. 17  Seah Chee Meow 
extended this argument to assert that the ‘administrative state-model’ has been 
institutionalized over many years.18 To be sure, these arguments were not attempting 
to assert that the bureaucracy had acquired a high degree of autonomy, impervious of 
the political leadership. Rather, they were positing that the Public Service had served 
as the recruiting ground for the state’s leaders across both political and economic 
spheres, and in doing so had become part of the national élite without being subjected 
to any systemic oversight. The bureaucracy, it was argued, was exerting an inordinate 
amount of unchecked influence over the country and had developed a symbiotic 
relationship with the political leadership. 
14
 See notes 5 and 6.  
15
 Ho Khai Leong, The politics of policy-making in Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
149. 
16
 Henri Ghesquiere, Singapore’s success: engineering economic growth (Singapore: Thomson Learning, 
2007) 102.  
17
 Chan Heng Chee, “Politics in an administrative state: Where had the politics gone?” Trends in 
Singapore, ed. C.M. Seah (Singapore: ISEAS, 1975) 68. 
18
 Seah Chee Meow, “The Administrative State: Quo Vadis?” Singapore towards a developed status, ed. 
Linda Low (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1999) 253. 
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However, even these ‘administrative state’ arguments were premised upon the 
bureaucracy being part of the PAP’s grand design. Both Chan and Seah by default 
acknowledged the centrality of the political leadership in transforming Singapore. The 
‘administrative state’ thesis reinforced the growing discourse crediting Singapore’s 
modernisation solely to Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP. In focusing on political 
leadership’s primary role in transforming Singapore, the existing literature has not 
specifically addressed the role of the Public Service in Singapore’s modernisation.  
To be fair, there is a discrete body of literature on the Singapore Public Service 
itself, although much of it is narrowly concentrated on specific aspects of the 
administrative bureaucracy. Jon Quah has written extensively on its management of 
personnel, particularly through the Public Service Commission and the fight against 
corruption.19 He studied the bureaucracy’s ability to implement policies formulated by 
the political leadership, contrasting this effectiveness with the difficulties faced in other 
developing countries.20 Lee Boon Hiok, another prolific scholar of Singapore public 
administration, led the study of statutory boards in the country’s development.21  More 
recent works dwelt on administrative reforms in the bureaucracy, especially in the light 
of the PS21 (Public Service for the 21st Century) initiative.22  
The existing literature overlooks two important aspects relating to the Singapore 
bureaucracy. There is no dedicated history of the Singapore Public Service apart from 
19
 Jon S. T. Quah, “The Public Service Commission in Singapore: a comparative study of its evolution and 
its recruitment and selection procedures vis-a-vis the Public Service Commissions in Ceylon, India and 
Malaysia,” M.Soc.Sci. Thesis, Dept. of Political Science, University of Singapore, 1971; Jon S. T.  Quah, 
“Decentralizing public personnel management: the case of the public sector in Singapore,” New trends in 
public administration for the Asia-Pacific region: decentralization, eds. Susumu Kurosawa, Toshihiro 
Fujiwara and Mila A. Reforma (Tokyo: Local Autonomy College, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1996) 492-506; 
Jon S. T. Quah, Administrative and legal measures for combating bureaucratic corruption in Singapore 
(Singapore: Chopmen, 1978); Jon S. T. Quah, “Singapore’s Anti-Corruption,” Corruption and Governance 
in Asia, eds. Susumu Kurosawa, Toshihiro Fujiwara and Mila A. Reforma, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003) 180-97. 
20
 Jon S. T. Quah, “Public bureaucracy and policy implementation in Singapore,” Southeast Asian Journal 
of Social Science, 15(2)1987: 77-95.  
21
 Lee Boon Hiok, Statutory boards in Singapore (Singapore: University of Singapore, 1975). Also Lee 
Boon Hiok, “The Public Personnel System in Singapore,” Asian Civil Services: Developments and Trends, 
eds. Amara Raksasataya and Heindrich Siedentopf (Kuala Lumpur: Asian and Pacific Development and 
Administrative Centre, 1980) 431-479; Jon S.T. Quah, “Statutory Boards,” Government and Politics of 
Singapore, eds. Jon S.T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1987); Jon S.T. Quah, “Administrative Reform and Development Administration in Singapore: a 
comparative study of the Singapore Improvement Trust and the Housing and Development Board,” PhD 
thesis, Florida State University, 1975. 
22
 Gillian Koh, “Bureaucratic rationality in an evolving developmental state: Challenges to governance in 
Singapore,” Asian Journal of Political Science, 5.2 (1997): 114-141; David Seth Jones, “Recent reforms in 
Singapore’s administrative élite: Responding to the challenges of a rapidly changing economy and society,” 
Asian Journal of Political Science, 10.2 (2002): 70-93. Also Jon S.T. Quah, “Improving the efficiency and 
productivity of the Singapore civil service,” Asian civil service systems: improving efficiency and 
productivity, ed. John P. Burns (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1994) 152-185; Jon Quah, 
“Transforming the Singapore civil service for national development,” Democratization and bureaucratic 
neutrality, eds. Haile K. Asmerom and Elisa P. Reis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 294-312. 
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two outdated accounts by Seah Chee Meow and Lee Book Hiok.23 Quah’s Public 
Administration Singapore Style was a comprehensive coverage of the Singapore 
bureaucracy but, by dedicating individual chapters to specific subjects rather than 
threading them together, he was not aiming to chart the bureaucracy’s overall 
development.24 Chua Mui Hoong might have provided a credible history of the 
Singapore Public Service, except it was an official commemorative volume rather than 
a scholarly piece and, for that reason, was non-critical and did not adopt an 
independent academic format.25 
Also missing from this literature is a review of the development of Public 
Service capabilities and in particular executive development and training. Training 
refers to “the process of developing skills, habits, knowledge and attitudes in 
employees for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of employees in their 
present government positions, as well as preparing employees for future government 
positions.”26 It is “the systematic modification of behavior through learning which occurs 
as a result of education, instruction, development and planned experience.”27  Such 
training in the context of the Singapore Public Service can take the form of equipping 
employees with specific skill-sets to allow them to carry out their designated functions, 
such as finance, human resource, record-keeping or IT skills. For employees who are 
at more senior levels in the hierarchy, executive development programmes can 
enhance their supervisory or management skills and provide them with the capacity to 
motivate and inspire the teams and departments under their charge and to contribute 
towards the Public Service’s broader goals. Training can also acquaint employees with 
the context in which they have to operate, whether such contexts are the bureaucracy’s 
distinctive culture and processes, or the socio-political environment of the particular 
vocation or profession.  
All these different types of training, while equipping employees with attributes, 
knowledge and skills, at the same time build up the Public Service’s capacity to 
perform its goals. As Herbert Simon pointed out, by preparing members of an 
organisation to reach decisions that are in the interest of the organisation on their own, 
23
 Seah Chee Meow, “Bureaucratic evolution and political change in an emerging nation: a case study of 
Singapore,” PhD Thesis, Manchester: Victoria University of Manchester, 1971; Lee Boon Hiok, “The 
Singapore civil service and its perceptions of time,” PhD Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1976.   
24
 Jon S.T. Quah, Public Administration Singapore Style (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2010). 
25
 Chua Mui Hoong, Pioneers once more: the Singapore Public Service, 1959 – 2009 (Singapore:  Straits 
Times Press and Public Service Division, 2010).  
26
 William G. Torpey, Public Personnel Management (Canada: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1953) 154. 
27
 Michael Armstrong, A Handbook of Personnel Management Practice (London: Kogan Page Limited, 
1996) 529.  
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training devolves the organisation from constant exercise of authority or advice.28 
Internalising within officers the knowledge, skills, identifications and loyalties of the 
organisation to act towards the organisation’s interests in their discretion, training 
allows big organisations to function. This is especially so when organisations grow so 
large and dispersed over various physical locations, as in the case with the national 
public bureaucracy, that direct command of the top leadership over subordinate officers 
is difficult if not impossible. Hence, training, regardless of its specificity, allows a huge 
organisation like the Singapore Public Service to carry out daily routine functions 
effectively, essentially allowing the bureaucracy to perform competently.   
The literature on the Singapore Public Service has not to date specifically 
examined executive development and training. Training has only been discussed as 
part of broader topics, such as personnel management. Several undergraduate-level 
essays did explore the subject, but these were written two decades ago.29 Although 
there are several more recent theses on the Civil Service College (CSC), the training 
school of the Public Service, their focus was not on the College’s training function. 
Instead, these concentrated on CSC’s transformation from a department within a 
government ministry into an autonomous statutory body, the effects of such 
organizational change on individual employees and customer service.30  
Given the large body of public administration discourse on the Singapore 
bureaucracy, the absence of a dedicated history on the Public Service and the subject 
of executive training, is a distinct gap in the literature waiting to be plugged.  
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
A broad history of the Singapore Public Service needs to be written but 
chronicling five decades of developments across the ministries and statutory boards 
28
 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour: A study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative 
Organisation (New York: The Free Press, 1976) 15. Also R.N. Spann, Public Administration in Australia 
(New South Wales: V.C.N. Blight, 1973) 84. 
29
 Sim, Sock Hoon, “Training in the Singapore Administrative Service,” B.Soc.Sci.(Hons) academic 
exercise, National University of Singapore, 1985; Siow, Viola, “Training in the Singapore civil service: the 
way forward,” B.Soc.Sci.(Hons) academic exercise, National University of Singapore, 1998; Lai, Tony, 
“Administrative training in the Singapore civil service: an evaluation of recent changes.” B.Soc.Sci.(Hons) 
academic exercise, National University of Singapore, 1995. 
30
 Saravanan s/o Sangiah, “Transformation of the Civil Service College into a Statutory Board: Causes and 
Implications,” B.Soc.Sci.(Hons), Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 2003; 
Lim Peng Soon, “Organisational Change and the Impact on the Individual: A Phenomenological Study in 
the Transitory Experience of Employees in the Context of Transformational Change in Organisations,” 
George Washington University, 2006; Rinkoo Ghosh, “An Empirical Study on a Customer-focused 
Strategy for a Singapore Government Training Organisation,” Doctor of Business Administration, Graduate 
School of Business, Southern Cross University, 2008.  
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that made up the whole bureaucracy will require much longer time than afforded by this 
thesis. Rodney Lowe’s The Official History of the British Civil Service, Volume 1, took 
10 years of research and writing before publication.31 More critically for Singapore, 
government archival records required to inform such a project, especially for those of 
security agencies like the defence and foreign affairs ministries, will be difficult if not 
altogether impossible to access.  
This thesis aims to present training as a medium through which substituted 
change was introduced into the bureaucracy. To make this argument, the thesis 
presents an administrative history of the various training initiatives and institutions 
guiding the Singapore Public Service, from its inauguration in 1959 to 2001. Besides 
assessing executive training as a catalyst to promote bureaucratic change, tracing the 
evolution of these various institutes plugs the gap in the subject of training in the 
bureaucracy currently missing from the public administration literature.  In a one-party 
state such as Singapore, which can be sensitive to analysis of its administrative past, a 
focus on a seemingly innocuous topic such as administrative training can throw light on 
the priorities and workings of government and enable ready access to archival records. 
To impose boundaries on the topic, the thesis focuses on centralised training. 
As the Public Service is made up of different agencies and wide-ranging portfolios, 
training for the different functions and vocations can be highly specialised and 
particular to the respective agencies. Induction training in uniformed agencies, for 
example, will immediately emphasise command and regimentation while the 
organisational culture in civilian agencies such as the finance ministry will be more 
analytically demanding, or for a tourism board more client-oriented. Training for civil 
defence personnel, for example, concentrates on the use of rescue and fire-fighting 
equipment, while training for soldiers is dedicated towards the use of fire-arms. Without 
a common platform for comparison, hence, addressing the diverse range of specialised 
and particular modes of training can be inconclusive.  
In contrast, centralised training brings together personnel of various vocations 
from all government agencies for common modes of instruction. Examining such 
universal training is thus more purposeful in assessing broad intents and effects 
pertaining training across the bureaucracy. In particular, centralised leadership training 
typically receives inordinate amount of attention in bureaucracies.  In theory, such 
training is dedicated towards the best and brightest of each bureaucracy and 
31
 Rodney Lowe, The official history of the British Civil Service: Reforming the Civil Service, Volume 1: The 
Fulton Years, 1966 – 91 (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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represents the best efforts towards developing the leadership which will steer the 
bureaucracy. Secondly, the impact of leadership training has the potential to shape and 
manage public agencies towards their respective organisational goals, maximising the 
greatest output from a single source of input. The scope of this dissertation, hence, 
documenting an administrative history of centralised training initiatives, in particular 
leadership training, aims to draw out the thesis that training is a point through which 
change was introduced into the bureaucracy. 
Articulating the definition of ‘civil service’ within the context of Singapore is 
important. Edward Blunt traced the origins of ‘civil service’ to the East India Company 
(EIC), in the name of which Singapore was colonised in 1819, which used the term to 
distinguish civilian employees from military and ecclesiastical establishments.32 The 
1955 re-organisation saw the newly-created ministries – which succeeded government 
departments – also inheriting the ‘civil service’ nomenclature. But the need to include 
statutory bodies structured outside of these ministries gave rise to the term “Public 
Service” to encompass the ‘civil service’ and these statutory boards.33  Further, Lee 
Boon Hiok categorized the modern Singapore administrative machinery into three 
organizational types – traditional civil service, statutory boards and government-owned 
companies.34 Mobility in appointments of personnel, especially the élite Administrative 
Service officers, across these organizational types is common, and personnel from 
these organizational-types do attend common centralized training at the Civil Service 
College. Naturally, the missions of different organizational-types impose specific 
training on their respective personnel at the agency level. This is another reason why it 
makes sense to limit the scope of this study to centralized training.   
The study finishes in 2001, far enough in the past not to become entangled in 
current political issues. But the date is significant, because one of the main training 
institutions, the Civil Service College, was then reorganised into an independent 
statutory board. The central institution responsible for training was for the first time 
detached from a government ministry to become a separate entity. This thus provides a 
fitting end-point for this study. Further research may subsequently take the narrative 
further. 
32
 Edward Blunt, The Indian Civil Service (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1937) 1ff. 
33
 Colony of Singapore Annual Report 1955 (SAR 1955) (Singapore, GPO, 1956) 252. Statutory boards 
structured outside of the re-organised ministries included the City Council, Harbour Board and 
Improvement Trust.   
34
 Lee Boon Hiok (1980) 441. The Constitution states that “the public services shall include (a) the 
Singapore Armed Forces; (b) the Singapore Civil Service; (c) the Singapore Legal Service; and (d) the 
Singapore Police Force”. Republic of Singapore, Reprint of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 
prepared by the Attorney-General, Singapore, with the authority of the President, 31 Mar 1980, Article 102. 
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This study aims to chronicle the history of the Singapore government’s efforts to 
institutionalise executive training. Yet, to merely document the various institutes and 
training schools will not flesh out their main purposes, or how their roles evolved over 
time, what training they provided, or provide a measure of their effectiveness and how 
they confronted the challenges they faced within the larger complexity of government 
and society. The organisational dimension of these training initiatives and their 
existence as part of a broader total institution of the Singapore bureaucracy needs to 
be examined. This will inevitably thrust to the fore the role of institutionalised training in 
professionalizing the Singapore Public Service. The specific subject of reforming the 
bureaucracy, such as anti-graft measures or tightening discipline, or factors such as 
the compact nature of Singapore’s political system or strong political will of its ruling 
élite, will not be the thesis’ focus. However, these factors will be noted as they arise 
when examining the role of training schools and their impact on the professionalization 
of the Singapore bureaucracy.  
To explore the proposition that training played a critical role in the reforms of the 
Singapore Public Service, allowing the bureaucracy to facilitate the Singapore’s 
modernisation, this thesis addresses three sets of research questions: 
1. What were the reasons and circumstances that gave rise to the various
training initiatives and institutes throughout the history of the Singapore
Public Service? This requires us to ask why did the Singapore bureaucracy
invest so heavily in executive training and what did the government expect
would be the outcome?
2. How did the Singapore bureaucracy undertake executive training in practice
over these five decades? This will involve investigating:
 What were the relationships between these training institutes and their
stakeholders, namely the political masters, the larger bureaucracy and
the state?
 What were the objectives and functions prescribed to these training
endeavours?  How did they carry out these objectives? What were the
effects and impact of training upon the bureaucracy?
 What types of executive training were delivered and what programs
were mounted and for whom?
 What were the changing roles played by these training initiatives as the
bureaucracy and state evolved and modernised over time?
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 What factors and circumstances led to the repeated closures, mergers
or even reorganisations of the various training institutes established?
3. Stepping back and taking a long view after fifty years, what were the
defining features and characteristics of Singapore’s endeavours in
institutionalising executive development and training?
1.4 Theoretical and Policy Significance 
This thesis, by highlighting the critical role played by Public Service training, 
offers a fresh perspective into Singapore’s rapid and extensive modernisation. Existing 
studies of Singapore’s development have limited their analysis to the role played by the 
political élite, as recounted earlier. Without diminishing the contribution of Singapore’s 
political leaders towards the country’s development, this thesis points out that the 
Public Service played an also instrumental part as the implementation arm of 
Singapore’s modernisation. Further, this thesis argues that executive development and 
training was especially important in preparing the bureaucracy to support the 
development of Singapore.  
Examining the importance of training in the professionalization of the Singapore 
bureaucracy also provides possible lessons and practices that could be replicated or 
adapted in other jurisdictions seeking to reform their bureaucracies. Although any 
lessons will need to be contextualised within Singapore’s unique circumstances, there 
could be practices sufficiently generic for replication in other bureaucracies. Some 
practices could also be de-contextualised and modified to suit local conditions. 
Minimally, Singapore’s experiences can offer policy-makers references on the use of 
training for bureaucratic reform.  
1.5 Broad Approach to be Taken 
This study approaches the subject as an administrative history, primarily 
because the genre attends to the rationale of exploring the role of training in 
Singapore’s public service reforms over time. It is a qualitative research, drawing on 
archival records and interviews with officials involved as the main approach. It does not 
dispute the importance of other methodologies but presents one approach to expand 
the field of public administration in Singapore, and add to the diversity of the field of 
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knowledge.35 The methodology adopted for this study will be discussed in depth in 
Chapter 3. 
Administrative history is best defined by Jos Raadschelders as the study of the 
structure and functioning of government, the interaction between society and 
government, and ideas about government-in-society.36 This definition reiterates the 
importance of locating the study in the proper government-in-society context. The 
research questions of the ‘whys’, ‘whats’, and ‘hows’ of training in the Singapore 
bureaucracy cannot be explored in isolation; rather, these factors will be set against the 
dynamics of the broader society, government and bureaucracy during a succession of 
distinct eras. To address these various layers of institutional and corresponding time 
contexts, this study will be guided along by a conceptual framework, a subject 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2.  
Cross-country comparisons also help to situate Singapore’s civil service training 
initiatives and sharpen its features. Because these constituted examples which For 
meaningful comparisons, jurisdictions should share characteristics similar to those of 
Singapore, such as British colonial tradition, Westminster parliamentary system of 
government, small jurisdictional size, efficient and incorruptible bureaucracy, etc. 
Drawing up proper specifications for cross-country benchmarking, and more in-depth 
issues of methodology are addressed in Chapter 3.  
1.6 Chapter Outline 
This introductory chapter has set out the rationale, defined the scope and 
research objectives, and laid out the theoretical and policy significance of this study. 
The dissertation thereafter proceeds as follows.  
Chapter 2 discusses the analytic framework guiding this study. It clarifies 
various conceptual terms, such as ‘training’, ‘education’ and ‘development’. It then 
locates civil service training in its proper contexts in each case, at their respective 
intersection of time, across the myriad of political, social, economic and bureaucratic 
35
 David McNabb, Research Methods in Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2010) 230. 
36
 Jos Raadschelders, “Administrative History as a Core Dimension of Public Administration,” 2008, Web 6 
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definitions, building upon the work of earlier scholars. See Lynton K. Caldwell, “The relevance of 
administrative history,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 21.3 (1955): 455; R.L. Wettenhall, 
“The challenge of administrative history: an Australian perspective,” Colony to Coloniser, eds. J.J. Eddy & 
J.R. Nethercote (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1987) 15; Jos Raadschelders, Handbook of Administrative 
History (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 1998) 7. 
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dynamics. This framework, thus, establishes the contextual ballast to anchor 
discussion in subsequent chapters.  
The methodology involved in researching the thesis is discussed in Chapter 3. It 
lays out administrative history as an optimal approach to chart the progression of civil 
service training over time, together with the various institutional dynamics. It addresses 
the use of sources to inform on the thesis, and discusses the use of cross-country 
comparisons to locate and sharpen Singapore’s case. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the colonial background to situate the 
context of the Singapore Public Service for subsequent discussion. As Singapore was 
claimed by the British as a base for her Far Eastern empire, the remit to the colonial 
bureaucracy on the island was to maintain stability at minimal costs. This chapter 
points out that, in that institutional context, training for civil servants was not a priority 
for the broader colonial period. Executive development and training was, on the whole, 
not undertaken before Singapore gained self-government. 
The next five chapters examine the five civil service training initiatives straddling 
across five decades. The Singaporean government chose to rebadge its civil service 
training initiatives regularly to realign its institutional provisions within its emerging 
priorities and target training constituents of various levels of public officers.  
Chapter 5 introduces the initial Political Study Centre (1959 – 1969), set up by 
the People’s Action Party government to socialise the bureaucracy to the new political 
operating milieu, under the guise of training. Having served as executive arm of the 
colonial authorities for over a century, the bureaucracy at the threshold of 
decolonisation was steeped in colonial organisational culture: its leadership 
disconnected with the local population, and rank-and-file officers largely rent-seeking 
and corrupt. Apart from being the vehicle through which the PAP government asserted 
control over the bureaucracy, the Political Study Centre was the platform through which 
the political leadership introduced – for the first time – the use of training for political 
socialisation to reform the Singapore Public Service.  
Chapter 6 discusses the Staff Training Institute (STI, 1971 – 1975), set up in the 
contours of the Singaporean developmental state. The rapid state-led economic and 
infrastructural development soon revealed the lack of requisite management training 
among civil servants responsible for planning, regulating, implementing and managing 
these projects. This was a gap that STI was set up to plug. After a decade of using 
training for political socialisation, the STI’s role in equipping public officers for the 
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developmental state returned the function of training to providing technical skills and 
knowledge for the bureaucracy. 
The period 1975 – 1996 witnessed the Civil Service Staff Development Institute 
(CSSDI) and the Civil Service Institute (CSI) but both referred to the same organisation 
and hence merit discussion together in Chapter 7. The CSI, particularly in the 1980s, 
was the point through which reforms, such as computerisation and productivity, were 
introduced across the Public Service. But the CSI’s maturity into an institution of 
training for the whole Public Service brought to the fore the dilemma between broad-
based training and élite executive development. This tension highlighted the 
importance placed upon the leadership corps of the Singapore Public Service, and the 
corresponding role of executive development. The CSI’s inability to offer meaningful 
leadership programmes resulted in its eventual marginalisation when it was supplanted 
by a dedicated leadership development institution.   
 Chapter 8 focuses on the first Civil Service College from 1993 when it was set up 
until 1996 when it was renamed Institute of Policy Development (IPD). This embryonic 
Civil Service College brought to realisation a dedicated leadership development centre 
after decades of futile efforts to develop leadership training programmes. Its 
establishment amidst various obstacles highlighted the critical importance of political 
support. As a platform dedicated towards fostering the values and élan of the Public 
Service, the Civil Service College manifested the use of executive development as a 
point of introducing reforms into the leadership élite.  
Between 1996 and 2001, the two existing central training schools were 
consolidated under a new Civil Service College, later devolved into a statutory board. 
Chapter 9 shows that these re-organisations – seemingly a myriad of re-labelling –
consolidates the various training functions into a single focal point. The ultimate aim of 
turning CSC into a statutory board was not an end-goal by itself, but to orientate the 
training functions to support the agenda for reforms. Therefore, the transformation of 
the Civil Service College, from its establishment in 1996 to its transition into a statutory 
board in 2001, was a remarkably purposeful and well-planned alignment of training 
functions to introduce reforms into the Singapore Public Service. 
Chapter 10 concludes the study by first highlighting the key arguments in the 
preceding empirical chapters. It provides the platform for the whole study – spanning 
the entire 40-year period under investigation – to be analysed.  Some of the pertinent 
questions that arise include: what were the changes and continuity throughout this 
period? How might these be explained? What were the key features and factors in the 
15 
Singapore model? What is the Singapore model? It explores if lessons and practices 
from Singapore’s experience can be replicated or adapted in other jurisdictions seeking 
to reform their bureaucracies.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Training, Development and Education: A Framework for Analysing 
Institutional Development  
To address executive training and staff development across 40 years of 
evolution in the Singapore Public Service, this thesis employs the aid of a conceptual 
framework. Executive training and development in the public sector, in particular, 
involves various considerations and dilemmas. The decades under examination – 
almost five, even when contained within the parameters of the Singapore bureaucracy 
in this study – involved a complex interplay of political, societal, economic and civil 
service factors and dynamics. These forces combined in different ways in each of the 
eras to influence the nature of training in the bureaucracy. A conceptual framework 
helps us to identify the focus and how they impact training and development, and 
unpack the different levels of training and development and ways they could be viewed 
to develop in the Singapore Public Service.  
This chapter begins by broadly defining the conceptual terms of ‘training’ and 
‘development’ used across this thesis. Then, through a deeper examination of these 
concepts, key issues of ‘training’ and ‘development’ can be located against the 
backdrop of their respective circumstances during the particular points in time.1 In order 
to help draw out these specific contexts, another dimension of the emerging conceptual 
framework identifies – on the one hand – the periodization of time pertaining to the 
Singapore Public Service, and – on the other hand – the political, societal and 
bureaucratic institutional forces at play. The framework presented at the conclusion of 
this chapter introduces the main analytical themes allowing us to recognize and later 
explain the trajectory of executive training and development influencing the Singapore 
Public Service.  
2.1 Executive Training and Staff Development in the Civil Service 
One of the earliest definitions of training within the public sector context was 
offered by William Torpey: 
Training refers to the process of developing skills, habits, knowledge and 
attitudes in employees for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of 
employees in their present government positions, as well as preparing 
employees for future government positions.2  
The term ’training’ in human resource development, Michael Armstrong pointed out, is 
a response an organization can undertake to promote learning among its employees, in 
1
 McNabb (2010) 230. 
2
 Torpey (1953) 154. 
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order for employees to carry out tasks and responsibilities in its behalf. ‘Learning’ in 
turn is “the process by which a person acquires and develops new knowledge, skills, 
capabilities, beliefs and attitudes.”3 Over time, finer distinctions separated ‘development’ 
and ‘education’ from ‘training’. These distinctions are important because they 
differentiate the types of interventions and levels of investment to equip employees with 
different capacities and work-functions.  
Synthesizing the discourse on the subject, this study adopts the following 
definitions on the key conceptual terms:  
 ‘Training’ refers to the provision of learning to employees, i.e. equipping them with
the knowledge, skills and abilities to carry out their “current responsibilities and
tasks.”4 Training improves individual and organizational capabilities.
 ‘Development’, by comparison, builds up employees’ knowledge, skills and
capacities, with the aim of strengthening the organisation’s general knowledge base,
and preparing employees to think strategically in behalf of the organization.5 The
knowledge, skills and abilities invested in employees as part of ‘development’ may
not necessarily pertain to the current work functions of the employees.
‘Development’, in other words, has a longer term and more strategic orientation than
the focus of ‘training’ on current work functions.
 ‘Education’ refers to the individual’s learning, with the aim of acquiring knowledge,
skills and abilities that can be generalized to different situations and prepare the
individual for new responsibilities in the future. ‘Education’ revolves around the
learning of the individual; in contrast ‘training’ and ‘development’ are concerned with
the needs of the organization. Like ‘development’, ‘education’ prepares for the future,
while ‘training’ aims towards meeting the current needs of the organization.
2.2 Dilemmas of Training in the Public Bureaucracy 
The key issues of training and development in the bureaucracy are succinctly 
summarized in the series of questions raised by the British Centre for Administrative 
Studies in 1963: What should be taught? To whom? By whom? Where? 6 Added to 
these is also: When? While training and staff development prepare staff to better serve 
3
 Michael Armstrong, Armstrong’s Handbook of Strategic Human Resource Management (London: Kogan 
Page, 2011) 249. Also Lynton K.  Caldwell, Improving the Public Service through Training (Washington, 
DC: Agency for International Development, 1962) 15. 
4
 Donald E. Klinger and John Nalbandian, Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003) 240. Also Evan M. Berman et al., Human Resource Management in Public 
Service: Paradoxes, Processes and Problems (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2010) 276. . 
5
 Klinger and Nalbandian (2002) 240-241; Berman et al (2010) 276. 
6
 Lowe (2011) 314. 
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their parent organization, training is not without cost. The opportunity cost of 
employees away on training, rather than attending to the work-functions the 
organization is paying for, compounds the actual costs of engaging trainers, developing 
curriculum and the logistics of delivering training. Training and development thus 
constitute a dilemma to any organization, which has to weigh the costs of training 
against the benefits training can bring to it.   
In the typical bureaucracy, systems of training and development can be 
categorized into three broad stages:  
1. Pre-Service Training, i.e., before a prospective recruit is formally admitted into the
civil service;
2. Induction and In-Service Training, which includes all training activities after an
officer is formally admitted into the civil service;
3. Mid-Career and Leadership Development, where an officer, after several years of
service exhibits leadership potential or is being prepared for greater job
responsibilities, is put through executive or leadership development programmes.
These three stages pose dilemmas in the provision of training in the 
bureaucracy. Before an officer is formally recruited into the bureaucracy, what levels of 
prior education or pre-requisite training is expected? As Caldwell observed, “the better 
the job done in the nation’s schools, colleges and universities, the better the foundation 
for government’s training programmes.”7 Should additional pre-service training be 
deemed necessary, despite prior education, how much general pre-service training will 
be essential – taking into consideration training costs –for the officer to carry out his 
work functions?  
Secondly, what types of in-service training is desired? Who should conduct 
such training, i.e. agencies themselves, central training units, or external providers 
such as universities or consultants? On-the-job training – learning by seeing and doing 
– provides new officers the most immediate learning needed to carry out their jobs.8
Structured training, conversely, caters to learning specialised equipment or procedures. 
While specialised training can be outsourced to external providers, thus reducing the 
costs of maintaining internal capacity, in-house training allows officers to identify with 
the organisation. Centralised training, then, besides offering economies of scale by 
concentrating expertise and standardising knowledge and procedures across the 
7
 Caldwell (1962) 93. 
8
 Torpey (1953) 5; Armstrong (2011) 541-543; Klinger and Nalbandian (2002) 246-247. 
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bureaucracy, also socialises officers to common goals and values, and stronger 
identification with the Public Service.9    
Thirdly, what forms of executive leadership training and senior staff 
development should be given? When, how and by whom should these leadership 
development programmes be conducted?  The importance of senior leadership to steer 
the Public Service presently and into the future, i.e. preparing succession planning, 
sharpens the dilemmas of training and development.10 Executive degree education, 
such as Master in Public Administration or Master in Public Policy, can equip the officer 
identified with strong grounding in administration, policy-making and leadership.11 But 
the high costs concentrated on an individual heighten the question of fiscal prudence; 
the protracted time away, especially in foreign universities, disconnects the individual 
from the operating context. On the other hand, in-house design and delivery of high-
level leadership development programmes requires investment in a staff college and 
dedicated faculty.12 The added advantage of a shared learning experience can forge 
esprit de corps among the leadership cadre and strengthen the sense of identification 
among these leaders with the bureaucracy.13  
Table 2.1 provides a visual summary of the key dilemmas of training and 
development in the bureaucracy as discussed.   
9
 Caldwell’s description of the ‘coordinating’ roles of the central training agency may be limited to 
personnel administration functions without considering the possibility – and actuality – of such agencies 
also carrying out training and development functions. Caldwell (1962) 47-48. 
10
 Armstrong (2011) 556; Klinger and Nalbandian (2002) 245. 
11
 Berman et al (2010) 289.  
12
 Caldwell (1962) 103.  
13
 Klinger and Nalbandian (2002) 245.  
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Table 2.1 Levels of Training and Development in the Bureaucracy 
2.3 Integrating the Dynamics across Institutional Depths and Chronological Span 
Training and development in the bureaucracy does not occur in a vacuum but is 
necessarily influenced by its political, societal and civil service contexts. To locate the 
dilemmas of training and development in proper perspective, the context of institutional 
dynamics and evolution of time impacting on training need to be identified. This study 
uses three levels of institutional analysis, as shown in Table 2.2:  
 The ‘State’ provides the over-arching context, operating as the authorizing
environment and setting the geographical parameters for the jurisdiction. It also
brings into play the values, social concerns and economic make-up of society that
provides the backdrop to the development needs of the bureaucracy. It takes into
account events and dynamics in the broader world outside the borders of the
jurisdiction, such as global or regional economic conditions, or technological
advancements like computerization. More importantly, the ‘State’ identifies the
political élite who, in determining the orientation of the ‘State’, shaped the direction
and character of the bureaucracy, which in turn charted the dynamics affecting its
training. In relation to the subject of training and development thus, the question at
this level is: what were the governance priorities during each period of discussion?
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Table 2.2a Levels of Institutions 
 Secondly, the ‘Bureaucracy’ anchors the objectives and subjects of training and
development within the context of the civil service. The central question of “what to
teach” needs to be preceded and driven by the goals, roles and functions set by the
civil service, and the qualities and competencies the civil servant should hold in
order to carry out these goals and functions.
Table 2.2b Levels of Institutions 
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 Finally, a focus on ‘Training’ indicates how the various civil service schools went
about providing the training to make civil servants relevant to the ‘Bureaucracy’ and
the ‘State’. The direction, and dilemmas, of bureaucratic training can be summed
up in these questions: what to teach, who to teach, when to teach, by whom, and
where?14
Table 2.2c Levels of Institutions 
2.3.1 Spanning across the Chronological Evolution: Periodisation 
With the subject extending over 40 years, dividing the time covered into distinct 
periods enables a more meaningful and closer examination of issues and 
developments. It makes the project more manageable and enables 
compartmentalisation and containment. It also allows for a more detailed exploration of 
the particular circumstances and challenges within each of these identified periods. 
Other administrative historians have effectively used periodization to assist and 
illuminate their analysis of significant institutions. For instance, Rodney Lowe’s Official 
History of the British Civil Service, Volume 1, divided the period from 1966 to 1981 into 
three chronological parts: a background part examining the British bureaucracy from 
the time of Northcote-Trevelyan (1854) to 1950s; an analysis of the ‘reform momentum’ 
culminating in the Fulton Report of 1968; and a third part investigating the many twists 
and turns in the evolution of reform efforts from the Wilson government to the early 
years of Thatcher’s administration. Periodization provides a structure for researchers to 
14
 Lowe (2011) 314. 
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firstly organise their research investigations, and secondly to write a coherent and 
convincing explanation of developments with some detailed focus.    
A more basic and mundane alternative could be to provide a year-by-year linear 
chronology, but such a simple historical evolution would miss the changing contexts 
and political dynamics that shaped the various periods and training initiatives.  Dividing 
the period into distinct phases enables the author to investigate particular 
developments – asking how they came about, who influenced decisions, what 
enthusiasm or resistance was encountered, what the effects of changing political 
developments were, and the effects upon the bureaucracy of the broader society at 
large.  
These periods do not entirely depend on the subjective judgement of the 
administrative historian.  In this study, they are derived from the different institutional 
phases of development of the training function at the centre of the Singapore 
government (see Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3 Spanning Across Chronological Evolution 
1. These periods begin with the Colonial Era from 1819 to 1959;
2. The period 1959 to 1969 witnessed Singapore becoming a self-governing state,
attaining independence and undergoing early state-formation nation-building. This
period also coincided with that of the first local training initiative in the Singapore
Public Service:
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3. The 1970s and 1980s saw Singapore going through rapid economic, infrastructural
and social development; against this background was the advent of a series of
training initiatives in the bureaucracy;
4. The 1990s saw Singapore emerging as a developed economy, a period which also
witnessed evolutions in the bureaucracy’s training institutions culminating in the
establishment of the Civil Service College as a statutory board in 2001.
Each period displayed certain energies and synergies, which then fed into the 
dynamics of the next phase. Sometimes the implication was to build on previous 
progress; at other times there was a sense things had gone badly and that renewed 
efforts were needed or training initiatives had to be taken to new heights. 
Hence, using periodization this study can more appropriately focus on 
subordinate operational questions, such as:  
 what were the context and circumstances that led to the formation of the respective
training initiatives?
 Where did the personnel and staff assigned to these initiatives come from and how
were they organised in these institutes?
 How were the actual training activities carried out in these bodies, what did they
teach, who were the participants that underwent training and what were the effects
of training upon those participants and upon the wider bureaucracy?
 What were the reasons that led to either the periodic closure or reorganisation of
these institutions?
2.3.2 The Intersection of Time and Institutional Contexts 
The administrative history of Singapore and the Singapore bureaucracy’s 
training institutions can be demarcated into four broad periods (see Table 2.4):  
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Table 2.4 Institutional & Time Context of Training in the Singapore Bureaucracy 
Juxtaposing institutional and chronological contexts, allows for the interrogation 
of various dynamics influencing the subject of training and development in each time 
period. Posing the ‘State’-level question of ‘what were the governance priorities and 
needs?’ locates the political contexts in the respective chronological discussion. 
Similarly, asking the ‘Bureaucracy’-level question of ‘what were the main functions of 
civil servants?’ at each of these time-periods reiterates the central context of the 
bureaucracy when examining the respective chronological evolution of the subject of 
training and development. Having set in place these dynamics, we can properly 
contextualize the key questions that serve the subject of training and development in 
this thesis: What to teach, who to teach, what policy and delivery agencies to run 
training and development, when to teach, and where to teach – the main dilemmas of 
training and development in the bureaucracy.  
Table 2.5 brings together the visual representation of the analytic framework 
guiding the collection, reporting and analysis of data for this dissertation.  
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Table 2.5 Thematic Conceptual Framework for the Study 
In essence, this thesis seeks to use a sophisticated framework to explore the 
dynamics of executive development and training in the Singapore Public Service. The 
framework acknowledges the significance of institutional dynamics and leadership 
priorities and needs, and studies these over a detailed chronological timelines.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology and Approach 
This chapter discusses the methodology adopted for this dissertation. It begins 
by locating the study as an administrative history project, because of the suitability of 
the approach to address the research objectives. The discussion moves on to situate 
the project in its qualitative-interpretivist methodology, in view of the reliance on 
archival-text research and oral history interviews. Finally, the chapter sets up the 
specifications for cross-country comparisons to sharpen and locate the features of 
executive development and training in the Singapore Public Service.  
3.1 Administrative History and Qualitative-Interpretivist Methodology 
The thesis uses an administrative history approach because such an institutional, 
descriptive and chronological approach is the best way to achieve the research 
objectives of the study: to explore the role of training in the Singapore Public Service 
over time.  
Authors of several exemplary administrative histories – such as the 19th Century 
British Foreign Office, the Australian National Audit Office, the British Civil Service – 
typically do not begin with a definition.1 But having identified their works as 
administrative histories, they could reasonably expect an interested audience to 
already understand what that means. Others though have offered definitions. An early 
approach adopted by Caldwell stressed that administrative history was a “study of the 
origins or evolution of administrative ideas, institutions and practices”.2 His framework 
was reviewed by Raadschelders as relevant but “incomplete and not entirely clear”.3  
Gladden, Molithor, Garcia Madaria and Tiihonen sought to explain administrative 
history according to the themes through which historians approached the subject: 
leadership and decision making; organization, structures and institutions; functions, 
administrative methods, processes and practices; personnel and functionaries; and 
ideas, theory, doctrines and ideology. But such thematic approaches, Raadschelders 
argued, cannot sufficiently articulate the essence of administrative history.4 Similarly, 
1
 Ray Jones, The Nineteenth Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1971); John Wanna, Christine Ryan and Chew Ng, From Accounting to Accountability: A 
Centenarary History of the Australian National Audit Office (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001); Lowe (2011). 
Also E.N. Gladden, A history of public administration (London: Frank Cass, 1972). 
2
 Lynton K. Caldwell, “The relevance of administrative history,” International Review of Administrative 
Sciences 21.3 (1955): 455.   
3
 Jos Raadschelders, Handbook of Administrative History (New Brunswick, London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998) 6.  
4
 Ibid 7. 
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Wettenhall’s definition of administrative history as the application of historical method to 
the study of administrative affairs5 pointed more to the topic of the methodology than 
explaining the subject per se.   
In seeking to construct an accurate definition, Raadschelders related 
administrative history with component concepts of public administration: structure 
(organization), functioning (processes) and functionaries: “the study of structures and 
processes in and ideas about government as they have existed or have been desired 
in the past and the actual and ideal place of public functionaries therein.” 6 Not satisfied 
with this articulation, he added ‘societal context’ into the mix. Comprehensive as it may 
be, this rather cumbersome definition did not provide an easy explanation of 
administrative history.  
Ten years later, Raadschelders offered a simple working definition of 
administrative history: the study of the structure and functioning of government, the 
interaction between society and government, and ideas about government-in-society.7 
By charting the nature and evolution of organisational goals, structures, staffing and 
functions of the training agencies within the Singapore bureaucracy, administrative 
history draws out the relationships and dynamics with the broader bureaucracy and the 
society at large. 
Qualitative research methodology was chosen for this study because it helps to 
explore issues such as why certain decisions were taken, to what effects, what 
changes were made by ministers, by the civil service and its training providers.  In 
particular, the study relies on an interpretivist approach because, when drawing on 
archival research and oral history interviews, it locates the meaning-making practices 
of human actors.8 This strategy is considered particularly relevant for researching the 
bureaucracy, as McNabb pointed out, “Interpretive research is important for the study 
of government organisations and agencies.”9 Bureaucracies are not just faceless 
entities but made up of many people whose beliefs, values and interests drive and 
shape the actions and decisions stemming from these agencies. In understanding the 
evolution of training in a large government organisation over time, Rhodes further 
validated “an interpretive approach constructs the meaning of social actions by 
                                                          
5
 R.L. Wettenhall, “The challenge of administrative history: an Australian perspective,” Colony to Coloniser , 
eds. J.J. Eddy & J.R. Nethercote (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1987) 15. 
6
 Raadschelders (1998) 7.  
7
 Raadschelders (2008) 2.  
8
 Dvora Yanow, “Qualitative-Interpretive Methods in Policy Research,” Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: 
Theory, Politics and Methods, eds. Frank Fischer, Gerald Miller and Mara Sidney (Boca Raton: CRC 
Press, 2006) 406.  
9
 McNabb (2010) 229. 
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recovering other people’s stories.”10 Their own interpretations and beliefs were 
important phenomena to recount and study. Further,  
Interpretivism encompasses a broad stance toward research, rather than a 
preference or predilection for word data, as opposed to numbers; it responds 
more to positivism than specifically to quantitative analysis. That is, analysis of 
numbers occurs in interpretive research, but looks different rather than carried 
out in a positivist approach.”11  
Interpretivism notes the possibilities of other methodologies, and their potential benefits, 
to explore the subject matter. Indeed, “no single approach – even if accorded the highly 
positive label science – is adequate for the conduct of research in public 
administration.”12 This study, even when it is the first to explore civil service training in 
Singapore, is only among many others to come, all contributing to the ‘diversity of 
approaches’ seeking to expand the field of public administration in Singapore. 
This study has employed a combination of extensive archival research and 
élite/non-élite oral interviews. Government records and officials serving during the 
various periods under investigation represent a rich lode of information. This study thus 
emulates Rhodes in “collecting data about beliefs and practices, including historical 
archives, textual analysis of official documents, biographies, oral histories, recorded 
interviews and informal conversations… to provide a ‘thick description’”.13 The following 
provides further detail on the specific approaches adopted to conduct archival research 
and interviews. 
 
3.2 Archival Research 
Government documents are one of the most credible sources of information on 
government policy-making. Government-decisions, especially those with broad national 
implications, are generally recorded for accountability and to guide policy-
implementation across the levels of governments. Historian Kwa Chong Guan pointed 
out that government documents, as evidence, ground narratives reconstructing the 
past as objective and credible because “they are records of transactions completed, 
responsibilities discharged and as such records of accountability.”14   
                                                          
10
 R.A.W. Rhodes, “Frank Stacey Memorial Lecture 2008: Scenes from the Departmental Court,” Public 
Policy and Administration 24.4 (2009): 438.  
11
 Mara S. Sidney, “Critical perspectives on the city: constructivist, interpretive analysis of urban politics,” 
Critical urban studies: new directions, eds. Jonathan S. Davies and David L. Imbroscio (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2010) 30.  
12
 White and Adams, quoted in McNabb (2010) 230. Italics as original. 
13
 Ibid 438. 
14
 Kwa Chong Guan and Ho Chi Tim, “Archival Records in the Writing of Singapore History: A Perspective 
from the Archives,” The Makers & Keepers of Singapore History, eds. Loh Kah Seng and Liew Kai Khiun 
(Singapore: Ethos Books and Singapore Heritage Society, 2010) 53.  
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3.2.1 Singapore Archival Sources 
The National Archives of Singapore (NAS), as custodian of the records of the 
Singapore government, has a huge collection of official files from government agencies 
deposited with it. Although the National Heritage Board Act stipulates that government 
records more than 25 years old become “public archives” for reasons of security and 
policy sensitivity, unfortunately many of these records still have restricted public 
access.15 Rather than the deluge of information overwhelming Lowe when working on 
British government records, researchers of Singapore history and government 
generally faced difficulties in accessing archival records.16 Unlike the United States, 
Britain or Australia, Singapore does not have legislation providing for freedom of 
information requests. Nevertheless, with the passage of time and changing 
circumstances, the classifications of some Singapore official files have been reviewed 
and some records have been made available for specific research projects.17  
Such precedence aside, this project consciously seeks to avoid the limitations 
of archival access by adopting several strategies. Defining the scope of the thesis on 
staff training, arguably a topic that has little security or policy-sensitivities, aims to ease 
access to relevant government records. To further facilitate archival access, this study 
adjourns in 2001. In part a reorganisation of the Civil Service College at that time 
provides a timely break. But this also aims to assure archival authorities that more 
recent material, which could be deemed more sensitive, was not sought. This strategy 
has rewarded the author with access to some Civil Service College records. These 
documents were particularly useful in appreciating the high-level of thinking and 
planning leading to the inception of the Civil Service College, and the condition 
requiring no verbatim citation did not prevent the writer from paraphrasing the contents.  
While official records may not be readily available, a mine of official information 
can still be found from government publications in the public domain. Both Singapore’s 
National Library and the National University of Singapore Library retained large 
collections of government publications, such as the Singapore Annual Report (SAR) 
series, continued as the Singapore Year Book after independence, Singapore 
Legislative Assembly Debates (SLAD), succeeded after 1965 by the Singapore 
                                                          
15
 Republic of Singapore, “National Heritage Board Act, 1993,” Government Gazette, Acts Supplement, 14 
May 1993, para 2.  
16
 Lowe (2011) 2 and 12. Loh and Liew (2010) contained frustrations by several researchers in accessing 
government records lodged with NAS. Kwa and Ho (2010), although “in no way reflective of the views of 
the National Archives of Singapore” represented a perspective from NAS.  
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 For example, files from the Prime Minister’s Office at NAS were made available for Albert Lau to write A 
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Academic Press, 1998). See p. vi.  
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Parliamentary Debates, and others. A particularly important source of information on 
the organisational structure of the Public Service is the Singapore Establishment Staff 
List (SESL), continued as the Establishment List after independence. Annual reports of 
government agencies such as the Public Service Commission and training institutes, 
and periodicals such as Bakti and Management Development published by the Political 
Study Centre and the Staff Training Institute respectively, also offered insights into the 
dynamics of these training endeavours. 
 
3.2.2 Overseas Archival Sources 
As several Singapore researchers pointed out, limited access in NAS need not 
paralyse research: “By cross-checking and juxtaposing sources from multiple 
repositories, one could still piece together a relatively coherent picture of the historical 
episode.”18  
Britain’s The National Archives (TNA), for one, has progressively de-classified 
records pertaining to Singapore. As UK was the colonial ruler over the island, files from 
the Colonial Office (CO) were pertinent for understanding the colonial bureaucracy, 
including its organisational character and issues such as localisation (also known as 
Malayanisation in Singapore and Malaya). Given that Britain maintained diplomatic and 
military presence after Singapore’s decolonisation, the author harboured expectations 
that files from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence could 
offer insightful information. But these files provided more background reference, from 
details of UK-Singapore relations for example, and were not directly relevant to the 
central theme of civil service training in this study.  
Similarly, Australia’s long diplomatic and military presence in Singapore led to 
expectations that records of Australia’s Departments of External Affairs and Defence 
lodged at the National Archives of Australia would avail useful data. However, while 
some files did inform on the flows of Australian-Singapore relations and Australia’s 
provision of various assistance to the fledgling country, not much was found on training 
of the Singapore Public Service.  
The UK National Archives is also a useful source for researching official records 
on training within Britain’s bureaucracy. In particular, material informing on the 
circumstances and considerations leading to the various training milestones such as 
the Assheton Committee on Training of Civil Servants, Centre for Administrative 
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 S.R. Joey Long, “Making and Keeping the History of the US Involvement in Singapore,” Makers & 
Keepers of Singapore History, eds. Loh and Liew (2010) 154. Also Ang Cheng Guan, “Writing Diplomatic 
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Studies and the (British) Civil Service College. These were relevant material, as by 
tracing the development of training in the British Civil Service, it provided the British  
bureaucracy as one basis for comparison with the Singapore Public Service.  
TNA is also a source for research on Hong Kong, for comparison with 
Singapore’s training schools. As Britain was the colonial master of Hong Kong, and 
until as recent as 1997, this writer was anticipating more official records to be found at 
TNA. Unfortunately, archival records pertaining to the training of civil servants in Hong 
Kong cannot be located.  Nevertheless, a field trip to the Public Records Office of Hong 
Kong, the territory’s official archives,19 and the Hong Kong Civil Service Training and 
Development Institute did provide some material that can inform on developments in 
bureaucratic training since 1997.    
 
3.2.3 Newspapers as Primary Sources 
Reports in the newspapers during the period in question also constitute a major 
primary source. While some newspapers might have particular editorial slants, their 
reliance on basic credibility for readership and revenue meant that leading newspapers 
can be counted upon for objective reporting of facts in key events. This provides a 
source of corroborating evidence for other sources, including government records, and 
can even elaborate upon these other sources by providing additional information.  
Editorials and opinion pieces in the media also offered a useful source of 
sentiments among the population at that time. Besides treating newspaper reportage 
as ‘event evidence’, as Yanow pointed out, editorial columns “might be read for a 
sense of time – of how people responded at that time to particular events or ideas.”20 In 
this regard, a useful news media source will be The Straits Times, the oldest 
established broadsheet with an uninterrupted publication – save for the Japanese 
Occupation – in Singapore. Other newspapers during the respective periods, including 
the Singapore Standard, were also reviewed for relevant information.  
 
3.3 Oral History and Élite /Non-élite Interviews 
While the value of oral history interviews may not be held in the same regard as 
official records, these interviewees can be important witnesses to a stage of history. In 
approaching history, as Wanna et al. pointed out, these actors should be allowed to 
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 Hong Kong, Government Records Service, “Public Records Office,” Web 6 Oct 2011, 
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speak for themselves as much as possible, to provide eye-witness accounts of the 
events and sentiments of the period, but their claims should be checked and 
triangulated for reliability as far as possible.21 As a long-time oral history archivist 
cautioned, oral history sources need to be interrogated through three filters: oral 
sources are the past as seen by the interviewees; oral sources are the past as 
interpreted by the interviewer; and oral sources are the past as understood by the 
listener or reader.22  
The 2,000 oral history interviews with civil servants by NAS, under the project 
‘The Civil Service – A Retrospective’ were useful in corroborating and elaborating 
official records.23 In view of security and policy sensitivities and also personal and 
family privacy, many of these interviews had long been restricted from public access. 
With the passage of time, some of these concerns have been superseded while other 
interviewees have recognised the value of opening up access to their oral history. The 
passing of some first-generation civil servants has also led their families to review and 
open access to their oral history transcripts. 
Beside the preceding oral histories, new interviews with senior public officers 
involved with the bureaucracy’s training schools were conducted for this thesis. NAS 
oral history project with civil servants was undertaken several years ago, and some of 
the public officers who played instrumental parts in more recent periods were not 
included.24 The purpose of these interviews was to draw upon as-yet untapped sources 
and, through integrating multiple perspectives, develop a holistic and detailed 
description of the events and dynamics pertaining to executive development and 
training of the Singapore Public Service.25  
In selecting interview subjects, a key criterion was identifying ‘privileged 
witnesses’ in order to extract information as sources for the study.26 Most of these 
interview subjects were listed in various documentary sources, in many instances 
containing official designations, altogether making them desirable informants. A 
consideration was the positions they held and roles they played that had an impact on 
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 Wanna, Ryan and Ng (2001) x-xi.  
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 Lily Tan, “Archival Strategies for Oral Sources in Southeast Asia: Southeast Asia’s Forgotten History,” 
Reflections and Interpretations (Singapore: National Archives of Singapore, 2005) 35.  
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 Robert S. Weiss, Learning from Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview Studies (New 
York and Toronto: Free Press, 1994) 9-10. 
26
 Ibid 17 and 19. 
        
 
34 
 
the developments of the various training schools. While the aim was not to concentrate 
on interviewing élites only, the deep impact of decisions by senior officials on the 
training schools, and their knowledge into the workings of the bureaucracy, 
necessitated interviewing officials who held senior positions.27 Efforts were also made 
to interview officers at the staff level: apart from gleaning details on the schools’ 
operation, non-élite actors could offer glimpses to responses by rank-and-file towards 
top-down decisions in the bureaucracy. These interviews also pulled out aspects of 
informal organisation which erstwhile may not be documented in official records, such 
as informal goals, informal organisational structure, and adaptation in activities.  
Prospective interview subjects were approached with emails stating the 
objective and scope of the study, the importance of their participation in informing the 
study, and assuring them that information shared would be safeguarded and treated 
with sensitivity.28 To expand the number of interviewees, a ‘snowballing technique’ was 
adopted, asking each interview subject to recommend several more key individuals 
who may be able to assist with information.  To temper against security and policy 
sensitivities, interview subjects were assured that the scope of interviews was 
restricted to the subject of training alone and until the period of 2001. The 10 year time 
lapse also allowed them the time to reflect and locate their recollections, though this 
may result in retrospective rationalisation which could limit objectivity.  
 
3.4 Memoirs and Commemorative Publications 
In the past few years, several retired civil servants have published memoirs 
shedding light on developments in the Singapore Public Service.29 At least two 
government agencies have compiled recollections of their officers into publications of 
organisational ‘war-tales’.30 In recent times, several government bodies have produced 
celebratory publications, including the Public Service Commission. While these can 
simply be dismissed as ‘coffee-table books’, they still have their impact, as noted by 
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Scott and Wanna.31 Notwithstanding their celebratory slants, these offer insights into 
the workings of the respective departments of the Public Service publications. With 
training playing a significant role in the bureaucracy, nuggets of information may be 
drawn from these emerging sources.  
 
3.5 Cross Country Comparisons 
 To locate and sharpen the features of training initiatives in the Singapore Public 
Service, comparisons were made with training schools in other jurisdictions. To make 
for meaningful analysis, models for comparisons that shared similar backgrounds and 
characteristics with Singapore were identified: British colonial background, Westminster 
parliamentary model of government, and a bureaucracy that does not intervene in the 
political realm and is known to be efficient and incorruptible.  
Such specifications preclude comparison with some better-known institutions 
for one reason or another: the Australia New Zealand School of Government 
(ANZSOG)32, Canada School of Public Service (CSPS), France’s Ecole Nationale d’ 
Administration (ENA)33, Malaysia’s National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN)34, 
even UK’s Civil Service College in view of Britain’s much larger geographical size than 
Singapore. Nevertheless, as some of these were held as benchmarks of bureaucratic 
training, ‘the holy grail of training’ as Rhodes attested to the ENA35, references where 
appropriate will be made with these foreign civil service schools. 
A more appropriate benchmark for direct comparison is Hong Kong, which 
shared with Singapore similar British colonial background, compact jurisdictional size, 
unitary-structure of government and reputation of efficient and relatively clean 
                                                          
31
 Joanne Scott and John Wanna, “Trajectories of public administration and administrative history in 
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bureaucracy.36  More direct comparison was made with Hong Kong the Civil Service 
Training and Development Institute (CSTDI) .37 There are other small former British 
colonies with Westminster styles of government and relatively professional 
bureaucracies, such as Barbados, Botswana, Ireland, and New Zealand.38 But their 
locations, entire oceans and continents away from Singapore, together with the diverse 
cultural and contextual contrasts, complicate meaningful comparisons. Besides, limited 
funding and specific timeframes for completing this dissertation prevented every 
potential jurisdiction being investigated in detail. In any case, the purpose of 
comparison was not an end in itself but to draw out the characteristics of Singapore 
Public Service’s training institutes, the focus of this study.  
In sum, in chronicling the evolution of Singapore’s civil service training initiatives, 
constant comparisons will be made with similar developments in Hong Kong and other 
countries where appropriate. The context, formation, objectives, organisational 
structures, training activities, curriculum, participants, and challenges will constitute the 
main thrust of the narrative. The intent was not to devote attention to recording or 
analysing these events per se. Rather, the purpose of examining these events 
overseas was to contrast with developments in Singapore’s evolution, thereby 
sharpening the similarities and peculiarities in the training bodies of the Singapore 
Public Service.   
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3.6 Merits and Limitations of Sources 
 The limitations of this strategy must also be acknowledged. Government official 
records may not be fully frank or readily available, particularly those from more recent 
years, in view of possible policy or operational relevance to the present period. The 
relevance of archival records from foreign countries, such as those of Britain and 
Australia, also diminishes with the scaling back of their presence and influence in the 
years following Singapore’s independence. Official sources can often focus on the 
official version of history and not include accounts of what really happened or why 
decisions were taken.  
Oral history interviews and memoirs may have varying degrees of inaccuracy 
because of the dilution of memories and post-event rationalisation. While the use of 
English language in oral history and recollections may not draw out the voices of those 
not educated in English or the illiterate in other projects, the use of English as a 
working language in the Singapore Public Service frees this thesis from that potential 
limitation.  
Notwithstanding the limitations discussed, all sources which were available 
were pursued to address the research questions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Neglect? The Origins of Singapore’s Administration and Administrative 
Training prior to Self-Government (1819 – 1959) 
When the British laid claim to Singapore in 1819, the intention was not merely 
to seize the island as an end; the goal in appropriating Singapore was to exploit its 
strategic location as a base to stage colonial expeditions into the Far East. The brief to 
the bureaucracy set up to administer the island-base was singular, as will be seen in 
this background chapter: to maintain the island as a colonial base at minimal operating 
cost. This directive shaped the character of the bureaucracy, and ensured that training 
would never feature as a priority.  
Chapter 4 is not a full exposition of Singapore’s colonial administration, but 
frames subsequent discussion. This overview of Singapore’s colonial administration 
begins with the periods 1819 – 1867 when Singapore was ruled by the East India 
Company and 1867 – 1942 when it was transferred to the United Kingdom Colonial 
Office. The over-arching directive from the métropole to the bureaucracy in Singapore 
was to maintain the island as a colonial base at minimal operating costs. Training in the 
bureaucracy was not a priority. After the Japanese Occupation (1942 – 1945), the late 
colonial period (1945 – 1959) saw various administrative reforms, including training. 
But with the British seeking to retain UK authority over the island, training in the local 
bureaucracy was not a priority. In 1959, Singapore was elevated to a complete self-
governing state.  
4.1 Administration by the East India Company: 1819 – 1867 
In 1819, Stamford Raffles claimed Singapore for the British East India Company, 
to exploit the island’s strategic location as a base to stage colonial expeditions into 
China. As a commercial enterprise aimed at maximizing profit, administration was not a 
priority.1 To keep costs low, the EIC maintained “the minimum administrative 
infrastructure necessary for the promotion of economic activities.”2  Whether Singapore 
was reporting to Penang after the 1826 formation of the Straits Settlements, or the EIC 
headquarters in Calcutta after 1832, the EIC while using Singapore to expand its 
empire in the region, kept the bureaucracy small.3 The India Office, taking over the 
Settlements after the EIC’s abolition in 1858, continued to curtail the size of 
1
 Seah Chee Meow, “The Civil Service,” Government and Politics in Singapore, eds. Quah, Chan and 
Seah (1987) 96; Quah (2010) 26. 
2
 Seah (1971) 4-5. See also Turnbull (2009) 34 & 54. 
3
 C.M. Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, 1826 - 67: Indian Presidency to Crown Colony (London: 
University of London, 1972) Ch. 2. 
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administration. “Between 1830 and 1867,” Lennox Mills summed up, “the history of the 
Civil Service in the Straits Settlements resolved itself largely into a struggle between 
the local administration to increase and the Government of India still further to 
decrease, the existing staff.”4  
The EIC used the phrase “civil service” to distinguish its civilian employees from 
those in the Company’s military, maritime and ecclesiastical establishments.5 There 
were two types of civil servants: covenanted and uncovenanted officers. Covenanted 
civil servants were recruited from England, after securing the nomination of a director 
of the EIC and signing a ‘covenant of faithful service.’ In 1826, there were just 14 
covenanted officers in the Straits Settlements, only three of whom served in Singapore, 
reflecting the EIC’s persistence in keeping administration small.6  
Although covenanted recruits were originally put through two years of training at 
the EIC’s school at Haileybury, essentially pre-service training, the prevailing belief was 
that formal training – even subsequently in-service – was unnecessary.7 An English 
university education was deemed sufficient in preparing EIC officers to administer the 
colonies. Indeed, after Haileybury’s closure in 1855, covenanted officers were drawn 
from university graduates without any pre-service administrative training. While officers 
upon arrival in India did study local languages, this was not compulsory for those 
destined for the Straits Settlements.  Training for civil servants in the Settlements, like 
counterparts in India, was on-the-job:  
On arrival … the young civilian [officer] is always put at first under a man who 
will look after him, and train him in the ways in which he should go. …. The 
young civilian must remember from that start that the training which he receives 
from others is of little importance compared with the training which is obtained 
by the simple process of keeping his eyes and ears open.8 
For most civil servants in the Straits Settlements, “information regarding native laws 
and customs was gradually acquired in the course of duty.”9 Local studies were left “to 
individual initiative with no material inducement or reward.”10 This meant that most 
English civil servants were barely fluent in the Malay language and few learnt the 
Chinese vernacular tongues.  
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 Lennox Mills, British Malaya, 1824 – 67 (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1961) 107. 
5
 Blunt (1937) 1ff.  
6
 Mills (1961) 104; Turnbull (1972) 74; Robert Heussler, British Rule in Malaya: The Malayan Civil Service 
and Its Predecessors, 1867 – 1942 (Oxford: Clio Press, 1981) 24.  
7
 Blunt (1937) 35; Mills (1961) 111 
8
 Blunt (1937) 201 and 205.  
9
 Mills (1961) 112.  
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 Turnbull (1972) 75. Also Robert Tilman, Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya (Durham: Duke University 
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Morale was low, as the Settlements was not an attractive posting. The dearth of 
covenanted officers qualified to deal with local issues resulted in the need to recruit 
uncovenanted civil servants from among local European and Eurasian communities.11 
Uncovenanted officers were recruited for their local knowledge and administrative 
usefulness but were subordinate to covenanted officers and had poorer salaries and 
service conditions than covenanted officers.  
With both the East India Company and the India Office focused on maintaining 
Singapore as a base at minimal costs, the island’s infrastructure soon fell out of 
synchrony with its growth. As Seah Chee Meow pointed out, “Good administration 
could not be sustained by an incredibly small budget.”12 The local administration, 
under-staffed and demoralized, allowed municipal amenities to become poorly 
maintained even as commerce and population expanded rapidly. These, in part, 
contributed towards the campaign by European merchants in Singapore to petition 
against the administration of the island from India. As Mary Turnbull observed, the 
petition to transfer the Straits Settlements from India “made no specific complaints 
about the Company’s civil service, but many of the deficiencies of Indian administration 
stemmed from the shortcomings of the bureaucracy”.13 By 1867, Singapore and the 
Straits Settlements were transferred from the India Office to the direct rule of the 
Colonial Office in London. 
 
4.2 Colonial Administration in the Crown Colony: 1867 – 1942 
 As a Crown Colony ruled by the Colonial Office in London, Singapore’s role 
remained as a base for Britain’s Far Eastern empire and the character of the 
administration in Singapore unaltered.14 The remit to the local colonial bureaucracy on 
the island continued to be maintaining a stable political and social environment, at the 
lowest possible operating cost, to serve the security of the Singapore base. Seah, in 
his study, observed that the British in their colonial rule spent very little on the social 
development of Singapore; their focus was on building up a Singapore as a bastion of 
the métropole’s broader empire.15   
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 Mills (1961) 115.  
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 Seah (1987) 96. 
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 Turnbull (1972) 85. 
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 Lee Boon Hiok (1980) 437 suggested that the impetus for transfer among Singapore’s mercantile 
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The highest administrative authority in Singapore was the Governor and the 
Executive Council he presided over. While there was a Legislative Council, without the 
assent or veto over bills introduced by the Governor, it was not a law-making body as 
commonly found in other jurisdictions. As the Governor and the Executive Council 
members were officers of the Colonial Office, British civil servants effectively governed 
Singapore.   
In 1869, the Colonial Office established a dedicated Straits Settlements Civil 
Service, separate from the Indian Civil Service, but the difficulties in attracting officers 
to serve in the Settlements persisted.16 Even after entrance examinations replaced the 
nomination-patronage system of recruitment dating back to the EIC days, cadets who 
excelled at the examinations preferred the Home and Indian civil services. In 1904, the 
Straits Settlements bureaucracy was renamed the Malayan Civil Service (MCS), 
acknowledging the British consolidation of authority across the peninsula. The creation 
of a unified colonial civil service in 1934 finally allowed the posting of recruits to any 
parts of the British Empire, including less attractive posts like Malaya. The Malayan 
Establishment Office in turn was set up to deploy officers across the peninsula, 
including Singapore. The sum of these policies contributed to the emergence of a 
distinct MCS as precursor to the modern Singapore Civil Service.17  
The Malayan Civil Service, ironically, was not opened to local Malayans. Cadets 
were required to be “natural-born British subjects of pure European descent on both 
sides”.18 Rather than harness the growing number of local inhabitants who attained 
tertiary education to the task of governance, separate schemes of service were created 
to stave off complaints of discrimination.19 Even then, local schemes of service were 
subordinate to the European-only MCS, with salary scales substantially lower than 
European officers because, according to the official justification: “Malaya is not a 
suitable country for the ‘poor white’; unless a European can earn a wage on which he is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
only 13% on social services.  Quah (1996) 290 added that the colonial bureaucracy was so focused on 
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able to live decently as a European should, he merely brings discredit and contempt 
upon the European community.”20 
 
4.2.1 Training in the Colonial Bureaucracy 
Such belief in the superiority of the European race, particularly the English 
cultural background, defined the qualities sought in the colonial civil servant: “strength 
of character, readiness to accept responsibility, care for the people whom the 
administrator was serving, albeit at times rather autocratically”.21 Recruits were drawn 
from graduates of British universities. The assumption, in the Colonial Service but also 
held by the British Civil Service,  was that a liberal arts education would provide any 
Englishman with sufficient foundation to administer natives in the colonies.  
The pattern of informal on-the-job training continued. New civil servants learned 
from more experienced officers the local customs and practices, as they adjusted to 
their duties.22 When the Colonial Office decided in 1909 that training was needed for 
recruits to the African Administrative Service, this did not extend to other colonial 
bureaucracies. 23  
Only in 1932 were all Colonial Service probationers provided with formal 
training, by means of a Colonial Administrative Service course, which was more 
academic than vocational. Veterans who had served in Malaya, and favoured 
maximum preparatory training prior to recruits taking up positions in country, did not 
find these training schemes beneficial. On the whole, learning on-the-job in situ 
continued to be regarded as more pertinent. “Even the C.O. [Colonial Office] itself took 
a somewhat patronising view of the lectures.”24  
In the 123 years of British rule prior to the Japanese invasion, Singapore was 
viewed by the métropole as a base for the extension of her Empire. The priority for the 
local administration was to maintain Singapore as a base at the lowest possible cost. 
The belief in the superiority of English cultural and educational background meant that 
the Englishmen needed no prior training to administer over the natives. Training for 
British civil servants in Singapore during this period was largely on-the-job.     
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4.3 Administrative Developments under the Japanese Occupation: 1942 – 1945 
The Japanese 70-day rout of the British through Malaya was such a piercing 
stab into the body politic that the colonial administration never recovered post-war. In 
the meantime, a Japanese-installed Municipal Administration staffed by Japanese 
civilian officials succeeded pre-war antecedent-departments in local governance.25  
The Japanese intended to staff the Occupational civil service with their own, 
surmising that “many natives were incapable of administrative duties.”26 But with the 
Japanese Empire stretching across Asia, few qualified Japanese were left to assume 
all the senior positions in Singapore. In reality, many of these posts were staffed by 
lower ranking Japanese officials, or even Taiwanese and Koreans from Japanese 
colonies.27 Lower down the hierarchy, local rank-and-file civil servants were ordered 
back to resume their posts. One writer observed that the Japanese generals were 
“more familiar with the art of war than of public administration.”28 Turnbull noted that a 
shortage of senior administrators resulted in positions being filled by “inexperienced 
men with inferior caliber”.29 To worsen matters, within the 3½ years of Occupation, 
Singapore witnessed five administrators.  
The inexperienced and weakened administration fuelled the deteriorating 
wartime socio-economic dislocation. Shortage of staples coupled with non-existent 
economic planning led to spiraling inflation and black markets. The Japanese 
suppression of civil servants’ pay in a bid to reduce expenditure had the perverse effect 
of leading many civil servants to levy commission for services and participate in black 
marketeering.30  
Any evaluation of the Japanese Occupation vis-à-vis the bureaucracy must take 
into account the endemic corruption among civil servants, which was especially 
destructive upon the bureaucracy’s institutional ethos. But the British defeat eroded the 
pre-war deference among local officers towards colonial authority, contributing to the 
rise of post-war nationalism.31 
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4.4 Post-War Developments: 1945 – 1955 
 The British Military Administration (BMA) set up after their return in 1945 further 
undermined British colonial authority in Singapore. To be fair, the BMA faced immense 
challenges in restoring a civilian government: chronic overcrowding, diseases, law and 
order. A sampling of the administrative capacity to deal with these problems can be 
gained from Turnbull’s comments about the police force: badly equipped and untrained, 
ill-disciplined and corrupt, and generally hated by the public. But the Japanese legacy 
of “corruption of public and private integrity” persisted during BMA, evident in the 
“flourishing gambling dens and brothels … resurgence of opium smoking, universal 
profiteering, and bribery”.32 When its six-month mandate expired, the acronym BMA 
had become Black Market Administration to the local population. If Britain’s defeat at 
the hands of the Japanese exposed the hollowness of her colonial authority, BMA’s 
incompetence and corruption emptied any moral premise on which Britain could hope 
to resurrect her pre-war empire.  
With the return to civilian rule in 1946, Britain attempted to reassert her colonial 
rule over Singapore to the status quo antebellum. The Malayan Union scheme had 
detached Singapore from the Malay peninsular, ostensibly offering Singapore a more 
liberal constitution. But concessions for the election of local representatives into the 
Legislative Council were negated by the negligible powers conferred them and limiting 
voters to a small British-subject minority. In reality, the constitutional ‘liberalization’ was 
window dressing for Singapore’s separation from Malaya, which was destined for more 
rapid constitutional progress. Britain’s oblique aim was to strengthen its control and 
exploitation of Singapore’s strategic location as the hub of her post-war Far Eastern 
imperial defence.33  
The constitutional separation from Malaya detached Singapore-specific 
departments from the pre-war Malaya-wide bureaucracy. On the one hand, this 
contributed towards a more distinct Singapore civil service (see Table 4.1). However, in 
the name of policy coherence across Singapore and Malaya, 11 pan-Malayan 
departments retained jurisdiction that included Singapore. More importantly, the 
Malayan Establishment Office continued to manage senior personnel appointments 
across Malaya and Singapore.34 Although the Colonial Office directed that post-war  
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Table 4.1: Colony of Singapore Government, 1946-1955 35 
 
                                                          
35
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public services “must to the greatest extent be staffed by local people”36 the Malayan 
Establishment returned to the pre-war practice of reserving senior positions for 
Europeans, denying local officers access to the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. 
The élite Administrative Service scheme in particular continued to be European only 
and denied to local officers. The British government continued to take the view that 
colonial outposts were sinecures (i.e., employment sites, for its élite governing class). 
Discrimination in staffing the bureaucracy was persisting on grounds that locals lacked 
“standards of conduct and moral values, which are productive of impartiality and 
integrity, a high sense of duty and service, sympathy and understanding”.37 
However, such a return to discriminatory staffing was no longer tolerated by 
local civil servants. In 1947, some local officers petitioned the colonial government for 
wartime back-pay similar to those granted to British colleagues.38 The government 
responded by setting up various committees, ostensibly to review specific issues. But 
the authorities selectively accepted recommendations favourable to them while 
rejected those sympathetic to local officers. Nevertheless, from among these, the 
Commission chaired by Harry Trusted, a British judge, standardised the erstwhile 
diverse schemes of services and various grades into four divisions:  
Division 1 were administrative and professional officers with high qualifications; 
Division 2 contained officers whose qualifications fell short of those in Division 1; 
Division 3 comprised officers holding secondary school education; and  
Division 4 contained the manual workers such as postmen, peons, etc.39 
 
Local senior officers were also re-organised at Trusted’s suggestion into the 
Higher Services Scheme, allowing them entry into Malayan Establishment positions.40 
For the first time, local officers broke the monopoly of European officers over senior 
echelons positions. However, only 14 local officers were admitted into the élite 
Administrative Service, which topped the Division 1 hierarchy of the bureaucracy.41  
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The Trusted Commission also suggested creating a Public Service Commission 
(PSC) to handle personnel matters of civil servants in Malaya.42 Following 
endorsement from a Legislative Council committee, a Singapore PSC independent of 
the Malayan Establishment Office was set up in 1951. The creation of the Singapore 
PSC transferred control of the island’s bureaucracy from the Malayan Establishment 
Office to the government in Singapore, a critical step towards subsequent localisation.  
 
4.4.1 Reforms in Training 
The training of civil servants also benefitted from the wave of reforms though 
training reforms spun out of a drive to re-impose Britain’s colonial empire. British 
wartime soul searching had blamed the loss of her Far Eastern empire partly on the 
lack of proper training among her officials.43 Ralph Furse, a senior official within the 
Colonial Office, argued that the existing system of on-the-spot training was inadequate 
for the post-war setting: “Gone … are the days when the most obvious task of the 
administrator was to redress wrongs and to relieve suffering.” 44 The problems of 
colonial development were increasingly sophisticated, expanding to include finance 
and economic planning, labour relations, social welfare and land use. Not to be 
overlooked were longstanding American objections to Britain’s plans to restore her 
colonial empire post war, and the needs of colonial civil servants operating “under the 
critical gaze of a much more vociferous and more sensitive international world”. 45  
Furse recommended a three stage training scheme spanning four years for all 
Administrative Officers of the Colonial Service. A Preliminary Course, providing cadets 
with a background of their work, would cover Colonial History, Colonial Systems of 
Government, Tropical Hygiene, native languages, and anthropology “with special 
reference to the mentality of primitive peoples.”46 A two-year Apprenticeship followed, 
where the young officer would work under the mentorship of a senior officer in the field, 
to acquire an understanding of the local context he was serving in. The third stage, 
what Furse called the Second Course, would help officers who have served five to 
seven years understand the Colonial Office’s policies across Britain’s colonies.  
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Furse’s recommendation was only partially taken up by a committee chaired by 
the Duke of Devonshire.47  While the Devonshire Committee, which comprised 
representatives from the universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London, agreed that 
pre-war training was “almost totally inadequate,”48 striking the balance between 
classroom-learning and learning in situ was not simple. Ultimately, limited funding and 
urgency to staff large number of vacant posts with the end of the war weighed against 
Furse’s full training scheme.  
The resultant Devonshire courses nevertheless introduced formal training into 
the Colonial Service bureaucracy. The First Devonshire Course (or A Course) in 1946 
sought to “enable candidates from the Colonial Dependencies to reach the standard at 
which they can be considered on equal terms with candidates from this country [Britain] 
and the Dominions, for selection for appointments to the higher grades of the Colonial 
Service.”49 Recruits underwent a one year programme in either Cambridge or Oxford 
universities, covering anthropology, economics, law and colonial administration.50 The 
Second Devonshire Course (B Course) provided mid-career officers with seven months 
of training through seminars and research guided by faculties at Cambridge, London or 
Oxford universities.  
But debate raged on about the usefulness of formal training. Participants of the 
First Course actually argued “in favour of ‘training on the job’ followed by a course on 
the lines of a second course”.51 The Second Course also had less than satisfactory 
outcomes.52  
Still, the Devonshire Courses allowed the Colonial Service to keep pace with 
training policy in the British Home Civil Service. The Assheton Committee had 
recognised that “the achievement of the balanced judgement, which is the real 
meaning of common sense in this connection, can be hastened and facilitated by a well 
thought out training scheme.”53 Accordingly, Administrative Class recruits were put 
through three-month long courses covering subjects such as financial and 
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parliamentary background of the administrator’s work. However, the prevalent view in 
the British bureaucracy continued to hold learning from books a ‘crime’ “something that 
one just does.” 54 Against that context, the Devonshire courses while “no more than 
exposure to scattered knowledge on a number of subjects…. was an advance on 
training on the spot”.55  
More importantly, the Devonshire courses provided ‘native officers’ with training 
opportunities in England.56 The inaugural First Devonshire Course saw a Malay officer 
among the 12 destined for the Malayan Civil Service.57 But only in 1950 did such 
opportunities training in England cascaded down to Singapore. Four Singapore 
Administrative Service cadets attended the First Devonshire Course but, “Neither the 
reports of their supervising tutors nor the standard of work performed since their return 
were entirely satisfactory, and as a result doubt has been expressed as to the 
advisability of sending future cadets to the First Devonshire Course.”58 The colonial 
authorities in Malaya and Singapore acknowledged that such training “broaden[ed the 
officer’s] views by his travels outside Malaya”59, but the actual value of such training 
was not thought to be anything more than that.   
In sum, formal training despite the reforms continued not to be a priority. The 
motives behind reforming training, in the face of post-war pressures for decolonisation, 
were really to train up a bureaucracy for the perpetuation of Britain’s empire. Britain’s 
training reforms to the colonial administration were “carried out in a defensive spirit 
given that colonies were under attack in the United Nations in the 1950’s”.60 Even then, 
to colonial officials in Malaya and Singapore, reforms such as the Devonshire courses 
in the Colonial Office faraway, were less than relevant or useful.  
 
4.5 Limited Self-Government: 1955 – 1959 
Meanwhile, the colonial authorities had to contend with the rising mixture of 
nationalism and frustrations among the local population, particularly the ethnic Chinese 
majority. As it was, the Second World War revealed Britain’s lack of wherewithal to 
maintain its over-stretched empire. In contrast to Britain’s declining imperial fortunes 
was a rising wave of nationalism across its colonies. In Singapore, the ethnic Chinese 
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majority of the population had long been neglected by British colonial policies. Limited 
job opportunities for graduates of Chinese-language schools and exploitative labour 
conditions were stoked by pro-communist unionists to anti-colonial fervour. The 1954 
Rendel Constitution, conceded by the British amidst heightening demands for self-
determination, allowed election of a local government. But Britain retained powers over 
legal, finance and security subjects. The Rendel Constitution was essentially tailored 
for a pliant local government cooperating with colonial authorities to preserve British 
interests, particularly the security of UK bases in Singapore.61  
For the bureaucracy, the Rendel Constitution replaced Singapore’s format of 
government with a ministerial system.62 With the reorganisation of former departments 
into ministries, the term ‘Public Service’ emerged as a reference to “The Government 
[i.e. the ministries], the City Council, the Harbour Board and the Improvement Trust”63 
the last three being statutory boards created by acts of legislation to carry out specific 
functions. A distinction was thus made that ‘civil service’ referred to the ministries that 
constituted the Government. ‘Public Service’ on the other hand referred to the broader 
organisation encompassing the ‘civil service’ and statutory boards.  
The Labour Front emerged from the 1955 election to form a government under 
Chief Minister David Marshall. Marshall, a Jew and long-time resident of Singapore, 
had campaigned on the basis of decolonisation for the island. Locally elected ministers, 
assuming responsibilities over six ministries, asserted the newly-introduced principles 
of ministerial responsibility and subordination of civil servants to political masters.64 
Reporting to these political heads were Permanent Secretaries, the most senior career-
executives in each ministry, “responsible for the day to day administration of the 
Department, for formulating recommendations on policy for the Minister’s consideration 
and for ensuring that policy decisions of the Minister and the Council of Ministers were 
put into effect.”65  This establishment of the Permanent Secretary was important as a 
demarcation thus divided the executive and administrative branches of government.66 
The British retained the Attorney-General’s Chambers, Chief Secretary’s Ministry and 
the Financial Secretary’s Office (see Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Colony of Singapore Government (Limited Self-Government), 1955 – 1959 67  
 
                                                          
67
 Organisational structures of Ministry of Communications & Works and Chief Secretary’s Ministry amplified for illustrative purposes. Organisational chart drawn up from information in 
Chan Heng Chee, A sensation of independence: a political biography of David Marshall (Singapore: OUP, 1984) 90; A.A.Williams, Deputy Chief Secretary, to multiple recipients, “Chief 
Secretary’s Ministry – Organisation,” 2 Apr 1955, File PRO 58/55, NAS Microfilm No. PRO 17/957; John Hingham to multiple recipients, “Constitutional changes – Organisation of 
Ministry of Communications and Works,” 11 Jan 1955, File PRO 58/55, NAS Microfilm No.  PRO 17/1003.  
 
52 
 
Among the Labour Front’s first tasks was setting up a commission to accelerate 
Malayanisation, i.e. replacing expatriate public officers with locals. The Malayanisation 
Commission recommended localisation of four departments immediately and the 
remaining 32 departments within five years.68 Accepting the recommendations, the 
Labour Front Government localised six permanent secretaries but sought to retain 
expatriates in key appointments for 10 years to prevent administrative breakdown.  
While the colonial authorities hoped for a pliant local government, the Labour 
Front Government of Chief Minister Marshall manifested the rising tide of nationalism 
among the population.69 In May 1955, striking workers at the Hock Lee Bus Company 
and sympathising Chinese-school students were so frenzied by the anti-colonial 
rhetoric from pro-communist unionists that fatal riots broke out. Marshall exploited 
British need to keep him in position, to prevent re-election of a more extremist 
government, to press for constitutional concessions. When the British agreed to 
discuss constitutional development, Marshall sought for a fully elected local 
government.70 But the British were not assured by Marshall’s ability to contain the 
communist threat to their bases. Failing to secure ‘independence’, Marshall resigned.   
The crack-down on communist-front groups by succeeding Chief Minister Lim 
Yew Hock finally impressed the British sufficiently to grant a new constitution in 1957.71 
Singapore would become a full self-governing state in 1959. A Council of Ministers, 
presided over by a Prime Minister, drawn from the fully elected Legislative Assembly 
would exercise jurisdiction over domestic affairs, including the Public Service.72   
Meanwhile, the pace of Malayanisation was exceeding the Labour Front 
Government’s anticipation. Local officers increasingly rose to the higher echelons of 
the Public Service. By 1957, six of the eight permanent secretary posts were staffed by 
locals.73 Stanley Stewart, a local Eurasian, even became Deputy Chief Secretary, 
subordinate only to the most senior appointment in the colonial bureaucracy.  
On the other hand, many expatriates, apprehensive of career prospects with 
rising nationalism, took advantage of generous compensation to retire early.74 By 1957, 
175 or 42% of the 416 expatriate officers had retired; another 36 had given notice to 
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leave.75  The Administrative Service witnessed 55% of the expatriate officers leaving 
within one year of Malayanisation, including 9 of the 15 super-scale officers. The 
scramble to fill these critical appointments resulted in the downgrading of posts 
deemed less important in order to relieve demand on the shrinking pool of 
Administrative Officers. Finally, 61 Administrative Officers – 22 of these with less than 
four years of service – were found to fill 65 posts.76 Reporting to the Council of 
Ministers, the Chief Secretary responsible for the Public Service assessed: 
nothing can make up for the chronic lack of experience in the ranks of the 
Service. It is clear that the efficiency of the Administrative Service which even 
now is not good will deteriorate badly. If there was a wealth of experience and 
ability available in the ranks of the Clerical Service for senior Executive posts, 
the outlook would not be so grim. There is, however, a dearth of such talent…. 
The prospect is an inexperienced Administrative Service, but also an 
inexperienced Executive Service ‘supporting’ it.77 
The Commissioner of Police admitted that the departure of expatriate officers was two 
and a half years ahead of his estimate and prevented the Police from “maintaining 
present efficiency”.78 Only 576 doctors were available when minimum standards 
required 1,600.79  
The exodus of expatriate officers was hastened by growing signs of the 
People’s Action Party winning power at the impending 1959 elections. Having 
championed the plight of workers and Chinese school students, the PAP’s popularity 
among the Chinese working class masses helped it win the 1957 City Council elections. 
With enfranchisement of 220,000 ethnic-Chinese residents under the new 
constitutional arrangements, the PAP’s prospects in 1959 were almost inevitable. But 
British civil servants were “generally perturbed by the success and recent 
extravagances of the PAP”.80 In their eyes, the PAP had been associated with pro-
communist unions and most notably with violence arising from the Hock Lee strikes 
and Chinese Middle Schools disturbances. Anti-colonial tirades from PAP leaders like 
Lim Chin Siong often broadened to attacks against English educated professionals. 
Many expatriates chose to retire or be posted to other British territories.  
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Nationalist sentiments and localisation also had ramifications within the 
bureaucracy. As Malayanisation resulted in local officers succeeding the top echelons, 
competing interpretations over the role of the civil service resulted in intra-bureaucratic 
tensions. One group sought to preserve the traditions of the colonial bureaucracy, 
including their entitlement to the perks and privileges of expatriate predecessors, the 
stratification between senior officers and rank-and-file staff, and the political neutrality 
of the bureaucracy. Another group led by Goh Keng Swee and Kenneth Byrne believed 
that local civil servants should seek independence rather than adhere to political 
neutrality and prioritising perks and status.81 Goh and Byrne soon resigned to join the 
People’s Action Party to contest for the impending elections but this intra-bureaucratic 
conflict would have deeper ramifications.  
 On the eve of the 1959 elections, the Public Service was weakened by the rush 
to localise, especially among its senior leadership. Out of the 12,584 civil service 
positions, 2,634 posts or about 9% of the bureaucracy were vacant. 187 of these 
vacancies were in the Division 1 grades which consisted of the Administrative Service, 
Executive Service and other professional schemes of service. Many local officers were 
quickly promoted to take over posts vacated by expatriates, including some not 
qualified for the responsibilities.82 Efficiency and effectiveness suffered not just from the 
inexperience of the top echelons but the hollowing out of middle management to 
replace the higher hierarchical levels. Although most vacated posts were filled, the 
Chief Secretary assessed that “the Public Service has undoubtedly been seriously 
weakened, not so much in numbers as in experience.”83 Morale also dipped with 
prospects of serving seemingly hostile political masters: the Chief Secretary had found 
it necessary to address “reports that some civil servants were concerned about their 
future after the next elections” and directed:  
Permanent Secretaries, by their advice and example, should ensure that the 
Civil Service carried out the policy of the Government in office at the time, and 
that it would be their particular responsibility to establish feelings of mutual trust 
and confidence with the new Ministers, whatever their party. 84  
 
 The Public Service at the threshold of decolonisation was also pyramidal in 
personnel structure and stratification (see Table 4.3). Whilst civil servants were 
organised into four personnel divisions according to their job functions (following 
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Trusted’s reforms), this system was also dictated by officers’ educational qualifications. 
Hence, officers in the Administrative Service leadership corps of the bureaucracy and 
the executive and professional grades were organised into Division 1 by virtue of their 
high university-degree qualification. Conversely, officers with little or no formal 
education carrying out manual and unskilled positions were categorised into Division 4. 
The colonial bureaucracy, on the eve of decolonisation, was very much in the same 
personnel organisational structure as it was formed a century earlier: a small highly 
qualified élite presiding over a broader swathe of rank and file officers.      
Table 4.3 Personnel Structure of the Singapore Public Service, 1959 85  
 
 
4.6 The Staff Training School, 1954 – 1959 
 A reform in this late colonial era relevant to the subsequent discussion was the 
introduction of the Staff Training School in 1954.86 The dismal performance of 
Singapore’s Administrative Service cadets at the Devonshire Course earlier led John 
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Nicoll, the Governor of Singapore, to decide against sending local civil servants to 
future courses: 
it is in my view, certainly for the Singapore cadet, important that greater 
emphasis should be laid, in any post-selection training course, on the more 
practical aspects of public administration. One of the main criticisms of the 
younger Singapore officers is that they are too academic in outlook and too little 
inclined to apply themselves to solid and detailed administrative tasks and I do 
not consider the First Devonshire Course is best calculated to remedy this 
attitude.87 
 
The need for formal training was not questioned. But rather than classes at the 
University of Malaya, which his officers were exploring,88 Governor Nicoll wanted,  
a Training Section in the [Colonial] Secretariat which would take charge of the 
newly entered cadet. It would be made clear that during this period an officer’s 
training was to be the first consideration; he would not be posted to any definite 
duties, but would be expected to devote a good proportion of his time to 
perfecting his writing and thinking in English and to case work and deviling on 
current files. … the intention [is] to give the young officer by means of 
instruction and visits, a clear insight into the principles of public administration 
and the workings of Government departments, public authorities, such as the 
City Council, Singapore Harbour Board, etc.89  
 
The Staff Training School was organized within the Establishment Branch in the 
Chief Secretary’s Ministry (compare Table 4.4 with 4.2). Heading the School was the 
Staff Training Officer, who reported to the Director of Personnel. As a unit of the Chief 
Secretary’s Ministry, the School drew from the budget of its parent ministry to run its 
activities; participants were not charged for the courses they attended at the School. 
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Table 4.4: Organisational Structure of the Staff Training School, 1955 90 
 
 
Two types of courses were held at the School – induction and vocational 
programmes (see Table 4.5). Induction programmes ranged from those for 
Administrative Service cadets destined for senior echelons of the bureaucracy, to 
typists at the junior grades of the hierarchy. Vocational courses focused on supervisory 
skills but also included specific subjects like law, clerical work and financial procedures. 
 
Table 4.5: Summary of Staff Training in Singapore, 1954 91 
 
Type and Description 
Number 
held 
Number and grade of Officers attending 
Higher 
Services 
Clerical Others Total 
Induction 1. Administrative Cadet (3 weeks) 2 28 2 - 30 
 2. Clerical Probationers (1 week) 3 1 39 - 40 
 3. Stenographers/Typists (24 hrs) 2 - - 31 31 
Vocational 4. Supervisors/ Staff Handling (10 hrs) 2 - 17 - 17 
 5. Supervisors/Instruction (10 hrs) 2 - 17 - 17 
 6. Clerical Work Units (3 hrs per month) 3 - 48 - 48 
 7. Law (15 hours) 1 25 - - 25 
 Total 15 54 123 31 208 
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The most significant training by the Staff Training School was the induction 
courses for Administrative Service cadets. A typical course spanned three weeks, 
covering topics like “Machinery of Government”, “Social Welfare” and “Staff Relations & 
Negotiation”.92 Half of the 60- to 90-minute sessions in each class of 16 participants 
would be lectures with the remaining time set aside for questions and discussions. 
Lecturers were senior officers from the departments responsible for the subjects, 
tasked “to give the officers attending the course a factual survey of the particular 
problem or Department, indicating the organization required, the planning involved, and 
the main administrative problem to be found.”93 The Public Relations Office, for 
example, lectured on “Relations with the Public”.  
Although its establishment suggested the authorities’ interest by in training 
public officers, the resources allocated to the Staff Training School were limited. Only a 
sub-unit of the Personnel Branch in the Chief Secretary’s Office, without its own 
dedicated budgetary allocations, its staffing was reduced within three years.94 The Staff 
Training Officer post was absorbed into the newly created portfolio of Deputy Secretary 
(Training and Organisation), i.e., the officer had to split his attention between two 
subjects rather than concentrate on the training portfolio.95 The School’s facilities were 
also quickly found to be inadequate:  
The library is at present being used as the third lecture room and is therefore 
most of the time never available for its proper function. Besides, it is not 
possible to conduct a class of even 8 people in the library (which has only one 
¾ h.p. air conditioning unit) for more than an hour without feeling the stuffiness 
of the room.96 
 
This dilution of resources could have impacted on the School’s capacity to 
proffer higher quality programmes. Indeed, interest in the School’s courses was not 
enthusiastic. While the ‘ideal’ class size of its Administrative Courses was 16, for 
example, the two courses in the first year totaled 30 participants (see Table 4.5) and 
classes in 1955 averaged 12 participants each (see Table 4.6).97 Over time, the 
number of Division 1 officers attending courses at the School declined, with a 
corresponding increase in officers from Division 3 undergoing training at the School 
(see Table 4.7).  
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Table 4.6: Summary of Staff Training in Singapore, 195598 
 
Type and Description 
Number 
held 
Number and grade of Officers attending 
Division 1 Div. 2 Div. 3 Total 
Induction: 
1. Administrative (3 weeks) 
 
3 
 
35 
 
- 
 
1 
 
36 
2. Administrative (2 weeks) 1 2 13 - 15 
3. Clerical (1 week) 11 - - 164 164 
Vocational: 
4. Supervisory (4 hrs) 
 
16 
 
159 
 
- 
 
- 
 
159 
5. Supervisory (2 hrs) 2 18 - - 18 
6. Supervisors / Staff Handling (10 hrs) 35 1 185 66 252 
7. Supervisors / Instruction (10 hrs) 34 10 170 63 243 
8. Supervisors / Methods (10 hrs) 15 1 78 24 103 
9. Departmental Instructors (2 weeks) 1 1 3 3 7 
10. Registry Officers (1 week) 1 - 2 11 13 
11. Financial Procedure (2 weeks) 1 - - 15 15 
12. Clerical Work Units (3 hrs per month) 9 - - 290 290 
Total 129 227 451 637 1,135 
 
Table 4.7: Summary of Participants at the Staff Training School, 1955 - 195899 
Years Number and grade of Officers attending 
Div. 1 Div. 2 Div. 3 Div. 4 Total 
1954 NA NA NA NA 208 
1955 227 451 637 NA 1,135 
1956 112 489 1,055 361 2,017 
1957 10 94 649 NA 753 
1958 NA NA NA NA 1,643 
 
A source of ‘competition’ could be overseas training, which took up “the major 
part” of the 1955 training budget.100 Within two years, the number of officers dispatched 
for foreign training had more than doubled to 255.101 Besides cannibalizing into the 
School’s budget, these overseas training opportunities inevitably posed more attractive 
options for public officers than local courses at the Staff Training School.   
Even when the number of courses conducted by the School grew, the 
proportion of officers trained in relation to the whole Public Service was small. As a 
fraction of the total 48,000 officers, the 1,135 officers trained in 1955 constituted only 
2.4% of the whole bureaucracy.102 By 1958, only 3.4% of civil servants had been 
trained by the School.103 Evidently, the mode of training for the larger majority of the 
bureaucracy was informal on-the-job training.  
In a review years later, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury admitted that 
the Staff Training School “has been looked upon primarily as a centre for elementary 
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and introductory training … and not as an instrument for training in the higher levels of 
administration. It has been accepted rather than welcomed by Departments.”104 
Although the colonial government decided to establish a school to train public officers, 
the resources committed towards this effort was limited. The shortage of instructional 
staff and inadequacy of facilities might have impinged on the quality of the School’s 
training. Had courses been more useful to public officers, the demand for and 
attendance at these courses would naturally be much higher.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Records indicated that Governor John Nicoll and his staff did not make any 
comparable references to discussion on training in the British Home Civil Service at 
that time. Nor were there references to the French Ecole Nationale d’ Administration. 
But as a very senior officer in the Colonial Service, Nicoll would have been aware of 
the debates ongoing in Britain. While the prevailing wisdom in the Home Civil Service 
opposed a centralized training facility, Governor Nicoll chose to set up a Staff Training 
School for the Singapore bureaucracy in 1954. The Staff Training School in Singapore 
was significantly ahead of the British colonies in the region and even the British Home 
Civil Service in its time: the Centre of Administrative Studies was only set up in 1963 
and only in 1968 did the Fulton Committee recommended the Civil Service College.105 
Malaysia, which shared Singapore’s colonial legacy, had a similarly-named Staff 
Training Centre but this was only established after 1959.106 Hong Kong, another British 
colony with similar jurisdictional features as Singapore, set up a Training and 
Examinations Unit in 1961.107   
Governor John Nicoll should be credited for playing an instrumental role in 
setting up the Staff Training School. However, given his decisive role, would Nicoll’s 
retirement in 1956 lead to a tempering of high-level attention towards the School? Did 
this in turn result in a reduction of resources to the School amidst other compelling 
pulls on the limited budget? Did these developments undercut the School’s capacity to 
expand the quantity and improve the quality of its training programmes?  
                                                          
104
 Oon Khye Kiang, Permanent Secretary (Treasury), Ministry of Finance, 24 Mar 1962, “Training in the 
Singapore Civil Service,” Try.Cf. 3711/56, File MC 218/62, NAS Microfilm No. AR 49/9/46. 
105
 Lowe (2011) 313; Bird (1992) 71-72; Fry (1969) 132-133.  
106
 Y. Mansoor Marican, Public Personnel Administration in Malaysia, Research Notes and Discussions 
Paper No. 12, 1979 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1979) 10-11, stated that INTAN was set up in 1963.  National 
Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), “INTAN in Brief,” Web 16 Nov 2012, http://www.intanbk.intan.my 
/i-portal/en/about-intan/intan-in-brief.html indicated that INTAN was established in 1959.  
107
 Government Printer, Hong Kong, A Report on the Public Service 1965 (Hong Kong: Government Press, 
1965) para 36, HKPRO, accession no. A/55/81/2A; Hong Kong Government, Report on Training of 
Government Servants 1952 – 1958 (Hong Kong: Establishment Branch, Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong, 
1958) 2, HKPRO; Ian Scott and John P. Burns, “Training,” The Hong Kong Civil Service: Personnel 
Policies and Practices, eds. John P. Burns & Ian Scott (Hong Kong: OUP, 1988) 119.  
 
61 
 
The role of the Staff Training School should not be overplayed. The School was 
training more officers from the junior rungs of the hierarchy, which called into question 
whether it was meeting the original raison d’etre of setting up the Staff Training School 
to train the Administrative Service and Division 1 officers. More attractive training 
options, especially overseas training opportunities, contributed to the low number of 
public officers – no more than 4% of the whole bureaucracy – who attended training 
programmes at the School. The default mode of training across the colonial 
bureaucracy was most certainly informal on-the-job training. The impact of the Staff 
Training School during this late colonial period can only be objectively assessed as 
negligible. 
 Summing up, the primary brief for the colonial bureaucracy between 1819 and 
1959 was to maintain Singapore as a base for Britain’s colonial empire, and to maintain 
the Singapore base at minimal operating cost. Through the prism of the analytic 
framework, the orientation of the state, i.e. the métropole‘s goal of expanding and 
perpetuating its colonial interests, defined the nature of the bureaucracy: a small British 
élite presiding over a large swathe of locals occupying rank-and-file positions. Training 
in a bureaucracy bent on low-cost maintenance mode was not a priority, a 
development not uncommon across other British colonial possessions. Even when the 
Colonial Office began to initiate reforms in training – albeit to perpetuate colonial rule 
across its empire – these reforms were regarded by colonial officials in far-away 
Malaya and Singapore as of little usefulness. Instead, the establishment of the Staff 
Training School in Singapore customised training to take into local conditions for civil 
servants working in the island-colony. Still, the departure of the School’s high-ranking 
patron (i.e. Governor John Nicoll, saw interest in structured training among colonial 
officials slipping, with the majority of civil servants undergoing informal on-the-job 
training). The token allocation of resources to the Staff Training School and more 
attractive overseas training options meant that the School had only a negligible impact 
on the training of civil servants during this period. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Early Political Socialisation: The Political Study Centre and Staff Training 
(1959 – 1969) 
At Singapore’s decolonization in 1959, the new locally-elected People’s Action 
Party government introduced the Political Study Centre to change the attitudes of civil 
servants. This chapter begins by setting the context of post-colonial Singapore. Civil 
servants – having served only the colonial authorities for over a century – were nervous 
towards their new nationalist political masters. The PAP in turn was anxious to pursue 
its nation-building agenda and impatient with the Public Service.  
Against this context, the PAP government imposed the Political Study Centre 
upon the Public Service to align civil servants towards its worldview. As the emerging 
political élite, still consolidating its authority at the threshold of ‘state-formation’, the 
PAP could not simply rely upon the bureaucracy – in its existing state of apprehension 
towards the newly-elected political masters – to carry out its governance priorities. The 
PAP government needed to re-align civil servants from the colonial mindset they were 
historically conditioned in, towards an appreciation of their new operating milieu. Yet, 
this chapter points out, this socialization of the bureaucratic élite by the Political Study 
Centre was not just an end-goal by itself. Seen against the larger political-bureaucratic 
relationship, the Political Study Centre was among the various measures by the PAP 
government to assert its authority over the bureaucracy. At the same time, these 
measures sought to reform the Public Service for better delivery of its policies and 
programmes.  
The fact that civil servants helped to translate the PAP government’s policy 
visions into actual programmes between 1959 and 1963, when Singapore acceded to 
Malaysia, attested in part to the success of the Political Study Centre. Civil servants 
evidently moved away from the colonial era mindset as they helped hasten the pace of 
public housing construction, improve municipal amenities, lower unemployment, etc. 
These programmes certainly played a part in persuading the electorate in rooting for 
the PAP’s referendum for merger with Malaysia, which also saved the PAP government 
from collapse. More importantly, that the Public Service stayed the course with the PAP 
government even through the government’s weakest point is by far the clearest 
indication of the success of the Political Study Centre in socializing the Public Service.  
The Political Study Centre, from that perspective, was an initiative by the PAP 
government to introduce change into and across the Public Service. For the first time, 
the function of civil service training was extended beyond the equipping of skills and 
  
 
 
63 
 
 
knowledge to political socialization. But broadening the definition of training to include 
socialization was at the expense of skills and vocational training which have been 
described in the previous chapter. The role of the Staff Training Centre set up by the 
colonial authorities, as the chapter unfolds, was evidently eclipsed by the Political 
Study Centre. As the Political Study Centre rose in prominence, even called upon to 
conduct courses for the Malaysian bureaucracy when Singapore became part of 
Malaysia, the Staff Training Centre was increasingly relegated to training junior officers 
at the lower rungs of the bureaucratic hierarchy. This prioritization of political 
socialization over vocational training in Singapore’s state-formation continued even 
after Singapore separated from Malaysia to become an independent state, until 1969 
when the Political Study Centre closed.  
 
5.1 New Political-Bureaucratic Relations: Perception and Apprehension  
On 3 June 1959, Singapore became a self-governing state, ending 140 years of 
British colonial rule. The newly-elected People’s Action Party government, headed by 
Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister, inherited the colonial government structure (see 
Table 5.1) and a $14 million budget deficit.1 The Minister for Finance, Dr. Goh Keng 
Swee, set out to attract investment and create employment. To sweeten the investment 
atmosphere, the Minister for Labour and Law, promised to protect workers’ rights and 
urged them to forsake strikes. To build up manpower for the industrialising economy, 
the Education Ministry would emphasise mathematics and science.  A Ministry of 
National Development would speed up housing construction to reduce slums and 
improve public hygiene. With Britain still controlling security and foreign relations, a 
Ministry of Culture sought to forge a sense of national identity among the population to 
prepare for full independence through merger with Malaya. 
The PAP government was anxious to translate quickly its pronouncements into 
actual policies, in light of the prevailing political context. While Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew and fellow English-educated ministers like Toh Chin Chye, Goh Keng Swee, 
Kenneth Byrne and Rajaratnam controlled government, they were wary of the threat 
posed by pro-communists within the PAP ranks.  From the PAP’s formation in 1954, 
Lee and other English-educated leaders subscribed to a constitutional route to 
independence, through merger with Malaya. But they needed pro-communists like Lim 
Chin Siong, whose eloquence in the Chinese-vernacular could mobilise the Chinese-
speaking majority of the population. The pro-communists in turn saw in Lee and the  
                                                 
1
 SAR 1959: 12; Singapore, Towards a more just society (Singapore: GPO, 1959) 1. 
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Table 5.1: Structure of the Singapore Government, circa 1959 2 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Drawn up from information in Ministry of Culture, What you should know about (Ministries and Departments) (Singapore: GPO, 1959).  
  
 
 
65 
 
 
PAP the veneer of acceptability to the British who retained control over security. 
Although their modus vivendi allowed the English-educated moderates and pro-
communists to win the 1959 government, both camps knew an eventual split was  
inevitable. To stave off the risk of pro-communists instigating the Chinese-speaking into 
electing a communist regime, the PAP ministers needed to quickly improve the lives of 
citizens. For the task of translating their political visions into policies and services to the 
citizenry, Lee and his ministers had to call on the Public Service. 
The Singapore Public Service was re-inaugurated from the colonial 
bureaucracy at self-government. At 30,000 strong, it represented about 2% of the 
state’s population of 1.5 million.3 Too rapid a pace of Malayanisation had weakened the 
bureaucracy, especially the higher services. By 1959, 405 expatriate officers had left; 
rather than retaining 267 expatriates in key positions as planned, only 104 remained. 
The Administrative Service which formed the leadership corps of the Public Service lost 
more than 55% of the expatriate officers, including nine of the 15 top scale officers.  
More importantly, the Public Service was nervous about its fate in the hands of 
new political masters. It had only served British colonial authority and some senior civil 
servants had earlier clashed with PAP leaders, particularly Goh Keng Swee and 
Kenneth Byrne, over whether the bureaucracy should remain politically neutral or help 
the nationalist movement.
4
 The vast majority of the 1,200 Division 1 officers, including 
the Administrative Service leadership of the bureaucracy and the professional services, 
were English-educated.5 Unlike the Chinese-speaking majority of the population who 
voted in the PAP, most senior civil servants were not ecstatic towards the new 
government. The bureaucracy was naturally not altogether like-minded towards their 
new political masters, but as Goh Koh Pui recounted:  
Generally the civil servants were not very happy about [the PAP], particularly 
about their pronouncements about [sic] anti-British and anti-English educated 
citizens of Singapore. And the civil service being mainly English-educated, 
therefore they had a strong feeling that their conditions in the government might 
be jeopardised.6  
PAP leaders had cultivated their nationalistic credentials by pitching against the 
colonial establishment, including Lee Kuan Yew and the English-educated moderates, 
though in more tempered tones than the pro-communist elements. In the eyes of civil 
servants like Goh Sin Tub, “when the PAP came in, the first fear was really the image 
                                                 
3
 SAR 1959: 42; PSC Report: 5; Governor to Colonial Secretary, No. 43 Saving, 11 Mar 1958, TNA, CO 
1030/647. 
4
 Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Personal No. 10, 22 Jan 1958. TNA CO 1030/651. 
5
 PSC Report 1959-1960: 4. 
6
 Goh Koh Pui, Oral interview transcript, NAS, Accession no. 288, Reel 11, p. 5. 
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which they [PAP leaders] had of being extreme, of being pro-communist and of being 
anti-civil service.” 7 The general atmosphere among the English-educated upper 
echelon of the bureaucracy, hence, was one of apprehensive pessimism:  
There is a certain amount of question mark in my colleagues’ minds and also in 
my own mind as to what pattern the Civil Service will take in future. With such a 
strong political party coming in, with a certain amount of antagonism to the old 
Civil Service which has stood for the colonial masters and implemented the will 
of the colonial masters, to put it in the language of the extreme left, the running 
dogs of the British, what future was there for these civil servants?8 
 
The fears of public officers appeared to be realised when the new government’s 
immediate measures seemingly targeted the Public Service. The English-language 
criterion for entry into the executive ranks was lifted, ostensibly to draw in more 
talents.9 Salary-cuts followed quickly, to mitigate the budget deficit, according to the 
PAP. Although only the top 35% were affected, civil servants protested.10 S.R. Nathan, 
a welfare officer in the Ministry of Labour then, related his shock “as the pay cut took 
away a third of their monthly income.”11 Postal clerk Lee Gek Seng had to borrow for 
hire purchase payments. Nathan “wondered if the Chinese-educated left had taken 
over.”12  Mohamad Ismail Haji “worried that the communists had taken over.”13  
Lee Kuan Yew and his English-educated ministers, for their part, were 
“exasperated” by what they perceived as their civil servants’ lack of “appreciation of the 
grave challenges before us, and the fact that we had to prevent the communists from 
exploiting the grievances of the Chinese-speaking whose voting strength was now 
decisive.”14  
Senior public officers, it seemed to Lee and his ministers, had become 
conditioned to ruling by fiat of colonial authority. Sequestered in the comfort of their 
offices, they had become far removed and disconnected from the local population. To 
be sure, there were obviously exceptions but such was the impression of the 
bureaucracy among the population, including rampant corruption among frontline civil 
servants. Police constables were accepting $10 bribes to turn a blind eye to traffic 
offences; a driver’s licence could be guaranteed for $100 while back-room-rates for 
                                                 
7
 Goh Sin Tub, Oral interview transcript, NAS, Accession no. 1422, Reel 4, p. 39. 
8
 Ibid, Reel 5, p. 43. 
9
 Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates (SLAD) 21 Jul 1959, section 368. 
10
 SAR 1959: 13.   
11
 Quoted in Yap, Lim and Leong (2009) 173.   
12
 S.R. Nathan, An Unexpected Journey: Path to the Presidency (Singapore: S.R. Nathan, 2011) 205.   
13
 Quoted in Yap, Lim and Leong (2009) 173.   
14
 Lee Kuan Yew (1998) 319. 
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priority allocation of new government flats was $90.15 Even office-boys expected 
between 10 and 20 cents for handing out application forms at government departments. 
The extent of street-level corruption according to one Singaporean then: “people had to 
pay [police] officers to get them to investigate crimes. The rich and powerful could bribe 
the police to get people out of jail.” 16  
Hence, Lee recalled that, while civil servants objected, the Chinese-speaking 
majority of the population supported measures vis-à-vis the bureaucracy: “Some of the 
senior officers had to give up their maids – too bad, but the country was facing greater 
hardships and perils, and we had to convince people that this government would 
govern in the interests of all.” 17   
 
5.2 The Political Study Centre 
Against this backdrop of terse relationship between the new political masters 
and the Public Service, the Political Study Centre was established on 15 August 1959. 
Goh Keng Swee, the Minister for Finance whose portfolio oversaw the Public Service, 
outlined the need for the Political Study Centre: civil servants “because of past training 
and background … in the traditions of the British system, particularly the Colonial 
system …have not been made aware of the importance of keeping in touch with the 
masses.”18 Worst, they were not “able to see how they have been separated from the 
masses, why that is a bad thing and why it is necessary for them to know what the 
masses think about political affairs, their hopes and aspirations, so that the execution 
of government policy can be made more effective.”19 Goh clarified the PAP 
government’s notion of political neutrality expected of the bureaucracy:  
It is not sufficient just to say that the civil servants are there to carry out the 
policies and instructions of Ministers. When they carry out policies, they 
necessarily must have a wide sphere of discretion. It is not possible for 
Ministers to give directives in detail to enable the civil servant to meet any 
possible eventuality. If the role of the civil service were just to carry out 
instructions in a mechanical way, … you can  be sure that the Government 
would not be able to make any impact upon the people.20 
The Political Study Centre was thus necessary to educate public officers on the 
dynamics of the political milieu in which policies would be formulated and implemented: 
                                                 
15
 Yap, Lim and Leong (2009) 175; Cheong (2013) 296. 
16
 Tee Kim Leng, quoted in Yap, Lim and Leong (2009) 175. 
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 Lee Kuan Yew (1998) 319. 
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 Quoted in Straits Times (ST) 29 Jul 1959: 14. 
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 SLAD, 12 Dec 1960, section 386. 
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The Civil Servant participates in the democratic state by contributing his skill 
and experience in running the administrative machinery. He can hardly hope to 
be an effective administrator if he is unaware of the political milieu in which he 
must operate of if he is unsympathetic to the long term objectives which the 
government sets out to achieve.21 
 
 Not surprisingly, the Political Study Centre immediately fell under a cloud with 
many feeling it was set up to indoctrinate or brainwash public officers towards siding 
with the PAP. Quizzed by the Opposition, the Finance Minister had to assure the 
Legislative Assembly that the Centre’s training was “completely impartial …. we are not 
attempting to brainwash the civil service and ask them to subscribe to our ideology, 
because we rate the intelligence of the civil service high enough to know that such a 
course of action would be foolish and futile.”22 Nevertheless, questions persisted over 
the role of the Political Study Centre vis-à-vis the neutrality of the Public Service. Goh 
had to repeatedly clarify that the Centre was not intended to indoctrinate public officers: 
“Surely the civil servants could have seen through it.”23 The Centre’s name was not 
helpful. Available sources cannot address the intriguing question, given that Goh, Lee 
Kuan Yew and other PAP ministers were English-educated professionals, why a more 
innocuous name was not chosen over the semantically-loaded Political Study Centre.  
 
5.2.1 Organisational Structure and Staffing 
The Political Study Centre – located at No. 4 Goodwood Hill, the former 
residence of the colonial Financial Secretary – was set up within the Establishment 
Division of the Ministry of Finance.24 Selected to head the Centre was George 
Thomson, a former Colonial Service officer who “understood what we wanted and soon 
grasped the part he had to play.”25 Aspersions were soon cast on Thomson being a 
British spy, and the communist background of the Centre’s other instructor.26 Gerald de 
Cruz, a Eurasian, was indeed an ex-communist who embraced the “opportunity I’d long 
awaited to expose – and explode – the Communist ideology and Party tactics from the 
inside. As a practitioner of Malayan Communism for many years, I knew the 
                                                 
21
 Goh Keng Swee, “Message from the Minister,” Bakti: Journal of the Political Study Centre 1 (Jul 1960): 3. 
22
 SLAD, 11 Dec 1959, section 990.   
23
 SLAD, 12 Dec 1960, section 389.  
24
 Ministry of Culture, What you should know about the Ministry of Finance (Singapore: GPO, 1959) 6; ST 
29 Jul 1959: 14. 
25
 Lee Kuan Yew (1998) 321. Also Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 
1945 – 1983 (Colorado: Westview, 1985) 383; SLAD, 11 Dec 1959, section 990. 
26
 SLAD, 11 Dec 1961, sections 1865-1881.   
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Table 5.2: The Political Study Centre, 195927 
  
                                                 
27
 Drawn up from information in Ministry of Culture, What you should know about the Ministry of Finance (Singapore: GPO, 1959). Organisational units arranged left to right according 
to the sequence they were presented in the original documents. 
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Communist philosophy, practice and ‘dirty tricks’ techniques inside out.”28 With Malaya 
and Singapore embroiled in Emergency against communist guerrillas for the past 
decade, teaching senior public officers communism is intriguing. To the PAP 
government, the leadership of the bureaucracy must have been direly disconnected 
with political realities to warrant such a course.  
 
5.2.2 Training Activities and Participants 
The Political Study Centre’s curriculum were drawn up by a committee led by S. 
Rajaratnam, the Minister for Culture, and comprised several PAP leaders.29 Courses 
spanning over 2½ weeks would put classes of 20 permanent secretaries and directors 
through seminars to “make civil servants understand the new dynamic forces that face 
Asia, and by such understanding transform a colonial civil service into a civil service 
that will be adequate to meet new needs arising from revolutionary changes”30 A 
participant of the inaugural course described that,  
there were stimulating lectures, lively Q&A [question and answer], and 
uninhibited discussions covering the general history of East-West relationship, 
population changes in Singapore, our economic problems, our problems in 
nation building, communist tactics both here and in the Federation with their 
threats to Malayan nationalism. Theory and practice were equally studied and 
political institutions were studies against the background of political thought.31 
With allegations of ‘brain-washing’ hanging over the Centre, Rajaratnam stressed that 
in addressing various political parties in these courses, “we take great care, where we 
can, to avoid making political capital at the expense of one Party or the other.”32 
These courses received attention from the political leadership. Goh Keng Swee 
was one of the ministers who lectured at the classes while the Prime Minister visited in 
the evenings “to have informal but very informative sessions with the civil servants, at 
which questions were freely asked and answers honesty given.”33   
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 Gerald de Cruz, Rojak Rebel: Memoirs of a Singapore Maverick (Singapore: Times, 1993) 185-186. 
29
 Lee Kuan Yew, SLAD, 11 Aug 1960, section 572. 
30
 Cheong Hock Hai, “The first course at the Political Study Centre,” Bakti 1 (Jul 1960): 28. Also Khoo 
Seang Hoe, for Permanent Secretary (Establishment), to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Culture, 
“Courses at the Political Study Centre,” 22 Sep 1959, File MC 146 Pt 1, NAS Microfilm AR 8/16/219. 
31
 Cheong (1960): 28. Also Permanent Secretary (Establishment), to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Culture, “Courses at the Political Study Centre,” 22 Sep 1959, File MC 146 Pt 1, NAS Microfilm AR 
8/16/219.   
32
 S. Rajaratnam, SLAD, 11 Dec 1961, section 1879. 
33
 De Cruz (1993) 185. Also Vernon Palmer, Oral interview transcript, NAS, Accession no. 1423, Reel 9, 
pp. 72-73; SLAD, 11 Dec 1961, section 1876. 
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By 1960, the Political Study Centre was organising 16 similar courses a year; a 
total of 297 civil servants from Permanent Secretaries and school principals to Division 
2 officers and teacher-trainees underwent training at the Centre.34  
In addition, “General Lectures” were held on Saturday evenings, well outside 
the official working hours, typically on issues impacting on the government and the 
Public Service.35 Between September and December 1959, for example, Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew lectured on “The Parliamentary System in a Plural Society” and 
Goh Keng Swee spoke on “The Ideal Civil Servant in a Revolutionary Situation”. Two 
academics addressed “Muslim Political Thought” and “Economic Development in 
Malaya” separately.  
Records indicated that neither participants nor their parent-ministries needed to 
pay any fees for the courses at the Political Study Centre. As a sub-unit of the Ministry 
of Finance, the Political Study Centre drew on the ministry’s budget to fund its activities. 
 
5.2.3 Bakti: Journal of the Political Study Centre 
 In July 1960, the Political Study Centre published the inaugural issue of its 
journal. The title Bakti, was explained to mean “service in the highest form…..[including] 
devotion to God, love for parents, service to king and country and doing good to one’s 
community but also any kind of service in the highest order.”36 
Envisioned as a quarterly priced at fifty cents, Bakti’s “articles will aim to be, not 
the authoritative type which forecloses discussions but the intelligent type which 
stimulate discussion.” 37 The head of the Political Service Centre, George Thomson, 
urged heads of ministries to write and encourage contributions from their staff. The 
intended audience were evidently officers who had a grasp of the English language in 
the Executive, professional and clerical schemes of services rather than street-level or 
lower-educated frontline civil servants.   
The bulk of Bakti’s repertoire were articles from newspapers, essays by 
academics and transcripts of speeches by ministers and senior public officers. The 
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 SAR 1960 43; SLAD, 12 Dec 1960, section 388.   
35
 “Programme of General Lectures at the Political Study Centre,” 11 Sep 1959, File MC 146 Pt 1, NAS 
Microfilm AR 8/16/223. Also Oon Khye Kiang, Permanent Secretary (Treasury), to All Permanent 
Secretaries and Heads of Departments, “General Lectures at the Political Study Centre,” 2 Jan 1960, File 
MC 146 Pt 1, NAS Microfilm No. AR 8 /16/194.  
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 Sheh bin Alwi, “Bakti,” Bakti 1 (Jul 1960): 2. 
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inaugural edition, for example, carried an article by the Minister for Culture, 
Rajaratnam.38 Issue 3 included the English translation of an editorial in the local 
Chinese-language daily.39 Several issues featured topical interests like “The 
Emergence of South-East Asia”, “Education and National Independence”, etc.40 Civil 
servants contributed reports on courses and suggestions on policies.41 But the most 
prolific writer was Thomson, whose articles featured in almost every edition of the 
journal.42  
A fair assessment of Bakti is difficult without the availability of its circulation data. 
It was not conceived as a commercial undertaking and, without a proper publishing 
infrastructure, Thomson had to solicit for “volunteers [read: free of charge] in each 
Department who will distribute and sell the copies for us.”43 Notably, Bakti’s publication 
fell behind schedule, with the fourth edition late by a year.44   
 
5.2.4 Responses of Officials to the Political Study Centre 
  No official evaluations of the Political Study Centre are currently available but 
impressions can be drawn from the recollections of some civil servants. Tan Chok Kian 
remembered, “most civil servants, I think, took it well. Of course they said, ‘Well, we’re 
all going back to school. We’re going to be brainwashed, what have you.’ but I would 
say generally it was an eye-opener.”45 Ngiam Tong Dow, said: “I would not use the 
word ‘brain-wash’. It was changing the mindset of the old Singapore civil servants.”46  
Most officers acknowledged a better appreciation of the political milieu and 
roles they had to play in that context. Teo Kah Leong, then-Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of National Development, recalled leaving the Political Study Centre initiated 
into “the background and principles of the communist regimes [and] communism. …. 
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Many of us in those days were very vague about communism.”47 Vernon Palmer 
remembered his stint at the Centre helped him “to understand the Communist’s 
mind”.48 Such candid acknowledgement of their ‘vague’ conceptions of communism 
among top level public officers thus justified the rationale for the Political Study Centre.  
Ngiam Tong Dow thought that “the Political Study Centre was the game 
changer: “Because it changed the mindset: you are no longer the masters, now you are 
the servants of the people.”49 Tan Chok Kian said,  
It really gave the civil servants or most civil servants a new outlook, a new 
dimension of what life was, what the new environment was. Whilst you [as a 
civil servant] are apolitical, but you had to know more about politics that 
henceforth the government is going to be governed by politicians with 
ideologies but different party philosophies and ideas and so on. … it was just 
not the case of sitting in your offices and handing out decisions, that you had to 
get to know what’s going on down at the grassroots levels.50 
Teo Kah Leong remembered that,  
We began to realise that while we are taking decisions, we had to consider not 
only the technical aspects of the problem, we had to consider the political 
aspect as well. … Yes, [we were] more accountable to the people. Sort of made 
us an extension of the politicians. We became an extension of the politicians. 
The only difference was that we handled the machinery of government. And 
they handled the policy side. …. We had to work very closely with the politicians 
and whenever we made recommendations, we also had to weigh the purely, 
shall we say, the technical aspects of the matter against the political side, to 
weigh the two together.51  
 
In the light of their stints at the Political Study Centre, civil servants’ 
conceptualisation of the bureaucracy’s political neutrality was best reflected by 
NgiamTong Dow:  
In the tradition of the British civil service, I am political but not partisan. There is 
separation between the state and the executive. The executive, however, has to 
remember that our duty is to implement the will of the people manifested 
through the elected prime minister.52   
This was in line with the tenets of Westminster political neutrality summed up by 
Kernaghan and Langford: politicians make policy decisions and public servants 
execute those decisions; meritocracy rather than political affiliation as the basis of 
public servants’ appointment and promotion; public servants advise ministers in private 
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while ministers accept responsibility for departmental actions.53 Ridley elucidated the 
tradition of the civil servant’s identification with successive political masters in 
Westminster systems: “the British civil servant is expected to be a chameleon changing 
colour as government change.”54 Rhodes, Wanna and Weller elucidated the non-
partisan and professional traditions of Westminster bureaucracies as eschewing “direct 
involvement in political life”, that is, “Civil servants did not run for office, give political 
speeches, or campaign for one side or the other.”55 Hence, while the socialisation 
efforts at the Political Study Centre were criticised, particularly by the opposition in the 
Legislative Assembly, they did not appear to deviate from the principles expected of the 
bureaucracy in Westminster systems of government.  
One year on, the Minister for Finance was satisfied with the results:  
The senior officers who went through these courses – many of them for the first 
time – understand now why Government policy is what it is, and they are 
therefore able to exercise their own initiative in promoting our policies instead of 
being jogged along by their Ministers.56 
 
5.3 State Formation  
The establishment of the Political Study Centre together with the range of 
seemingly harsh measures by the PAP government upon the bureaucracy can be 
better appreciated in the context of a nascent state in the throes of ‘state-formation’. 
‘State-formation’ theorists led by Stein Rokkan and Charles Tilly observed that as 
states in Europe were formed, they underwent phases of ‘penetration’ and 
‘standardisation’. ‘Penetration’ is defined by these scholars as the actions of the 
emerging élite to establish their presence, impose their authority and assert their 
control over a territory.57 ‘Standardisation’ refers to the forging of a common culture 
across the territory. The cultivation of a shared identity among the population towards 
the state gives rise to the ‘nation’. While ‘state’ refers to a defined territory where ruling 
élite exercises its authority at will upon the population, ‘nation’ is a progression of the 
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‘state’ where the population actively identifies with and participates in the state. 
‘Standardisation’ measures, hence also known as ‘nation-building’, could include the 
imposition, use and presence of similar administrative procedures, identification 
documents, statistical system of classifying people into sub-categories according to 
geographical regions or racial typologies, integrated curricula for schools, network of 
public offices, uniforms for public officers, etc.  
In all these processes, the bureaucracy played a defining role as agent of the 
state. By erecting and maintaining government offices and infrastructure such as post 
offices and utilities, and by enforcement actions especially through the use or threat of 
force, civil servants serve as instruments for ‘penetrating’ the state’s authority across 
the territory. Similarly, state officers in insisting that the population adhere to common 
prescribed administrative procedures and identification documents, by propagating 
common educational curricula in schools, through wearing a common set of uniforms 
and accoutrements, etc., homogenise a population into a ‘standardised’ culture.  
State-formation theorists expanded other aspects of state- and nation-building, 
such as ‘accommodation’, ‘participation’, ‘redistribution’, etc. Some of these terms are 
used by different scholars to describe similar or overlapping aspects. But the current 
context of analysis, when Singapore was in its early years of state-building, focuses 
this discussion on the initial ‘penetration’ and ‘standardisation’ phases of state-building. 
Examined against the framework of ‘state-formation’ theory, socialisation and 
other measures by the PAP government vis-à-vis the Public Service were 
manifestation of the ‘penetration’ process. As the emerging élite, the PAP was still 
insecure politically. The seemingly punitive measures were, in Goh Sin Tub’s words:  
to tell the Civil Service: ‘This shows you who is boss. We are the piper and we 
call the tune.’ …. a punishment if you like, a stroke of the cane if you like, which 
the PAP had to administer, and to administer in fulfilment of its promise to their 
text that it had made against the Civil Service. And it was salutary. Once and for 
all. One stroke of the cane and it’s all over. Then immediately after that, the 
whole programme to win over the Civil Service, setting up the Political Study 
Centre, training, brainwashing, if you like, the senior civil servants and the down 
the line.58 
 
But these measures also manifested a ‘standardisation’ effect: by bridging 
public officers’ disconnect with the citizenry, these measures sought to forge a common 
identity among the population. Similarly, while the Political Study Centre’s socialisation 
of public officers was evidently ‘penetrative’, to stamp the PAP government’s authority 
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over the bureaucracy, it also sought to ‘standardise’ the public officers, drawing them 
closer to the citizenry they were supposed to serve.  
 
5.4 Reining in and Reforming the Public Service 
Seen in this light, the Political Study Centre and other government measures 
taken toward the Public Service served the simultaneous aims of ‘showing who’s boss’ 
and introducing genuine reforms. Indeed, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew located the 
Political Study Centre within a larger ‘effort to bring the administration to the people’: 
A most significant change in the past year is the conscious effort to bring the 
administration to the people. A Political Study Centre was started to educate 
and explain our political and ideological problems to the administrative officers 
of the state. Senior officers were asked to rethink our political problems. 
Counter clerks and other officials who deal with the public now understand that 
they are servants and not masters of the people. And the police have been 
brought down to the people to be their friend and protector, not their guardian 
and punisher. …. This is a constant and continuing process, and the work must 
go on. But after one year, there are clear signs that the position has changed 
for the better.59   
 
In October 1959, the PAP government mounted Operation Pantai Chantek to 
clean up public parks. The idea hailed from Ong Eng Guan, the Minister for National 
Development, “a copycat exercise borrowed from the communists – ostentatious 
mobilisation of everyone including ministers to toil with their hands and soil their clothes 
in order to serve the people.”60 Civil servants, for their part, were expected “to 
contribute in a small way to help in beautifying the new State of Singapore and would 
add a positive contribution for the welfare of the common people.”61 Making public 
officers leave the comfort of their offices to undertake physical labour in front of the 
public was undoubtedly another assertion of authority by the PAP government over the 
bureaucracy. Having public officers worked among citizens also drove home the 
message that public servants were meant to serve the public. 
By 1960, the PAP government was tightening its control over public officers. 
The Prevention of Corruption Ordinance increased penalties for graft.62 The Public 
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Service Commission was empowered to initiate disciplinary proceedings against errant 
staff; permanent secretaries could punish against officers for being discourteous to the 
public.63 In 1962, a Central Complaints Bureau allowed citizens to lodge complaints 
against public officers who were rude or misbehaved towards them.64  
Summing up the PAP government’s intentions, Finance Minister Goh Keng 
Swee pointed out that civil servants needed to move away from the colonial mindset:   
The people are now the real masters of the Government, whose responsibility is 
to serve the people. The people are the real employers of the public servants 
and the payers of their salaries. Therefore, it is only right that public servants 
should be courteous to the public in the performance of their duties. But in order 
to adapt themselves to these changed relationship Government employees will 
have to undergo a new process of training. This is a kind of brainwashing and 
time is required for re-adjustment and adaptation.65 
 
Whether genuine reforms or ‘showing who’s boss’, these measures affected the 
Public Service severely. In fact, a PAP leader wrote an open letter to Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew about “the deliberate hostility being stirred up in certain sections of the 
Party towards the English educated…. [causing] a growing sense of suffocation felt by 
teachers, lawyers, doctors and engineers”66. Public officers might not complain publicly 
but those most aggrieved chose to leave altogether. Civil servant Goh Koh Pui 
remembered, there was “quite a big [number of] resignations from the Administrative 
Service.” 67 His colleague, George Bogaars, recorded “the resignations of some half a 
dozen or more top civil servants who found their positions untenable.” 68 A PAP 
politician added 300 others from the professional services.69 Bogaars later wrote: 
The damage this did to the civil service was serious since it deprived the 
administration, at a time when it could least afford it, of very experienced 
officers who could, not only carry forward the administration but help in training 
and guidance of the large batches of new entrants who had to be fill up 
vacancies created by expatriate retirements and Malayanisation. These officers 
who had resigned had been recruited before the Second World War into the 
Straits Settlements Civil Service and had seen their service in many parts of the 
Malay Peninsula. Their withdrawal compounded the difficulties that were to face 
the civil service in the new chapter of political history that had begun.70 
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 The departure of unhappy senior public officers, nevertheless, removed the 
resistance within the bureaucracy to the PAP government. At the same time, these 
departures opened up the upper echelons to rising high-calibre young officers.71 
Altogether, this change in Public Service’s leadership facilitated the PAP government’s 
efforts to align the Public Service. With the benefit of hindsight, Quah pointed to these 
measures as a concerted socialisation effort by the PAP government.72  
 
5.5 The PAP Split, Merger into Malaysia, and the Role of the Public Service 
The political context was meanwhile evolving dramatically and the effects of the 
socialisation and reform of the bureaucracy would play their parts. In April 1961, Ong 
Eng Guan, having earlier been sacked from his ministerial and party posts for 
challenging the PAP leadership, resigned his Legislative Assembly seat at Hong Lim 
constituency to trigger a by-election. Despite its efforts, the PAP’s candidate was 
routed by Ong. More significantly, the PAP’s defeat alarmed the Malayan government 
to the risk of Singapore – under a weak PAP government – falling to the communists 
and threatening Malaya’s security.73  
In May 1961, Malayan Prime Minster Tunku Abdul Rahman, erstwhile cool 
about Singapore’s reunion with Malaya, reignited the possibility of merger. A Singapore 
under its jurisdiction would allow the Malayan government to arrest communists within 
the PAP, which Lee Kuan Yew and the English-educated leaders could not do without 
backlash from the Chinese masses. Lim Chin Siong and the pro-communists naturally 
resisted Singapore coming under the Malayan government.  
As merger became a battle for survival between PAP leaders and pro-
communists, Lim Chin Siong led supporters to defect en masse.74 The party 
organisation collapsed: 35 of the 51 branch committees and 19 of the 23 organising 
secretaries deserted the PAP to join Lim’s newly set-up Barisan Socialis.75 
As the PAP clung onto government with a four-vote margin, negotiations with 
the Federation government finally produced results. Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo 
                                                 
71
 There included Sim Kee Boon, J.Y. Pillay, Howe Yoon Chong, G.E. Bogaars, Pang Tee Pow and K.P.R. 
Chandra. Yap, Lim and Leong (2009) 174.  
72
 Jon S.T. Quah, “Culture change in the Singapore Civil Service,” Civil service reform in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, eds. Shahid Chaidhry, Gary Reid and Waleed Malik (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, 1994). 
73
 SAR 1961: 2-3; Tan Siok Sun, Goh Keng Swee: A portrait (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2007) 92-
99; Turnbull (2009) 277-278; Lee Kuan Yew (1998) 344, 362-372; 
74
 SAR 1961: 7-8; Tan Siok Sun (1998) 99-102. 
75
 Turnbull (2009) 279, Yap, Lim and Leong  (2009) 211-212. 
  
 
 
79 
 
 
territories would merge to form Malaysia.76 The Barisan Socialis, with its survival at 
stake, demanded a referendum on merger. The PAP government agreed to a 
referendum, but rather than ‘for or against’ merger, over the specific terms of merger.77 
Against this background, the PAP government drew on the Public Service in its 
campaign for merger. As the incumbent government, the PAP saw as its right to 
mobilise all resources of the state, because merger – in its view – was a state-wide 
cause. Union with Malaya would allow Singapore to become independent, provide for 
economic growth, thereby generating revenue to fund programs to improve the 
population’s standards of living.  
In its campaign, the PAP government highlighted its public service 
achievements to ingratiate itself with the population. On the government’s behalf, the 
Ministry of Culture published pamphlets drawing attention to the government’s 
accomplishments.78 Prominence was accorded to the 44,251 public housing units 
completed since self-government, housing 20% of the population, complete with 
utilities and amenities.79 Electricity supply was extended to 15 villages, improving living 
conditions of about 35,000 people.80 21 primary schools and eight secondary schools 
were constructed, increasing school enrolments by 76,028 to 397,005. 81 The Economic 
Development Board, these publications proclaimed, would “induce investments totalling 
something like $1,740 million and to create economic and social opportunities that 
would meet the needs of our vast growing population”.82 
Behind these statistics, cited to lend credence to the PAP government’s having 
improved the population’s standard of living, was the handiwork of public officers. While 
the PAP leaders drew up the broad political visions and agenda, public officers 
translated these into detailed plans, and then carried out and coordinated the 
implementation of programs to better the lives of the population. Hence, the work of the 
Public Service gave the PAP government the evidence of its public service for the 
citizens, and converted these into votes for the government at the referendum.  
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Results of the September 1962 referendum was an overwhelming 71% support 
for PAP’s Alternative ‘A’.83 PAP’s win halted the tide of its fall, from the by-election 
defeats to the mass defections to the destruction of its branch organisations. Its 
majority in the Legislative Assembly continued to be tenuous, with the razor-thin 
majority negated after more defections to Barisan Socialis. And it took the Anglo-
Malayan-Singapore Internal Security Council’s 1963 arrest of Barisan leaders, for 
consorting with plotters of the Brunei revolt, to ease the pressure off the PAP. But the 
1962 referendum, stemming PAP’s plummet and ensuring Singapore merger with 
Malaysia, saved the PAP government from certain political collapse. 
The Public Service, as evidenced in the preceding discussion, played a role in 
PAP’s success at the referendum. Permanent secretaries, directors and heads of 
ministries and state agencies helped translated the PAP’s political visions into specific 
policies, and then cascaded these into detailed actionable plans. Public officers across 
the rank-and-file, actualised these plans by building thousands of public housing units 
and implementing other essential public services. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew would 
later credit the construction of the first few blocks of public housing apartments in his 
Tanjong Pagar constituency for helping him hold on to his ward.84  
In this regard, the Political Study Centre, as part of the measures by the PAP 
government to rein in and reform the Public Service, delivered its objectives. Public 
officers professed a better understanding of the intentions of the PAP government, and 
a deeper appreciation of the political milieu in which government policies and 
programmes needed to be formulated and delivered. For those whom Goh Keng Swee 
labelled as ‘die-hards’ in his evaluation to the Legislative Assembly,85 the courses at 
the Political Study Centre probably sealed their decisions to leave the Public Service. 
The resignations of these senior officers removed the high level resistance within the 
bureaucracy towards the PAP government. And by facilitating the rise of younger 
officers who were more receptive towards the government, these departures 
consolidated the PAP government’s control over the bureaucracy and allowed the PAP 
government to have a cooperative agent to implement its policies and programmes.  
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5.6 The Staff Training Centre  
The Political Study Centre’s success in socializing public officers was, however, 
at the expense of staff training. The Staff Training School set up by the colonial 
authorities continued after self-government to conduct induction and functional skills 
training (see Table 5.3). In late 1959, its name changed to the Staff Training Centre.86 
Table 5.3 Analysis of Training Courses at the Staff Training Centre, 1959 
Type of Course Duration 
No. 
held 
Division Grades & Number attending 
1 2 3 4 Others Total 
1. Administrative  2 weeks 3 44 - - - - 44 
2. Executive 2 weeks 1 - 13 - - - 13 
3. Clerical 1½ months 4 - - 75 - - 75 
4. Clerical Assistant 4 days 1 - - 18 - - 18 
5. Administrative Course for Principals 2 weeks 1 - 30 - - - 30 
6. Courtesy Course 1 day 52 - 51 547 1009 - 1607 
7. Course for Legislative Assemblymen 10 mornings 2 - - - - 24 24 
Total  64 44 94 640 1009 24 1811 
 
As the Political Study Centre was set up, the resources of the Staff Training 
Centre were gradually hollowed out to support the former. The Director of Training who 
headed the Staff Training Centre, namely George Thomson, was concurrently 
appointed head of the Political Study Centre and progressively spending more time at 
the latter (see Table 5.4).87 Although the Staff Training Centre was allocated three 
officers and the Political Study Centre one instructor, both Centres were sharing two 
officers by 1961.88 The Political Study and the Staff Training Centres were in all 
purposes one entity, the latter subsumed under the banner of the Political Study Centre.    
While the Political Study Centre had its own building, complete with lecture hall, 
seminar rooms and canteen, the Staff Training Centre occupied half a level in the 
Fullerton Building which housed other departments. The Staff Training Centre’s sole 
lecture hall could be partitioned into two discussion rooms but “the partition is not 
sound proof, and it is not possible to hold two lectures simultaneously.”89By 1963, the 
Staff Training Centre had lost most of the important training. Induction for the élite 
Administrative Service and Executive Service were transferred to the Political Study 
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Table 5.4: The Political Study Centre & Staff Training Centre, 1962 90 
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Centre. Apart from induction for in Division 3, the majority of the courses held at the 
Staff Training Centre were for interpreters and translators (compare Table 5.5 with 
Table 5.3). The Staff Training Centre had effectively become a school for training the 
lower rank-and-file hierarchy of the bureaucracy. 
 
Table 5.5 Training Courses conducted by Staff Training Centre, 196391 
Type of Courses Number of courses / 
sessions held 
Number of Officers 
attending 
Clerical Induction  14 293 
Induction for Trainee Teachers, TTC 1 25 
Lecture to Police Inspectors 1 7 
Training of Student Interpreters and Police Translators   
(i) Malay 133 521 
(ii) English 81 856 
(iii) Chinese characters 194 1,679 
(iv) Hindustani 85 102 
(v) Tamil 151 379 
(vi) Punjabi 119 119 
(vii) Malayalam 103 335 
 
Apart from an analysis in Seah’s 1971 study, no formal evaluation of the Staff 
Training Centre can be found. Seah attributed the Staff Training Centre’s difficulties to 
resourcing, coordination among relevant agencies and attitudes towards training. To 
illustrate, Seah pointed to the Centre’s 1962 budget being only 4% of that of the 
Teachers’ Training College.92 Poor liaison among the Public Service Commission, 
Establishment Division and Staff Training Centre led to the Centre not receiving 
updated lists of recruits, resulting in laggard induction of new officers across the 
bureaucracy. With poor resources affecting capacity, the Centre’s courses were 
superficial, providing only basic knowledge rather than actual ‘real’ training; participants 
apparently preferred on-the-job training. The government was not unaware and a 
Commission of Inquiry recommended tighter coordination among the agencies to 
improve the training of civil servants.93  But the attitudes among senior civil servants 
towards training also contributed to the Staff Training Centre’s difficulties. 17 heads of 
departments, responding to a survey initiated by the Permanent Secretary of the 
Treasury, indicated that only 6% of their staff, in their opinion, needed training. More 
importantly, most department-heads did not see the Staff Training Centre as useful, 
preferring staff to attend courses elsewhere.94  
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In contrast, the Political Study Centre did not suffer the limitations of its poorer 
sibling. With the high level of political attention accorded it, public officers nominated to 
attend courses at the Centre, even for lectures on Saturday evenings, duly turned up. 
Their enthusiasm was also due to the more interesting and relevant curriculum at the 
Political Study Centre.   
Ngiam Tong Dow, in retrospect, explained that the political leadership was more 
interested in cultivating the Administrative Service than the Staff Training Centre. The 
Administrative Service was an élite scheme of service originating from the colonial 
bureaucracy. It was modeled after the British administrative class to provide the 
leadership corps for the bureaucracy. Ngiam, who joined the Administrative Service 
after self-government, pointed out that the Prime Minister and his Finance Minister in 
particular were focused on developing a small Administrative Service leadership cadre 
to lead and manage the broader public service:  
The whole concept was that we must have a core of men. What Dr. Goh called 
the Praetorian Guards …. So we must develop a core of Praetorian Guards to 
safeguard the sovereignty of the country. And this whole idea of developing a 
civil service is to develop the Praetorian Guards. So I think Lee Kuan Yew and 
Goh Keng Swee, they were not really interested, if I may say so, [in the] Staff 
Training Centre.95  
 
5.7 Priority of Socialisation: State Formation through Merger and Independence 
Hence, while the Political Study Centre was successful in re-orienting public 
officers, this broadening of the definition of training to include socialization was at the 
expense of skills and vocational training and the Staff Training Centre. With state-
formation as the over-arching context, however, the importance accorded to 
socialization is understandable, even necessary.  
 
5.7.1 Merger into the Federation of Malaysia 
The organization of the Public Services was one of the key questions leading 
up to Singapore’s Merger into the Federation of Malaysia, and among “the inevitable 
disputes between the two Governments.”96 In the course of Merger discussions, 
Federal Deputy Premier Abdul Razak and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
agreed there were five areas which needed close examination by senior civil servants 
from both sides. Under the ambit of an “Inter-Governmental Committee on Merger of 
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Singapore with the Federation of Malaya” were sub-committees addressing issues 
pertaining to the constitution, fiscal policies, security, broadcasting, and an 
“Establishment and Organisation Sub-Committee”.97 
Eventually, the Merger with Malaysia saw Singapore transferring to the Central 
Government the administrative portfolios of “civil aviation, meteorological services, 
transport, telecommunications, post, judicial services, audit, immigration and passports, 
defence, police and prisons.”98 Among these, the most significant was the Police Force 
along with the Special Branch responsible for internal security.99 The Singapore State 
Government retained the Ministries of Culture, Education, Finance, Health, Home 
Affairs, Labour and Law and National Development (see Table 4.1). The change into a 
state-level Public Service, as part of a federal bureaucracy, appeared more nominal 
than substantial. Hence, apart from the security agencies, the Singapore Public Service 
post-Merger continued status quo ante.  
Following Singapore’s accession into Malaysia, the Political Study Centre 
continued to feature prominently while the Staff Training Centre languished in its 
shadows. Immediately after Merger, “the scope of work of this [Political Study] centre 
was expanded to include the Federation of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak at the request 
of the governments of these territories.”
100
 Within three months of Merger, the Political 
Study Centre conducted eight courses for the Sarawak Civil Service and Sabah 
government. These were recorded in the official annual, renamed Singapore Yearbook:  
During each course, the political, economic and social problems of the region 
were discussed in the light of the new national pattern of responsibilities and the 
new attitude and methods of working required of a Civil Service in a community 
with full adult suffrage and a full parliamentary system of Government.
101
 
Civil servants from the Federation government were sent to attend the courses 
organised in Singapore, which continued as before merger. In contrast, there were no 
mention of the Staff Training Centre in any public records between 1964 and 1966.
102
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5.7.2 Full Independence for Singapore 
On 9 Aug 1965, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew suddenly proclaimed the 
independence of Singapore. While Singapore’s separation was unexpected, relations 
between the Federal government and the Singapore State government were already 
“far from happy.”103 The deteriorating Malaysia-Singapore relations leading to the 
latter’s separation is the subject of several dedicated books104 and not the focus of this 
study. To briefly provide context for discussion, the conflict between the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO), which led the Barisan Nasional coalition government in 
Malaysia, and the People’s Action Party in Singapore was fundamentally racial: PAP’s 
meritocratic approach to governance challenged UMNO’s affirmative action policies 
aimed at preserving Malay political dominance.  Other issues expanded the 
contestation while rhetoric from both sides of the Causeway fanned hostilities. But 
bloody riots in 1964 underscored the racial undertones of the Malaysian-Singapore 
conflict, which complicated the search for an acceptable solution to abate the spiralling 
tension. Eventually, to avoid further acrimony and violence, key UMNO and PAP 
leaders agreed to separate Singapore from the Federation to its own independence.  
The suddenness of Singapore’s independence surprised even its own Public 
Service; except for a handful of very senior officers, the rest of the bureaucracy was 
completely kept in the dark.105 The bureaucracy scrambled to set up the functions of a 
sovereign state. Chan surmised that, “When Singapore separated from Malaysia, the 
island fortuitously was managed by a politicised and relatively skilled bureaucracy.”106 
The delicacy of the situation required a keen appreciation of the political context: while 
the Malaysian government formally separated Singapore from the Federation, some 
radical elements in Malaysia were threatening to abrogate Singapore’s 
independence.107 A state of war remained with Indonesia in view of Jakarta’s 
Confrontation. Securing Singapore’s borders while rallying the international community 
to recognise and guarantee its sovereignty, and expanding trade to heighten its 
economic viability all became Singapore’s paramount priorities. George Bogaars, a 
senior civil servant at that time, wrote later:  
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Up to then the main focus of attention of the civil service had been domestic 
and internal matters. The paramount concern had been on political stability and 
security and the development of social and economic services to sustain this 
stability. The civil service has been conditioned over the previous decade to 
think largely in terms of Singapore’s internal problems.108   
Thus the rush to set up the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior and 
Defence and adjust functions of other ministries to meet the demands of a sovereign 
state (see Table 5.6). More challenging than structures was staffing new ministries and 
adjusted portfolios with the right people. The shortage of staff with the competencies 
and stature compelled the Civil Service to search the private sector for people to hold 
high-level appointments in the nascent Foreign Service.109  Even as officers were 
pulled away to staff newly-created portfolios, deputies and subordinates might not be 
qualified to take over vacated leadership positions. “Fortuitously,” as Chan put it, 
Singapore’s public officers had by this time “shared the same ideology as the ruling 
leadership and was sensitive to its political tasks.”110 An outcome she attributed to the 
“reorientation and retraining of the Civil Service” through the Political Study Centre.  
Unsurprisingly, with the state at the threshold of state-formation following 
independence, political socialisation was given greater priority, much more than skills 
training. The retiring Head of the Civil Service highlighted the continued importance of 
political socialisation in the context of state-formation:  
we must understand that the position of the Administrative Service in newly 
emerging and independent developing countries is different from that of 
Colonial and pre-self governing days. Whilst we still should not take part in 
politics, we cannot disregard politics in that there must be a keen sense of 
political awareness and a better standard of political assessment of conditions, 
problems and situations on our part, if we are going to advise our Ministers 
better in the formulation of policy, and understand and loyally carry out policies 
laid out by the Government.111 
 
Indeed, records available suggested that the Political Study Centre continued to 
enjoy priority while the training of senior officers was not returned to the Staff Training 
Centre.112 Instead, the Staff Training Centre was equipping vocational skills to officers 
who were relatively junior in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Between 1967 and 1969, for 
example, it provided induction courses for clerks, language classes for interpreters, and 
training in financial procedures.113 
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Table 5.6: Structure of the Singapore Government, circa 1965 114 
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5.8 Closure of the Political Study Centre and Staff Training Centre 
In August 1969, the government announced that the Political Study Centre was to 
be closed. After 10 years of operation, the Centre was deemed to have achieved its 
purpose remarkably: “All senior members of the Civil Service have undergone courses at 
the centre.”115 The government press statement announcing the closure added that newly 
recruited civil servants, having gone through National Service and been brought up in an 
environment of nation-building, would have a better appreciation of national objectives. 
Another possible reason might be the confidence of the PAP government in its political 
power, including its control over the bureaucracy. The strongest indicator of the PAP’s 
power was the overwhelming 84% popular vote through which the PAP was returned to 
power at the 1968 elections.116  
While the Staff Training Centre remained in operation, it continued to provide only 
vocational training to rank-and-file public officers.117 Induction courses for the élite 
Administrative Service and other Division 1 officers were not returned to the Staff Training 
Centre even with the closure of the Political Study Centre. After 1969, the official 
Singapore Year Book, which had devoted sections of varying lengths to key developments 
at the Staff Training Centre since its 1954 inception, no longer mention the Centre.118  
With the closure of the Political Study Centre, a gap in the training of senior officers 
thus arose. Given that these public officers occupied key positions in the bureaucracy, this 
training gap is a significant and glaring one.  
 
5.9 Summing Up – Reforming the Bureaucracy 
 This chapter has described the use of the Political Study Centre as a point to 
change the attitudes of the bureaucracy. Through the device of the conceptual framework, 
the chapter examined the subject from the lenses of the bureaucracy and the state, i.e., 
the political leadership at that time and the social-economic make-up of the jurisdiction. In 
1959, the Singapore Public Service re-inaugurated from the colonial bureaucracy was 
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apprehensive towards its new political masters: the People’s Action Party had since its 
formation accentuated its nationalistic credentials by pitting itself against the colonial 
establishment.  The PAP leaders on their part were exasperated that the bureaucracy, 
after 140 years as agents of the colonial authorities, was insensitive to the emerging 
political context: the Chinese-educated majority of the population, who now held electoral 
sway, was so aggrieved by colonial rule that they could be easily fanned into voting in a 
communist regime. While senior civil servants were largely disconnected with the public 
they were supposed to serve, street-level bureaucrats indulged in corruption, and the 
bureaucracy – still steeped in colonial-era organizational culture – was seen as ineffectual 
by the local population. 
 Consequently, the PAP government set up the Political Study Centre to reform the 
bureaucracy itself. By socializing senior civil servants to a deeper appreciation of the 
political context against which policies would be made, the Political Study Centre was not 
simply introducing change into the bureaucracy. Rather, in re-orienting these officers away 
from the colonial-era organizational culture towards an alignment with the newly-elected 
PAP government, the Political Study Centre cultivated a loyalty towards the emerging state 
among them. As they returned to their leadership positions of various ministries and 
departments, these senior civil servants carried with them that new alignment with the new 
government across the Public Service. Through socializing the bureaucratic élite, the 
Political Study Centre in effect was spreading reforms across the bureaucracy. The 
Political Study Centre was thus a catalytic point of change in the Singapore Public Service.  
In seeking to break the bureaucracy away from its colonial-era traditions, the 
Political Study Centre was not modelled after any British institution. In fact, the prevailing 
attitude in the UK Home Civil Service continued to be learning on-the-job, “sitting by 
Nellie”.119 Several more years would to pass before the Centre for Administrative Studies 
was set up in 1963 as Britain’s first dedicated civil service training institution.120  
The Political Study Centre’s socialisation aim draws comparison with training 
institutions in communist states. As Lee Kuan Yew and his fellow English-educated 
ministers were at that time co-habiting with pro-communists cadres within the People’s 
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Action Party, they might be aware of China’s Central (Communist) Party School.121 No 
records, however, suggest any reference to foreign training institutions in the setting up of 
the Political Study Centre. 
This use of training for socialization, though, was at the expense of skills and 
vocational training. Lee Boon Hiok surmised that the PAP “believed that the new recruit to 
the Civil Service would require only a brief and therefore not a very thorough course to 
familiarize himself with the workings of the Civil Service. The civil servant would thus, for 
the rest of his career, have to gain expertise while ‘on-the-job’.”122 Resources from the 
Staff Training Centre were thus diverted for political socialization. The Staff Training 
Centre, in contrast to its role in training senior officers before 1959, became relegated to 
training the rank-and-file of the bureaucracy.  
Through the lens of state-formation theory, such emphasis on political socialization 
represented the efforts of the emerging political élite to ‘penetrate’ its authority across the 
new state. The bureaucracy, in particular, having served colonial authorities for an 
extended period, was in all purposes a colonial institution. Together with other measures 
vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, the Political Study Centre was meant to show ‘who’s the boss’. 
Asserting executive control over the bureaucracy would allow the new political élite – in 
particular Lee Kuan Yew and his inner core of English-educated ministers – to harness the 
Public Service as its agents of policy implementation. At the same time, these measures 
brought public officers closer to the citizenry, which served to forge a common identity 
among the people of Singapore, an aspect of ‘standardisation’ in state-formation theory. 
The role of the Public Service in state-formation, and the effects of socialization at the 
Political Study Centre, became all the more evident when the PAP experienced its worst 
crisis in 1961.  
The success of the Political Study Centre’s socialization was best demonstrated 
when public officers stuck with the PAP government in 1961. Following the Hong Lim 
electoral debacle and the massive defection of pro-communist elements within its ranks, 
the PAP was hanging on by a wafer-thin legislative majority. At this point when the PAP 
leadership was at its most weakened, had public officers remained disgruntled, they could 
have taken the opportunity to not comply with instructions from their political masters.   
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A logical explanation would be public officers’ adherence to constitutional 
requirements, conditioned by British tradition, to abide by political masters regardless of 
their attitudes towards the government. Another explanation could be public officers’ fears 
of Singapore – and the bureaucracy – falling under the control of pro-communists. If the 
PAP had appeared harsh, an even more leftist pro-communist regime could escalate to 
outright persecution of public officers. Indeed, George Bogaars reflected years later, when 
he went on to become the Head of the Civil Service, that Singapore’s civil servants at that 
point of decolonisation could have it worse:  
It would have been one of the easiest things for the Government to have gone 
along with the general mood and fashion of the day – a mood and fashion which 
had started in the newly independent countries of Asia after the Second World War 
– to denigrate and abuse the civil service until by gradual exhaustion it loses all 
confidence in itself as well as the respect of the public for which it is paid to serve. 
The results of such attrition are a collapse of the Administration and its floundering 
in inefficiency, corruption and graft. These were already apparent in certain parts of 
Asia, though the cause was attributed to everything else except the political 
pandering to popular sentiment to get even with civil servants and the bureaucracy 
who apparently represented the past colonial masters. 123 
 
The most compelling explanation for the bureaucracy’s support for the PAP 
government at its most vulnerable was the successful socialisation of public officers to 
align with the PAP. Indeed, despite the initial apprehension towards the PAP and the 
weakened state of the ruling party, public officers continued to extend their support the 
political masters. Much of the policies that helped the PAP win electoral votes, such as 
public housing, better municipal amenities, larger student enrolment and other socio-
economic improvements, were translated from the political visions of the PAP into actual 
realities by public officers. Given that popular support for the PAP at the Merger 
Referendum saved the PAP from collapse, public officers through their policies played a 
not uncritical role. The socialisation of the Public Service through the Political Study Centre 
was thus largely successful. To quote a civil servant at that time:   
I think the whole thing went through in a very satisfactory way in a sense because it 
corrected the situation within so short a period. If you look at it in retrospect, it was 
a correction of an image of the Civil Service with a very short time. And after that, 
the PAP could use the civil servants. 124 
Bogaars, taking a long view of the evolution of the bureaucracy years later as head of the 
civil service, was sure that socialisation of civil servants through the Political Study Centre 
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played an instrumental role in aligning the bureaucracy, leading the civil service to support 
the Government when it was at its weakest and under attack:  
The politicisation of the civil service … by the Political Study Centre … [was], by 
and large, successful. There was a gradual understanding and perception of the 
civil service of political matters and the issues which concerned the electorate and 
influenced Government policy. This was tested during the next half decade when 
the extreme left in the People’s Action Party under Communist control broke away 
from the party in a bid to seize political power for themselves. …. The civil service 
had to be mobilised across the full range of its functions and activities to meet the 
attack at all points.125 
 
 Political scientist, Chan Heng Chee, went so far as to suggest that the PAP 
leadership, in view of the internal party struggle, “forged an alliance with the civil servants 
through re-socialisation and politicisation of the Civil Service” through the Political Study 
Centre.126 Although the timeline of events did not fit her argument, the Political Study 
Centre was set up in 1959 earlier than the rise of intra-PAP fissures in 1960, Chan was 
perceptive in pointing out that PAP leadership essentially formed an alliance with the 
bureaucracy. And the Political Study Centre was a critical element in that alliance. In fact, 
so profound was the Centre’s impact of the ruling party that when the PAP suffered 
electoral slippage 30 years later, PAP leaders invoked references to the Political Study 
Centre to remind civil servants of the importance of political sensitivity in policy-making.127   
In retrospect, therefore, through various socialisation efforts, the PAP government 
aligned the Public Service to share its goal of independence through peaceful and 
constitutional merger with Malaya. With the bureaucracy thus persuaded, the PAP 
government could rely on public officers supporting its merger campaign even when the 
party was weakened by internal strife. A Public Service that was aligned to PAP 
government could be counted upon to pursue the interests of Singapore, as it became a 
state of Malaysia with the success of merger.   
 The inception point of change, however, began with the Political Study Centre.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Towards Managing the ‘Developmental State’: The Staff Training Institute 
(1971 – 1975) 
In 1971, the Staff Training Institute (STI) was established to build up the 
capacity of the Singapore Public Service to keep pace with the needs of the emerging 
developmental state. As Singapore embarked upon rapid state-led economic 
development after independence, with the key aim of ensuring the survival of the new 
nation-state, the bureaucracy was expected to play the role of an ‘economic general 
staff’. Yet, without the requisite management training, this was a role civil servants 
were not prepared for. Attracting and retaining qualified and talented officers to lead 
and manage this developmental state was further complicated by more attractive 
career prospects in the private sector, booming from the state-led development.  
The STI was a response to level up the management skills of public officers to 
help drive and oversee state-led development. This equipping of managerial skill-sets 
was particularly critical with the appearance of a gap in executive training following the 
closure of the Political Study Centre and end of centralized training of the élite 
Administrative Service and Division 1 officers. At the same time, the introduction of 
management training at the STI would boost the career development of public officers 
and help sweeten the attractiveness of the Public Service in recruiting and retaining 
qualified and talented personnel.  
The chapter, in then detailing the organizational structure and personnel staffing 
of the STI, accounts for the considerations motivating these developments and draws 
out the STI’s relationships with its supervising agency as well as the broader 
bureaucracy. The manner in which the STI structured and deployed its resources also 
illustrates how the Institute sought to carry out its mission and objectives through its 
training activities.  
Given its new brief, an evaluation of the achievements of the STI – while difficult 
– is appropriate before concluding this chapter. A fair assessment is challenging
because of poor access to official government reviews of the STI. In any case, a 
noticeable diminishing of formal records in the public domain after independence, and 
increasing brevity of these records, means that interviews with officials have to be 
relied upon to inform on the writing of this, and subsequent, chapters. To sharpen the 
evaluation of the STI, some comparisons with appropriate foreign training initiatives 
seeks to locate the STI’s relative development. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
examining the events leading to the succession of the STI by another new training 
school, the Civil Service Staff Development Institute. 
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6.1 The Changing Context  
On 15 March 1971, the Minister for Finance, Hon Sui Sen, opened the Staff 
Training Institute.1 This was less than two years after the closure of the Political Study 
Centre, which – as mentioned in the preceding chapter – had taken over the training of 
the élite Administrative Service and other senior public officers. With the closure of the 
Political Study Centre, a gap in the training of senior bureaucrats thus arose. The Staff 
Training Centre, which provided vocational training for the lower hierarchy of the public 
service, also diminished further in importance that it disappeared from official records.  
 Although no publicly available records can account for the training of public 
officers between 1969 and 1971, training did continue. Herman Hochstadt, the Deputy 
Secretary in the Ministry of Finance whose portfolio covered personnel and training 
matters, explained that the management training for officers in the Administrative and 
Executive Services was largely on-the-job during this period. However, this was  
supplemented, when perceived to be needed and feasible, by ad hoc 
participation on sponsorship from individual ministries and departments with 
support of MOF, which had central control over finance and personnel, at part-
time programmes and courses by various organizations such [as] SAMTAS and 
later SIM.2 
Hochstadt was referring to the Supervisory and Management Training Association of 
Singapore, a professional body, and the Singapore Institute of Management, an 
educational institution. Both were entities outside of the government and public service.  
Hence, the training of senior public officers between 1969 and 1971 was 
essentially outsourced. This out-placing of senior officers’ training was not driven by 
innovative thinking in public administration or human resource management. Rather, it 
was an abandonment of formal structured training, returning to pre-1954 colonial 
practice of ad-hoc on-the-job coaching by more experienced officers. By 1971, even 
within the top Administrative Service, for instance, 86 of the total 176 officers had not 
undergone any induction training. By the government’s own admission, “more than 50 
per cent of the officers are relatively new and untrained”.3 As the People’s Action Party 
obviously recognized the value of training, having harnessed training to socialize civil 
servants upon forming government, a deliberate policy to marginalize training was 
unlikely. Perhaps the lowering of training as a priority resulted from the flurry of 
activities with the sudden thrust of independence upon the country. Senior officers, 
even when the importance of their training was recognized, were probably preoccupied 
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with the urgent tasks at hand and could ill afford time for training. The need to finance 
new priorities of nation-building, as mentioned in the previous chapter, added pressure 
on the limited budget. In the face of such urgent tasks and competing pulls on 
resources, an unconscious diversion of the Public Service’s attention away from 
training – rather than a deliberate neglect – was understandable if not inevitable.   
 
6.1.1 Matching Pace with the Developmental State 
The setting up of the Staff Training Institute pointed to the government’s 
dissatisfaction with such unstructured arrangements. The Minister for Finance:  
At present on-the-job training is provided on an ad-hoc basis, if at all, within 
prevailing constraints and resources in the ministries and departments. This is 
obviously unsatisfactory and a conscious effort will have to be made to provide 
adequate on-the-job training to supplement on-course training.4  
Minister Hon Sui Sen elaborated that “the need was recognized for developing a core 
of well trained and efficient civil servants with imaginative concepts of management, if 
we are to maintain and even surpass the level of economic and social growth that 
Singapore has achieved over the last 10 years.”5 Implicit therein was the recognition 
that public officers were unable to match the pace of Singapore’s development or 
changing domestic needs. Indeed, Quah commented that, 
While Singapore’s bureaucracy was not deficient in skilled manpower required 
for developmental programmes – the problem was not one of quantity as the 
size of the bureaucracy was quite large for a small country – the problem 
involved upgrading the quality of bureaucrats.6 
Early localization of the bureaucracy before independence and careful forecasting of 
manpower needs thereafter meant that Singapore had not suffered a scarcity of trained 
personnel. But the unconscious neglect of training, whether caused by post-
independence preoccupations or budgetary constraints, exposed a need “to produce 
well trained and efficient civil servants equipped with knowledge of modern 
management”.7 
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 Part of the reason public officers could not keep pace was Singapore’s 
remarkable speed of development. Chalmers Johnson, in explaining the East Asian 
economic miracles, included Singapore among the capitalist developmental states.8 
That is, the government “hegemonic in a commanding height … mobilize[s] economic 
and political resources” to actively drive the economy.9 The policy instruments ‘guiding 
the market’ were “formulated by an élite economic bureaucracy, led by a pilot agency 
of ‘economic general staff’.”10 Developmental states, thus, relied on “a highly elaborate, 
resourceful, and centralized administrative apparatus for effectively implementing 
national planning priorities and administering direct and indirect control over the 
industrialization process.”11  
The genesis of Singapore’s developmental state was traced to 1959, when the 
PAP upon winning self-government embarked upon state-led industrialization.12 
Economic development would also soak up unemployment and fund social expenditure 
to uplift the well-being of citizens. Post-independence, the PAP government’s focus to 
survive as a separate state led to rapid economic development. The structure of 
government, besides the security and social ministries, was geared entirely towards 
economic development and infrastructural expansion in support of that economic 
development (see Table 6.1). GDP grew from an already respectable 8.9% in 1965 to 
15.2% in 1968. These figures were all the more impressive when set against the 
uncertainties post-Separation, especially when Britain announced its early withdrawal. 
With the UK bases accounting for 20% of Singapore’s economy and 25,000 local jobs, 
British withdrawal was threatening to halt Singapore’s economic engine.13 Despite such 
gloomy outlooks, the Singapore economy powered on to score 17.5% in 1971. 
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Table 6.1: Structure of the Republic of Singapore Government, 196814 
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The massive scale of development across Singapore exacerbated the 
government’s need for the requisite capacity to manage the developmental state. More 
importantly, the use of public enterprises to lead Singapore’s development strategy 
sharpened the need for managerial skills among public officers. Chan pointed out that 
Singapore had established statutory authorities to address particular development 
issues, such as the Housing and Development Board to construct public housing, the 
Development Bank of Singapore to finance industrial start-ups, etc. This “choice of the 
statutory authority as an organizational form released bureaucrats from the 
conventional rules and regulations of the Civil Service to permit flexibility and 
experimentation in new areas, with the minimum of control from the legislature.”15 But 
this “economic and administrative innovation” also compelled public officers to quickly 
acquire the managerial skills to preside over large state-led enterprises. George 
Bogaars, an Eurasian who was then Head of Civil Service, wrote that: 
the rapid economic and social developments of the past few years had 
considerably expanded the scope of activities and responsibilities of 
Government and accelerated the pace of administration. The Government had 
become increasingly involved in businesses and industrial enterprises. All this 
had created a demand for properly trained civil servants with experience and 
knowledge of modern management techniques and with imaginative concepts 
of management.16 
The proliferation of multi-national-corporations into the economy, brought public officers 
face-to-face with some of the top executives from around the world, many of whom 
were highly qualified. For Singapore’s bureaucrats to be effective planners, regulators 
and policy-makers, dealing with overseas MNCs and local companies while keeping an 
eye on the country’s overall development, the need for Singapore’s public officers to be 
equipped with management training became real and urgent.   
Hence, the STI was set primarily to provide the bureaucracy, particularly top 
public officers, with the requisite management training to match the country’s pace of 
development. The STI’s establishment in effect was a catch-up initiative to lift agency 
performance it was an acknowledgement and rectification of the inadequacy of on-the-
job training.17 The STI was also meant to bring the training functions back in-house 
within the Public Service. 
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6.1.2 Retaining Talents 
 At the same time, the STI also aimed to strengthen the Public Service’s human 
resource management amidst the changing economic context. The booming economy 
and influx of MNCs in the 1970s resulted in a keen competition for qualified manpower 
and, in particular, “Managerial skills were at a premium”.18  
 But the Public Service was losing its lustre as a career choice, due to poorer 
remuneration but training compared to the private sector. All officers in the Singapore 
Public Service were organized into four divisions. Division 1 consisted of staff in 
administrative and professional grades with honours-class university-degrees.19 
Division 2 included executive and supervisory grades with general degrees or pre-
university education.  Division 3 contained technical and clerical grades with secondary 
school education, and Division 4 were officers carrying out manual duties.  
Graduates with university-degrees typically began their careers as Executive 
Officers (EOs), a scheme of service in Division 2 (see Table 6.2). EOs could be 
promoted to Higher Executive Officer (HEO) grade and Senior Executive Officer (SEO), 
a Division 1 grade. Graduates with Honours-class degrees could jump-start their 
careers as SEOs in Division 1.  
Table 6.2 Grade Structure of University-Graduates in the Public Service, 1971 20  
 Executive Service Administrative Service  
Division 1 
 Permanent Secretary (PS)  
Deputy Secretary (DS)  
Secretary 
Principal Assistant Secretary (PAS) 
Assistant Secretary (AS) 
Senior Executive Officer (SEO) Administrative Assistant (AA) 
Division 2 
Higher Executive Officer (HEO)  
Executive Officer (EO) 
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 Turnbull (2009) 328.  
19
 John Ewing-Chow and Teo Hee Lian, “Management Training in the Singapore Civil Service,” 
unpublished paper, 1 Sep 1982, John Ewing-Chow Papers,13. 
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 This EO scheme also admitted applicants with Higher School Certificate (equivalent to the UK-based 
General Certificate of Education Advanced Level) or polytechnic-diplomas but with lower salary points than 
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 April 1974 to 31
st
 March 
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circa 1974, Interview with Author, 28 Dec 2011; Teo Hee Lian, Language Education Officer, CSSDI, circa 
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The SEO-grade was equivalent to the Administrative Assistant (AA), the entry-
point of the élite Administrative Service.21 Originating from the colonial bureaucracy 
and modeled after the British administrative class, the Administrative Service was the 
leadership corps of the bureaucracy; its role was secondary only to that of the political 
leadership.22 No wonder that the Administrative Service was cultivated by the People’s 
Action Party as its ‘Praetorian Guards’ after it assumed power at self-government.23 
Administrative Service officers (AO) could be promoted from EO-grades but many AAs 
entered as ‘returned scholars’. These referred to graduates, some from local 
universities but many more from prestigious overseas institutions, where they studied 
on government scholarships. Scholarships were awarded to students who excelled at 
their pre-university examinations, to identify and nurture talented personnel early. Upon 
completion of their studies, ‘scholars’ would serve in the Public Service for a number of 
years. Progression rungs up the AO career ladder, after the AA-grade, were Assistant 
Secretary (AS), Principal Assistant Secretary (PAS), Secretary, Deputy Secretary (DS) 
and finally Permanent Secretary (PS), the highest appointment in the Public Service. 
The impact of private sector competition for manpower was best illustrated by a 
newspaper report at that time. The Straits Times’ survey of 50 senior officers found 32, 
all graduates with Honours-class degrees, would leave for better pay; only 13 would 
serve long term in the bureaucracy. The newspaper pointed out that, “The gap between 
wages in Government and the private sector has steadily widened during the past five 
or six years.”24 Fresh graduates with Honours-class degrees could start their careers 
earning $250 more per month in the private sector; Superscale-A officers could earn 
more than their $3,000 monthly salary in the private sector. This lure of monetary 
incentives, surmised political scientist Seah Chee Meow in an analysis around the 
same time, was due to a weak sense of identification with the Public Service:  
the bureaucratic ethos (such as pride in serving in the bureaucracy) is not 
effectively instilled among the bureaucrats who tend to be more susceptible to 
purely monetary considerations… due to the fact that many of the bureaucrats 
(especially those in the senior or division one grade) have not been in the 
bureaucracy for a long time. They have yet to internalise many of the norms of 
the bureaucracy.25 
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 By the late1970s, the grade structure adjusted slightly with the introduction of a Senior Administrative 
Assistant (SAA) and removal of the Secretary grades. Lee Boon Hiok (1980) 447, 462 and 478. 
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 Anthony Tan Kang Uei, “Meritocracy in the Singapore Civil Service: recruitment and promotion of 
Administrative Service officers,” B.Soc.Sci.(Hons) academic exercise, National University of Singapore, 
1997 24. 
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 Ngiam, Interview with Author, 10 Jan 2013.  
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 ST 25 Apr 1971: 8. Also ST 21 Mar 1971: 10. 
25
 Seah Chee Meow, The Singapore Bureaucracy and Issues of Transition (Singapore: University of 
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Remuneration for civil servants, particularly senior officers, would be raised 
progressively to match the pay-scales in the private sector. But this would materialise 
over several years rather than immediately.  
In the meantime, the government was ready to improve the career development 
of public officers. Closer supervision was introduced to tighten on-the-job training, 
erstwhile ad hoc and unstructured. A senior officer, with the rank of Deputy Secretary, 
was appointed at the Ministry of Finance to oversee the enhanced scheme, and 
empowered to interview new officers regularly to track their progress through improved 
on-the-job training. At the same time, the career advancement of officers was to be 
more purposefully charted out through a programme of planned postings. The abilities, 
potential and even inclinations of officers were to be factored into considerations for the 
postings of officers. Minister Hon Sui Sen reiterated that “Postings of young officers will 
be made with the career development of the officers in mind and not merely because 
the postings are administratively convenient or expedient.”26  
The centerpiece of the government’s plan to attract and retain qualified and 
talented manpower amidst competition from the private sector was the Staff Training 
Institute. Undoubtedly, the STI in the first instance was to provide formal training to 
make up for the unconscious neglect of training in the years after independence. 
Specifically, STI’s primary role was to equip senior public officers, particularly the 
pinnacle Administrative Service officers, with the requisite management skill-sets to 
manage the emerging Singapore developmental state. While so ramping up the 
capacity of the public service, the training of the individual officer would grow his 
capacity to better perform his next job, thus preparing him for advancement in his 
career. Training in the STI was thus also aimed to attract and retain talented officers 
amidst the competition for manpower from the private sector.  
 
6.2 The Staff Training Institute  
 Planning for the Staff Training Institute benefitted from the advice of two British 
management consultants.27 No indication, however, suggested any reference to the 
Fulton Report in Britain, recommending the setting up of a Civil Service College in the 
Home Civil Service, or the Ecole Nationale d’ Administration. By all accounts, there 
were no attempts to model the STI on any civil service schools in other jurisdictions. To 
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 ST 25 Apr 1971: 8. Also ST 21 Mar 1971: 10. 
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site the STI, the former residence of a colonial official at Lorong Langsir, off Stevens 
Road, was identified and renovated into an instructional facility by March 1971.28   
 
6.2.1 Organisational Structure 
 The Staff Training Institute was set up within the Treasury Division in the 
Ministry of Finance (see Table 6.3).29 The Permanent Secretary (Treasury) was 
assisted by three Deputy Secretaries. Herman Hochstadt, during this period, was the 
Deputy Secretary who – as part of his broader portfolio – oversaw the STI through the 
Personnel Administration Branch (PAB) (see Table 6.4).30 Locating the STI under the 
bureaucracy’s central personnel agency indicated that training was seen as a human 
resource subject. Heading the PAB was a Secretary-grade officer, Miss Lim Hsiu Mei. 
Table 6.4: Staff Training Institute, on its establishment in 1971 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Ewing-Chow, Interview with Author, 28 Dec 2011.  
29
 Directory 1970 18-25 updated 31 Oct 1971 and 31 Jul 1972; Estab List 1974 185-202. Also  Hochstadt, 
and Lim Hsiu Mei, Secretary, Personnel Administration Branch, Ministry of Finance, circa 1971, Interview 
with Author, 21 Aug 2012; Hochstadt, email correspondence with Author, 2 Jan 2013.  
30
 STI, Report of Activities, July – December 1972; Directory 1970 25 updated 31 Oct 1971. John Tan 
would have been able detail the developments in this early period of STI but he could not be located.  
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Table 6.3: The Staff Training Institute in the Ministry of Finance, 197131 
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 Drawn up from information in Directory 1970 18-25 updated 31 Oct 1971 and 31 Jul 1972. Organisational units arranged left to right according to the sequence they were presented 
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In 1973, Miss Evelyn Chew Beng Eng, Principal Assistant Secretary in the 
Finance Ministry’s Personnel Administration Branch, was posted to the STI as Acting 
Director (see Table 6.5).32 Chew would be familiar with the STI, having been assisting 
Lim Hsiu Mei at the PAB, making her lateral transfer optimal. The Language Training 
and Management Training sections undertook the STI’s training functions, supported 
by the Administration Section. 
In October 1973, a high-level Steering Committee on Training was set up to 
‘advise’ the Director STI.33 However, one senior member of this Committee 
remembered that, “the Committee did not meet very often.” 34 This Committee might not 
have much impact on the STI after all. 
 
6.2.2 Personnel Staffing 
Personnel for the STI were drawn from within the Public Service. The STI did 
not have to contemplate whether instructors should be recruited from among 
academics or civil servants, a question debated over when staffing Britain’s Centre of 
Administrative Studies and subsequently the UK Civil Service College.35 The STI, by 
1974, had a total of about 45 staff, 12 of whom were engaged in direct training duties.36  
The post of Director of STI was a civil servant, exercising the bureaucracy’s 
authority over the Institute and linking the STI with the larger bureaucracy. The decision 
could also stem from administrative convenience by deploying a senior officer from the 
Finance Ministry who had the competency and was available to start the new school. 
Recruiting from outside the Public Service would have required time, apart from the 
new entrant’s unfamiliarity with the workings of the bureaucracy.   
Similarly, the teaching staff was drawn from among civil servants with the 
number kept small. The Finance Minister explained that, “in view of the very wide field 
that we are going to cover, it will not be possible for us to have full-time staff lecturers    
                                                          
32
 STI, Report of Activities, July – December 1972 3; Estab List 1974-1975 186-187; Directory 1970 21. As 
late as June 1974, Evelyn Chew was signing off as Acting Director. See Evelyn Chew, Acting Director, 
Staff Training Institute, “Letters to the Editor, Govt replies: Civil servants and that cloak of anonymity,” ST 
17 Jun 1974:,14.  
33
 Beside Head of Civil Service, Bogaars, members were Tan Chok Kian, Permanent Secretary 
(Finance)(Budget); Ngiam Tong Dow, Permanent Secretary (Finance)(Development); Peter Tan, 
Secretary, Public Service Commission; Miss Lim Hsiu Mei, Deputy Secretary (Personnel Administration). 
STI, MOF, Training Programme 1975, Jan 1975 1.2. 
34
 Ngiam Tong Dow, Interview with Author, 10 Jan 2013. Tan Chok Kian, Lim Hsiu Mei and Evelyn Chew 
also could not recall much about this Committee. Lim Hsiu Mei, email correspondence with Author, 17 Jan 
2013; Evelyn Chew, Director, STI, 1973 – 1975, email correspondence with Author, 12 Apr 2013. 
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 Lowe (2011) 314.  
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Table 6.5: Internal Structure of the Staff Training Institute, circa 197437 
 
                                                          
37
 Developed from information gathered from Estab List 1974-1975 186-187; STI, MOF, Training Programme 1975, Jan 1975 1.2; Directory 1970 21 updated 31 Oct 1971; Lim Ang 
Yong, Interview with Author, 21 Jun 2012; Ewing-Chow, Interview with Author, 28 Dec 2011.  
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in all the various courses that we want.” 38 From the perspective of the Finance Ministry, 
maintaining a small staff of instructors could also keep expenditure low. But the small 
instructional cadre would not affect classes as the Institute planned on calling upon 
senior civil servants and officers from statutory boards to lead lectures for intermediate, 
advanced and induction courses.39  
Even so, the gap in management training expertise within the bureaucracy 
compelled the STI to look elsewhere for the relevant staff. As late as 1973, 
management trainers were still not recruited.40 Only in 1974 were six Management 
Training Officers appointed in STI. A Management Training Officer recruited around 
that time pointed out that “the economy was taking off and lots of people were joining 
the MNCs – National Semi-Conductor, Texas Instruments, hundreds of companies 
were coming in. There was shortage of manpower.”41  
Eventually, a University of Singapore academic was seconded to STI as Head, 
Management Training. 42 Tan Thiam Soon quickly realised that the existing civil 
servant-trainers were not equipped to teach management courses beyond the 
induction and supervisory courses. As a result, Tan had to bring in colleagues from the 
university to lecture in STI’s management courses.43 The Head of Language Training, 
Robert Walker Lynn credited as “instrumental in developing the Language section of 
the Institute,”44 was also from outside the civil service.  
Finding the appropriate instructional staff with management expertise continued 
to be challenging against the background of a booming private sector: “For [Financial 
Year 1974], $143,370 was not spent because suitable staff including Training and 
Senior Training Officers and Language Education Officers were not recruited despite 
several attempts to do so through circulars and advertisements.”45 
 The issue of locating instructors with the appropriate expertise was not caused 
by want of money. Remarkably, while much preparation had gone into planning the STI, 
such as identifying and renovating facilities, little advanced planning had focused on 
                                                          
38
 Hon Sui Sen, Minister for Finance, Parliamentary Debates, 24 Mar 1971, column 1172.  
39
 Public officers conducting lectures at the STI were paid allowances at the rate of $25 an hour for 
intermediate and advanced courses, and $4 to $10 for language courses. STI staff were not paid. Ibid.  
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 Ewing-Chow, Interview with Author, 28 Dec 2011.  
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 Tan Thiam Soon, Interview with Author, 21 Nov 2012.  
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Wong from the Singapore Institute of Management. Tan Thiam Soon, Interview with Author, 21 Nov 2012.  
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2011; Teo Hee Lian, STI, Interview with Author, 3 Jan 2012. 
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staffing it with the appropriate instructors. Tan Thiam Soon recalled that while his 
secondment from the University of Singapore was for a one-year term, there was no 
succession plan of STI’s management training officers to take over his position.46 
Eventually, when Tan returned to the university, the position of Head of Management 
Training was left vacant for some time.47   
 
6.2.3 Resources and Support 
As a sub-unit of the Finance Ministry, STI drew from the MOF’s budget to run its 
activities; participants and their parent-ministries did not have to pay any fees for the 
courses they attended. A good working relationship with MOF headquarters facilitated 
the resourcing of the Institute, but STI still faced logistical difficulties. Despite 
customized renovations, John Tan (who had supervised these upgrading works) wrote 
two years after STI’s opening that, “The existing premises have proved inadequate as 
more courses are mounted.”48 Inadequate equipment also prompted an obviously 
informed Member of Parliament to notice, during debates on the STI’s 1971 budget, the 
absence of “votes for audio-visual equipment.”49 To which, the Finance Minister replied: 
“It is always possible, of course, to get it on loan from the various organizations.”50  
 
6.2.4 Organisational Objectives and Training Activities 
Although established in 1971, STI’s objectives were only publicly articulated 
several years later. The STI’s Training Programme 1975, its inaugural course 
prospectus, stated that: 
The objective of the Staff Training Institute is to enhance the efficiency of the 
public sector by providing in-service training courses in the following areas:- 
 Induction 
 Management & Supervision 
 Specialised & Vocational 
 Language. 51 
These courses aimed at “Making officers aware of modern management concepts and 
tools” and “Showing officers how these concepts and tools can be applied in the Public 
Service.” In addition, they were meant to equip officers with “basic administrative skills.” 
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In the first nine months of its operations in 1971, the STI had organized an 
impressive 64 courses, training a total of 1,689 participants (see Table 6.6).52 Closer 
scrutiny revealed that some of these courses were conducted on behalf of STI by 
external institutions. All 15 Leadership Training courses were undertaken by the 
Outward Bound School and National Youth Leadership Training Institute.53 After paring 
away courses by external agencies, the STI really conducted 41 courses involving 
1,124 participants.  
Table 6.6: Courses conducted by Staff Training Institute, 1971 
Courses Division No. Held No. of Participants 
Induction Courses  3 80 
Administrative Officers 1 1 39 
General Executive Officers 2 1 25 
Defence Executive Officers 2 1 16 
Management Courses  7 164 
Intermediate Administrative Officers Course 1 3 70 
Executive Officers Course (Intermediate) 2 4 94 
Specialised & Vocational Courses  31 880 
Management Services Training Course 1/2 1 20 
Faster Reading 1/2 2 40 
Preparation of Confidential Reports 1/2 4 97 
Courtesy & Telephone 3/4 24 723 
Leadership Training  15 256 
Outward Bound School 1 4 15 
National Youth Leadership Training Institute 2/3 11 241 
Language Training  8 309 
Adult Education Board 1/2/3 8 309 
Total  64 1,689 
 
 
After a full year of operation, the STI had built up its capacity to provide a wider 
range of programmes (see Table 6.7). Personnel with the requisite knowledge and 
competency were brought on board, such as the secondment of Tan Thiam Soon from 
the University of Singapore to start up the Management Training Section or the 
recruitment of Robert W. Lynn to head the Language Branch. Beyond the number of 
courses held or participants trained, was the broader variety of class offerings. For 
instance, management type courses grew from just two classes in 1971 to five courses 
in 1972. Tan, who drew up the management training curriculum, pointed out that the 
subject of ‘management’ in those days was not overly business oriented: “The 
emphasis was not on finance, accounting, not on that, it’s mainly on management and 
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administration [of personnel].”54 Vocational courses also increased from four to nine, 
attesting to the STI’s growing capacity. Still, in proportion to the overall strength of the 
civil service, at around 63,000 at that time, the 1,287 civil servants trained by the STI 
represented only 2% of the whole bureaucracy. 55 
An examination of the training activities indicated that STI essentially embraced 
the roles played by the former Political Study Centre and Staff Training Centre. A dual 
emphasis was apparent: dedicated training for the top echelon of the bureaucracy and 
providing training opportunities to the lower strata of the Public Service.  
Table 6.7: Courses conducted by Staff Training Institute, 197256 
Courses Division No. Held No. of Participants 
Induction Courses  10 267 
Administrative Officers 1 1 20 
General Executive Officers 2 3 72 
Defence Executive Officers 2 2 55 
Clerical Assistants 3 4 120 
Management Courses  5 97 
Intermediate Administrative Officers Course 1 1 18 
Administration in Action 1 1 18 
General Management Course 1 1 18 
Seminar on Perspectives in Personnel Administration 1 1 20 
Executive Officers Course (Intermediate) 2 1 23 
Specialised & Vocational Courses  19 476 
Project Development & Analysis Course 1 1 30 
Introduction to Computers 1 1 20 
Interpretation of Financial Statements 1 1 18 
Faster Reading 1/2 7 211 
Financial Officers 2 1 20 
Personal Assistants 2 1 21 
Registry Supervisors 2 4 97 
Registry Clerks 3 1 35 
Audio-typing 4 2 24 
Leadership Training  15 209 
Outward Bound School 1 5 13 
National Youth Leadership Training Institute 2/3 10 198 
Language Training  7 238 
Adult Education Board ½ 7 238 
Total  56 1,287 
 
Courses for the leadership corps of the bureaucracy were receiving distinctly 
greater amount of attention. In its first year of operation, the STI had substantially more 
courses for officers in Divisions 1 and 2: while those in Divisions 3 and 4 only had three 
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courses, those in the higher echelon had 10 courses. Divisions 1 and 2 officers also 
had more differentiated development opportunities, with intermediate level 
management courses already on offer. These attested to the greater amount of time 
and attention by STI staff to focus on the training of officers in Divisions 1 and 2. 
Induction courses for the Administrative Service officers also saw the mustering of 
Permanent Secretaries and senior officers from various ministries and statutory boards 
as lecturers; these courses for cadets in the premier scheme of service spanned 10 
days. In comparison, induction courses for the Division 2 General Executive scheme of 
service were only a week long; lecturers were scheduled to be “senior departmental 
officers and Institute staff”.57 Induction for clerical assistants in Division 3 was only 
three days and completely led by SIT staff.58 By 1975, the Induction Course for the 
Administrative Service had stretched to two whole weeks. But that for the Executive 
Service had been reduced to three days. By then, STI had also rolled out an 
“Intermediate Administrative Officers’ Course” and courses on management principles 
and practices for senior officers, attesting to the dedicated amount of attention at 
planning and designing courses specifically for the élite scheme of service and higher 
echelons of the bureaucracy. 
 
6.2.5 Emphasis on the Whole Public Service 
Efforts were made to emphasise STI’s role in offering training to all strata of the 
bureaucracy, meaning including the lower-grade rank-and-file officers: “We will have 
courses for Personal Assistants, Receptionists, Telephone Operators, and Counter 
Clerks. We have courses in the Outward Bound School and in the National Youth 
Leadership Training Institute for officers in supervisory positions.”59 A year later, 
Minister Hon Sui Sen repeated that, “STI has been running a wide range of courses for 
officers in different grades and different Services.”60 The intent was to point out the 
government’s commitment to offer training opportunities to officers in the junior grades.  
 The Staff Training Institute essentially succeeded the roles played by the 
Political Study Centre and the Staff Training Centre, albeit consolidating the training of 
élite and rank-and-file into one agency. The focus on training the élite was a legacy of 
the Political Study Centre. Indeed, the induction courses for officers of the 
Administrative Service and the Executive Service were previously conducted by the 
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Political Study Centre before it closed. Most of the courses for the junior grade officers, 
such as induction for the Clerical Service, vocational training, and language training 
used to be held at the Staff Training Centre. STI was built upon the foundation of 
earlier predecessor training schools.  
 Beside such core structured courses, the STI was also involved in other 
occasional training activities. The Institute, for instance, collaborated with the union of 
public service employees to conduct courses on the Government Instruction Manual.61 
These courses were essential, even critical, as they helped new executive officers pass 
their probationary examinations to be emplaced and to receive a corresponding 
increment to their salaries. In August 1974, STI in conjunction with its parent Finance 
Ministry organized a seminar on “Enhancing Productivity in Government Operations” 
for 100 senior public officers.62 With the Singapore government subsequently launching 
a nation-wide Productivity Campaign, this could be a preparatory workshop for the 
changes that would be introduced across the bureaucracy, indeed, across the country.  
 
6.2.6 The ‘Management Development’ Bulletin – The ‘Gospel of Good Management’ 
 In September 1973, the STI and the Finance Ministry’s Management Services 
Unit jointly published “Management Development”. On the front page of the inaugural 
issue, the Minister for Finance, Hon Sui Sen, likened Management Development to an 
evangelist serving “to spread as widely as possible the gospel of good management, 
which we want to infuse the whole Civil Service.”63 
 The periodical had an editorial board, chaired by Lim Hsiu Mei, the Deputy 
Secretary at the Finance Ministry overseeing personnel matters and the STI. Members 
of the Board included Evelyn Chew, Director STI and Robert W. Lynn, STI’s Head of 
Language Training.  
The similarity between Management Development and the earlier Bakti cannot 
be missed. Bakti complemented the Political Study Centre’s courses by disseminating 
articles on the political context of Singapore’s state-formation process and the role 
expected of the bureaucracy to a wider audience across the Public Service. Likewise, 
Management Development sought to spread across the Public Service information on 
various aspects on management. The inaugural edition introduced “What is 
‘management services’,” for instance, and subsequent issues explained “Management 
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by Objectives”.64 Most of these were contributions from officers across the public 
service, contrasting with Bakti’s offerings of speeches by political leaders or articles 
reproduced from other publications. The articles in Management Development were 
also relatively well written, replete with footnote and bibliographic references.  
 
6.2.7 Evaluation of STI’s Programmes 
Whether formal evaluations were undertaken on the STI’s training programmes 
cannot be ascertained.65 Among academics, only Quah reviewed that “STI was merely 
a training institution and did not have a research programme.”66  
One internal report on a single course is the only document that sheds some 
light on the conduct of training in STI. The report was written up by John Ewing-Chow, 
in his third week as a Training Officer, after attending and administering a course on 
Management Principles and Practice for Division 1 public officers.  Ewing-Chow wrote 
that course participants, despite the publicity given to the STI over the years, were 
unfamiliar with the Institute’s role and course offerings. On the course itself, he thought 
that interesting sessions, such as a Management Game, were let down by vague 
objectives and unclear instructions. Topics on Organisation, Planning and Control 
would be more useful for officers with top management exposure rather than young 
participants. Case studies should be civil service-oriented to enhance identification with 
the scenarios. Between the two trainers, the civil servant rather than the academic 
came across to be more emphatic when acknowledging obstacles in practice. Ewing-
Chow reflected that, “It is therefore a good selection principle… to bring together 
participants of similar ages and educational backgrounds, not only for status reasons 
but also for a better learning environment.”67 While it provides a sampling and cannot 
be taken as representative of all courses, it is nevertheless illuminating. 
Another perspective on STI was found in an interview with J. F. Conceicao in 
the Management Development. The Chairman of the Parliamentary Public Accounts 
Committee lamented that many civil servants were focused on the mechanics of their 
jobs. Beyond vocational development, civil servants should appreciate their roles in 
relation to the community and the country:  
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the kind of orientation provided by the Political Study Centre was [thought] no 
longer necessary. Now surely if you take away that institution, you must devise 
some means of orientating people constantly to the fact that they are serving 
the public….Training, seems to be its just like industrial training without sending 
the guy to the factory. It’s a waste of time. Same thing with the training in the 
Civil Service, it has to be tied to career development. If you are thinking in terms 
of the [Executive Officer] and the chap down the line, you’re training them not 
only to function, but for a fulfilment of a function which if well fulfilled could 
entitle the chap to [promotion].68  
 
6.3 Some Comparisons 
The STI’s establishment was particularly timely considering developments in 
civil service training across other Westminster jurisdictions. In Britain, after years of 
debate, the UK Civil Service College was finally set up in 1971. Proponents for a 
central training school for the UK Home Civil Service, with the Assheton Committee in 
1944 amongst the earliest advocates, had long been tempered by institutional 
inclination towards on-the- job-training.69 The Centre for Administrative Studies set up 
in 1963 was a major step towards a central institution but “only a very small proportion 
of the civil service had access to what might be described as proper training, and this 
was of an exclusively introductory type.”70  The 1968 Fulton Committee finally provided 
the strongest impetus for reforming the subject of training in the bureaucracy and the 
Civil Service College was established in 1971.71  
The UK Civil Service College’s realization brought to the fore other dilemmas in 
civil service training. These ranged from whether academics or civil servants make the 
most appropriate instructors, should the curriculum be academically-rooted or oriented 
to the work and life of the bureaucracy, to whether the College should be headed by an 
academic or career-civil servant?72 The eventual decision was an eminent Professor 
Eugene Grebenik as principal and an under-secretary William Graham Bell as deputy, 
and the faculty was a mix between career civil servants and academics.73 Even so, 
these arrangements were by no means the final word on the long-standing debates 
between civil servants or academics as instructors, or even between advocates of a 
central training institution and those for ‘sitting next to Nellie.’ Nevertheless, the 
creation of a dedicated school in Britain underscored the recognition in that jurisdiction 
of the need for bureaucratic training.  
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In Hong Kong, similarly, training in the bureaucracy was gradually taking off 
after a late start: a Training and Examinations Unit was created under the 
Appointments, Training & Discipline Division within the Colonial Secretariat’s 
Establishment Branch in 1961.74 Its mandate was to upgrade the skill-sets of local 
officers in order to speed up the localisation of the Hong Kong Public Service. 
Considering the similar jurisdictional sizes and common colonial traditions, Hong 
Kong’s Training Unit was several years later than Singapore’s Staff Training School. 
Nevertheless, while the post-colonial Staff Training Centre languished as Singapore 
concentrated on political socialisation, bureaucratic training grew steadily in Hong Kong.  
By 1971, a dedicated Government Training Division separated from other 
shared portfolios (see Table 6.8).75 It continued to coordinate internal training within 
various government departments, and training for civil servants in local and overseas 
universities.76 Its Staff Training Centre, on the other hand, was similar to Singapore’s 
STI, comprising language training sections and a section on General and 
Administrative Training. A huge number of its officers taught languages, particularly 
English language, but the Hong Kong context also required civil servants to be 
equipped with various Chinese dialects. The General and Administrative Training 
section carried out courses on supervisory skills, communications, administrative skills 
and the like, for executive officers, clerks, secretaries and other officers of rank-and-file 
grades. In this regard, the types of training carried out by the Hong Kong Staff Training 
Centre and its main targeted audience were similar with those of Singapore’s STI. The 
exception was management training for the leadership corps, which was the impetus 
for the birth of the STI against the context of a developmental state. In Hong Kong then, 
there were no similar management type courses for its leadership of the bureaucracy. 
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Table 6.8: Hong Kong Government Training Division, 1971 
 
 
In Malaysia, with which Singapore shared a common colonial and bureaucratic 
tradition, the Staff Training Centre set up between 1959 and 1963 had by 1972 
graduated into a National Institute of Public Administration (Institut Tadbiran Awam 
Negara, INTAN).77 While the British neglected training during their “leisurely pace” of 
colonial “maintenance role,” independence and development highlighted the need for 
administrative training.78 Interestingly, apart from remedying “deficiencies in the 
existing training systems,” INTAN’s creation was catalysed by two ‘stimuli’: 
First, there was growing awareness within the civil service of its role as an 
agent of change and the consequent need to equip itself for this role. Second, 
there was pressure from the ADS [Administrative and Diplomatic Service], the 
élite bureaucratic cadre, whose members felt “threatened by a gradual but 
steady diminution of power” brought about in part by their relative inability to 
cope with the new demands made on them, systematic training and career 
development was seen as an immediate need in the process of ‘rejuvenating’ 
the élite cadres.79     
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INTAN’s mission was similar to Singapore’s STI, providing induction, basic training and 
refresher training. But its aim of “training for career development” was more ambitious, 
which INTAN appeared capable of delivering.80 From 1970, INTAN was partnering with 
local universities to conduct courses on management science and public administration 
leading to the conferment of diplomas.  
Currently available records and those officials interviewed for this study 
indicated that there were no references to Malaysia’s experience when the STI was 
being set up. The striking similarities in the respective circumstances leading up to the 
setting up of Singapore’s STI and Malaysia’s INTAN could be due to the near identical 
geographical-jurisdictional context and colonial bureaucratic tradition. Quah certainly 
attributed British negligence of structured training, favouring on-the-job training, as 
reasons for the late development of civil service training in both former UK colonies, 
compared to the rest of Southeast Asian states.81  In any case, compared with 
developments in other Westminster jurisdictions, the STI was a timely catching-up in 
civil service training for Singapore.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Against the context of the Singapore developmental state, the Staff Training 
Institute was set up for the purpose of building up the capacity of the Administrative 
Service corps to manage the country’s rapid economic development. The context of the 
developmental state loomed large when the period in this chapter is examined through 
the conceptual framework. From the prism of the state, the political leadership’s grand 
strategic goal was evidently to focus on rapid, large-scale, state-led economic 
development. This developmental state goal in turn highlighted the perspective from 
which senior ranks of the bureaucracy contemplated the situation: a lack of 
management skills among civil servants to lead, plan, regulate and manage the 
developmental state.  
The Staff Training Institute was meant to be the point through which public 
officers were introduced to and equipped with management skills. In the face of 
competition for limited qualified manpower, STI was part of an overall effort to boost 
public sector HR management, to attract and retain good public officers. STI, all 
considered, was thus set up as a point to reform the Public Service. 
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In the evolution of training in Singapore’s bureaucracy, the STI represented a 
return to the traditional functions of competency training, after a momentary neglect 
due to the priority accorded to using training for political socialisation. Quah observed 
that, “STI reflects a shift in emphasis from the political training courses of the PSC 
[Political Study Centre] to more practical and comprehensive training programmes for 
civil servants.” 82 After ten years of continued rule, the hold of the People’s Action Party 
government over the state was sufficiently secured and political socialization was no 
longer as compelling as at the onset of self-government.  
But, at the same time, focusing on technical competencies was also a natural 
progression from the Political Study Centre. The Political Study Centre had succeeded 
in aligning civil servants into sharing the worldview of the PAP government. Assured of 
a dependable bureaucracy and their civil servants’ loyalty to the new state, the focus 
could shift towards building up the technical competencies of the Public Service, and – 
hence – the STI. As the successor to the Political Study Centre, the purpose of the STI 
was to build up basic competencies and management skills.  
Furthermore, the shift in training policy towards technical skills was recognition 
that basic training in the civil service had largely been neglected in the period following 
independence and before the establishment of STI. For a government that ostensibly 
recognized the value of training, having harnessed training to socialize the bureaucracy, 
how did the PAP allow such an eclipse in the priority of bureaucratic training? The 
answer is likely that the PAP had competing priorities in the wake of independence, 
and civil service training had become a casualty of the primary goals of rapid 
development.  
The preoccupation with the urgent tasks of state-building and competing pull on 
limited resources in the aftermath of independence might have led to an unconscious 
distraction from civil service training. This risk was articulated by the civil servants 
responsible for leading training. John Ewing-Chow and Miss Teo Hee Lian, two trainers 
who started out their careers with the STI and rose eventually to become directors of 
the civil service school, wrote years later that, “The 1970s was … a time when the 
priority going to pressing issues related to economic restructuring, housing, health, 
education, and defence, further development of training in the public sector had to take 
a back seat.”83 In this regard, establishing STI was more than a shift from political 
socialization to practical training; it represented renewed emphasis on training in the 
Singapore Public Service.  
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 The STI was not modelled after any foreign civil service training organisations in 
other jurisdictions. Records available and officials interviewed attested to no references 
to the British Civil Service College, the French Ecole Nationale d’ Administration, the 
Malaysian INTAN or any other foreign bureaucratic schools, in the setting up of the STI. 
The STI was Singapore’s exploration of its own approach towards training, an 
experiment to plug the gap of management training among civil servants amidst the 
needs of the developmental state. This streak to go its own way could reflect distrust or 
an eschewing of foreign models; at the same time, it also reflected a sense of growing 
confidence within the bureaucracy, or the government, of its own budding 
competencies and capabilities. Without the boundaries of foreign models, the STI was 
certainly able to customise its structure, goals and activities to local necessities, and 
took into consideration local constraints. For example, it was able to work around the 
lack of management expertise within the bureaucracy by seeking for the secondment of 
academics to build up capacity in this domain. In all purposes, the STI represented an 
experiment on the part of the Singapore Public Service in training.    
 All its efforts notwithstanding, the STI and its work should not be exaggerated. It 
was always a small organisation, with 45 officers by 1974, of which 12 were in direct 
training positions. Especially stark was the lack of expertise to conduct management 
training, with only 4 trainers even when supplemented by seconded academics. Of the 
56 courses the STI conducted in 1972, only five – or less than 10% - were 
management courses. All 15 leadership courses were experiential types undertaken on 
its behalf by external agencies. The bulk of the STI courses were functional and 
vocational courses. This concentration on training the rank-and-file of the bureaucracy 
hierarchy appeared to have reversed, even subverted, the original intent of setting up 
the STI to equip the Administrative Service officer with management skills.84  
Unsurprisingly, while the STI might have publicised its mission and training 
activities formally, it was apparently not well recognised even among public officers. 
The STI’s organisational goals were set out by the Minister for Finance, and courses 
were offered across the Public Service through regular circulars. In 1975, the STI even 
published a Training Prospectus setting out in details its objectives and its offerings of 
training courses. Yet, in reality, the STI was not very well recognised among public 
officers, as evidenced by Ewing-Chow’s report on a course. Several course participants 
had queried STI staff on what was the STI, what were its roles, who were the staff of 
the STI and what were the courses available at the STI. Hence, for all the STI’s 
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professed official mission and goals, in reality, it was not really well known among 
public officers, its intended clientele.  
The Staff Training Institute appeared from the start to be a temporary milestone 
towards a larger and longer term scheme of training. Even as Flagstaff House was 
being renovated into the STI in 1971, the plan was already laid to eventually locate the 
Institute with a Civil Service Centre to be set up in the former Tanglin Barracks.85 
Within two years, the STI’s Lorong Langsir premises had become inadequate for the 
expanding needs of the STI. However, rather than the scheduled relocation to Tanglin, 
plans were unveiled in 1973 to move STI to Kent Ridge where “the present extent and 
scope of activities will be intensified.”86 In 1975, following the move to the brand new 
complex, the Public Service’s training school was renamed the Civil Service Staff 
Development Institute, thus ending the tenure of the Staff Training Institute from 1971 
to 1975.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Symbolism and Tinkering: The Civil Service Staff Development Institute 
and the Civil Service Institute (1975 – 1996) 
This chapter examines the central training school of the Singapore Public 
Service between 1975 and 1996. Although the school was known as the Civil Service 
Staff Development Institute and then the Civil Service Institute, the two names referred 
to the same organisation and hence merit discussion under the same banner. The 20-
year period is addressed in three parts to draw out the various stages in the school’s 
evolution.  
In 1975, the Staff Training Centre changed its name to the Civil Service Staff 
Development Institute as it moved to new and modern premises, and attempted to 
extend ‘training’ into more comprehensive staff ‘development’. The first part of this 
chapter examines the context leading up to this new phase of training in the Singapore 
bureaucracy. CSSDI helped to improve training but various difficulties hindered its 
development, particularly the CSSDI’s capacity to cater for senior executive 
development.   
The second part of this chapter deals with the Civil Service Institute. While the 
name change from CSSDI was no more substantial than nominal, the Institute did 
begin to grow in capacity and training offerings in the 1980s. Through its expanding 
range of courses, especially those on language, productivity and computerisation, the 
CSI was introducing changes and reforms into and across the Public Service.  
The third part of this chapter addresses the changes and challenges facing the 
CSI. In particular, the tension between broad-based training and developing the élite 
was brought to the fore with the gradual evolution of the CSI into a training institution 
for the whole Public Service. This aspiration contrasted, at least in the eyes of the 
Public Service leadership, with the CSI’s inability to provide leadership development 
programmes for the élite Administrative Service officers.  By the early 1990s, the 
establishment of a separate training centre for AOs ended the CSI’s monopoly of 
training in the bureaucracy. In 1996, the CSI was reorganised into a department within 
a new civil service college. Thus, the CSI’s 20-year tenure as a separate and sole 
central training school of the Public Service came to an end.  
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7.1  Heng Mui Keng Terrace and the CSSDI: A Quiet Graduation 
In June 1975, Management Development announced that: “The Civil Service 
Staff Development Institute (CSSDI), formerly known as Staff Training Institute, has 
moved to its permanent premises in Heng Mui Keng Terrace, off Pasir Panjang Road.”1    
 This allocation of a brand new building to the CSSDI was noteworthy: until then, 
the Public Service’s schools had been set up in existing government quarters. In 
contrast, facilities in the new building were state-of-the-art: a 185-seat lecture theatre 
with the latest sound system, cinema projector and motorized screens was 
complemented by syndicate rooms, language laboratories, a library and a 52-room 
hostel.2 One CSSDI staff recalled that at that time, “CSSDI had the most modern 
building and office in the whole Civil Service.”3  
 The context against which the new facilities were allocated to CSSDI was 
noteworthy. Singapore in the late-1960s and early-1970s, as mentioned in the last 
chapter, had embarked upon rapid state-led economic development, or what Chalmers 
Johnson called developmental-state.4 The dividends from this economic development 
made possible wide-ranging infrastructural and social development. Economic growth 
also allowed the development of the bureaucracy and its associated programmes.  
In 1975, oil crises and instability in Indo-China threatened to derail Singapore’s 
locomotive of rapid development. Singapore’s economic growth dipped to 4.1%. But 
compared with the recession among OECD countries (that recorded a negative growth 
of -2.25%), Singapore was staying afloat “without wage cuts, high unemployment and 
great social strain”.5 Early diversification into the services sector allowed Singapore to 
buck the global trend. The other reason for Singapore’s resilience was its 6% increase 
in public expenditure, primarily infrastructural expansion.6  
However, CSSDI’s new building was actually not part of this expansion in public 
expenditure. Apparently, the building was originally planned as Singapore’s 
contribution to the United Nations.7 One former permanent secretary recounted: 
The CSSDI building at Heng Mui Kheng Terrace – this was originally designed 
and built to accommodate a UN-sponsored regional training and development 
institute under the auspices of ESCAP [Economic and Social Commission for 
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the Asia and the Pacific] but, owing to differences between ESCAP officials and 
Singapore authorities on immunities, privileges and benefits to be extended to 
UN personnel to be attached to and engaged for the UN-sponsored institute, 
the offer to ESCAP to host the institute in Singapore was rescinded by the 
Singapore government; the building and facilities were, on completion, handed 
over to a newly formed CSSDI for use for its programmes and courses.8 
 
 More significantly, the name change from ‘Staff Training Institute’ to ‘Civil 
Service Staff Development Institute’ reflected, according to Miss Evelyn Chew, the 
director overseeing the transition, the institute’s direction towards ‘staff development’.9 
Chew’s supervisor, Miss Lim Hsiu Mei, Deputy Secretary (Personnel Administration 
Branch), concurred that the name change represented a progression from “mere 
training to a higher level of developing staff across the entire civil service.”10 Hence, the 
name-change with the move to new facilities in Heng Mui Keng reflected an elevation 
in training.   
 
7.1.1 Organisational Structure 
The CSSDI reported to the Personnel Administration Branch of the Ministry of 
Finance’s Budget Division11 (see Table 7.1). This reporting line was a continuation from 
that of STI although the MOF, following a reorganisation, had undergone some 
changes. The earlier Treasury Division was renamed Budget Division which continued 
to oversee PAB (compared Table 7.1 with Table 6.3). Hence, to the bureaucracy, 
human resources remained a subject of resourcing and training part of personnel 
management.  
The CSSDI also received policy direction on the training of Division 1 officers 
from the Establishment Unit in the Prime Minister’s Office, signalling the government’s 
attention to “an urgent situation … to spot talent at the top”,12 “because of the void in 
numbers of able officers in the 30 to 45 age group caused by many promising officers  
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Table 7.1: CSSDI in the Singapore Government, 197513 
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Table 7.2: Structure of the Civil Service Staff Development Institute, 197514 
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leaving to join the private sector in the years of rapid economic growth.”15 Internally, the 
CSSDI’s structure remained the same as that of the STI (compare Table 7.2 with Table 
6.5 in Chapter 6).  
 
7.1.2 Personnel Staffing 
The CSSDI continued to have about the same staff establishment as the STI.16 
Tan Thiam Soon and Robert W. Lynn remained Heads of Management Training and 
Language respectively but both left soon after, and the positions became vacant.17  
Lynn had identified a successor before his departure. Miss Teo Hee Lian, a 
young Administrative Service officer had impressed the CSSDI faculty while attending 
induction. Transferring her to the CSSDI was not easy as AOs were typically posted to 
policy-making positions in ministries but Teo eventually became a CSSDI Language 
Education Officer.18  Internal constraints aside, competition from the private sector was 
another issue. When the CSSDI sent Management Training Officer, John Ewing-Chow, 
for post-graduate studies, he had to avoid business-related fields such as Masters in 
Business Administration to avoid exposing him to private sector poaching.19 Difficulties 
in recruiting staff with administrative experience and training expertise continued to 
hinder the CSSDI’s capacity build-up.20  
 
7.1.3 Objectives and Training Activities 
The CSSDI was officially opened by the Minister for Finance on 10 Mar 1976. 
Its aims were similar to those of STI, primarily: “Making officers aware of modern 
management concepts and tools and showing them how these can be applied in the 
Service”.21 Courses remained ‘free’ for public officers; CSSDI continued to rely on the 
Finance Ministry’s budget to run its training activities. 
More significant was a new mapping of CSSDI programmes with the career 
development of public officers. This appeared to follow a parliamentarian’s feedback, 
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as mentioned in the previous chapter.22  Whether Conceicao’s comments prompted a 
review leading to this training-career linkage or resulted from ongoing deliberations in 
the government is not clear. Regardless, this was the first instance the career 
development of officers was factored into the planning of training in the Public Service. 
Mapping training to career progression was particularly evident at Division 1, 
especially for the Administrative Service officers (see Table 6.2). Recruits would attend 
induction within six months of joining the Public Service.23 Upon assuming managerial 
functions, officers would return to the CSSDI for management courses. Deputy 
Secretaries and Principal Assistant Secretaries would attend advanced management 
courses. All AOs would also return for monthly seminars to enhance their 
understanding of policies and policy-making processes.  
The training and career development of Division 1 officers were better 
developed than that of lower grades. Division 2 officers only had an induction 
programme, and, courses in supervision, and financial and personnel administration.24 
The greater attention to the higher grades was magnified when examining the course-
career development mapping for officers below Division 2: there was none.  
This emphasis on Division 1 arose from the bureaucracy’s inherent focus on 
developing its élite. From the beginning, the government concentrated on cultivating 
the premier Administrative Service as its ‘Praetorian Guard’.25 The Administrative 
Service, as mentioned in earlier chapters, was raised originally in the colonial 
bureaucracy and modelled after the British administrative class. Since self-government, 
AOs had been recruited from among the best and brightest of Singapore society, 
typically identified from those who aced pre-university examinations and awarded 
government scholarships for undergraduate studies. The élite status of the 
Administrative Service was fed by its exclusivity: while Executive Service officers in 
Division 2 could be promoted into the Administrative Service up to the 1970s (see 
previous chapter), political scientist Thomas Bellows asserted in the 1980s that “there 
is little movement from Division II to Division I.”26 The government’s commitment to 
prioritising the Administrative Service was reiterated in 1979: “whatever the changes to 
the professional or other services, the pre-eminence of the Administrative Service will 
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be the cornerstone of all services.”27 The CSSDI’s focus on the highest echelons of the 
bureaucracy was thus driven by the government’s long-standing focus on cultivating 
the élite Administrative Service.  
In reality, the training-career development mapping appeared more aspirational. 
Some of the courses prescribed to various levels of officers’ career progression were 
already in place or could be readily rolled out, such as induction and seminars for 
Administrative Service officers. However, some courses could not be easily carried out, 
such as the advanced management courses for Deputy Secretaries. The need to rely 
on foreign trainers, as it eventually did, hinted at the lack of expertise within the CSSDI 
to carry out management training beyond its existing suite of courses for mid-level 
AOs.28 Three academics from the University of Southern California were eventually 
brought in, through the personal efforts of Evelyn Chew, to run advanced management 
courses between 1975 and 1977.29 But the high costs involved required sponsorship 
from the Asia Foundation and when that funding dried up, the gap in the CSSDI’s 
capacity in senior executive development curriculum was once again starkly exposed. 
 
7.2  From the CSSDI to the Civil Service Institute 
 On 27 Feb 1979, the Prime Minister called a meeting that was to affect the 
CSSDI. Lee Kuan Yew was unhappy with the verbose language of memoranda 
reaching his desk. “[This] steady deterioration over the last 20 years,” he warned 
ministers and civil servants, “If we do not make a determined effort to change, the 
process of government will slow down. It will snarl up.” 30 The transcript of the 
discussion thereafter recorded his response to a reference to the CSSDI: “Prime 
Minister: Can’t we find a better name for CSSDI. Find a word that conveys the meaning 
instead of an acronym which does not convey any.” 31  
Overnight, Kirpa Ram Vij who took over as CSSDI Director earlier in the year, 
recalled that the Civil Service Staff Development Institute became the Civil Service 
Institute.32 But its objectives, as other aspects, were similar with those of the CSSDI: 
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Table 7.3: CSSDI and Civil Service Institute, 1979 33 
 
                                                          
33
 Developed from information gathered from Govt Directory 1977: 144-145 updated 1 Jan 1979; Training Programme 1979: 1; Bell, “Teaching Communication Skills: The 
Grammarian’s Funeral?” MD 24 (June 1979): 15-18; Bell, “Investigating Language Training Needs in the Civil Service,” MD 30 (January 1981): 9. Evelyn Chew was posted to the 
Ministry of Health in June 1977: see ASAS Newsletter 16 Jul 1977: 2. 
 2 Training Officers Division I 
 
 3 Training Officers Division II 
Director 
Kirpa Ram Vij 
 
Administration Section 
Miss Jeyamalar 
(Training Administrator) 
Management Training Section 
Dr. Henry Hunter Meyer 
(Head) 
Alfred York 
(Head, from Sep 1979) 
Language Section 
Roger Thomas Bell 
(Head) 
 3 Executive Officers  
 9 Clerical Officers & 
Assistants 
 3 Typists 
 1 Telephone Operator 
 2 Driver & Despatch Rider 
 5 Caretaker & Watchmen 
 3 Office Attendants 
 3 Language Education 
Officers  
 
 1 Lang. Laboratory 
Technician 
Library 
Miss Chan Chwee Yin 
(Assistant Librarian) 
 1 Library Officer 
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(a) Orienting newly recruited officers to the Service;  
(b) Equipping officers with basic administrative skills; and  
(c) Making officers aware of modern management concepts and tools and 
showing them how these can be applied in the Service.34
 
 
 
A more significant development was the establishment of a Training Advisory 
Council (TAC) “to advise the CSI on the development and management of its training 
programmes, and to review periodically its activities and progress.”35 The TAC 
comprised the Head of the Civil Service, Permanent Secretaries from the Prime 
Minister’s Office and Finance Ministry, Secretary of the Public Service Commission and 
Director of the CSI.  While reminiscent of the earlier STI Steering Committee, the work 
of the TAC was to be much more significant. 
 
7.2.1 The Administrative Staff College Proposal 
Among the Training Advisory Council’s first tasks was to review a 
recommendation to upgrade the CSI into a Singapore Administrative Staff College 
(SASC). This was tabled by two professors from the European Institute of Business 
Administration (INSEAD), arising from a French government offer to help train 
Singapore’s public officers:  “a high quality, prestigious SASC should be set up to 
provide continuing education in public administration and management to senior 
officers in the Civil Service.”36 This SASC should be structured under a new ministry or 
department of Public Service and guided by a high-powered Board of Governors. In the 
long term, the INSEAD team envisioned the SASC to  
play a leading role in providing ideas, promoting concepts, methods and 
organising talks given by visiting scholars or foreign personalities. If the College 
is successful in reaching excellence, it could ultimately play a regional role in 
opening its doors and facilities to neighbouring countries.37 
 
A key element of the proposal was a faculty team: selecting from among the 
Administrative Service, six officers with a minimum of six years of service and Principal 
Assistant Secretary or Deputy Secretary-grade. After one year training at INSEAD, the 
six AOs would devote four years to developing various programmes at the Staff 
College.
 
The Training Advisory Council’s interest in the INSEAD proposal was 
particularly piqued by the need to plug the gap of senior-level executive training. 
Except for a few advanced management courses by visiting academics years ago, the 
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CSI had not been able to provide appropriate training for Administrative Service officers 
above the Assistant Secretary-grade. This gap in the CSI’s leadership development 
capacity was, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, begging to be plugged. 
For a more in-depth review of the Administrative Staff College proposal, the 
TAC set up a dedicated task force. Kirpa Ram Vij, the CSI Director, was also sent to 
evaluate the British Civil Service College, French Ecole Nationale d’ Administration and 
INSEAD.38 This was the furthest Singapore had gone to entertain foreign models of 
bureaucratic training. 
The Political Study Centre (1959 – 1969), set up after self-government to 
socialise civil servants away towards a closer appreciation of their political context, had 
no precedent, overseas or locally. The Staff Training Institute (1971 – 1975) was not 
modelled after any foreign training schools, based on available archival records and the 
knowledge of officials interviewed. The CSSDI/CSI, though a progression in training, 
also continued in not taking any reference from overseas models, according to staff 
who were involved. Against this background, the deliberations of the INSEAD proposal 
and the studies of the British and French civil service schools indicated the lengths the 
Singapore Public Service was venturing to plug the gap in the development of its 
leadership.   
On his return, Kirpa Ram Vij recommended support for the INSEAD proposal 
and this was taken into consideration by the task force. After deliberations, the task 
force also endorsed the INSEAD proposal. Suggesting that the most optimal approach 
was upgrading the CSI into the Administrative Staff College, the task force detailed a 
possible organisational structure for the SASC (see Table 7.4).  
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Table 7.4: Proposed Structure of the SASC39 
 
 
Rather than a faculty team of six Administrative Service officers, the task force 
projected that four AOs would suffice. It saw the Principal of the College and the 
Director of Studies (Staff College) to be the same officer, and three more AOs to staff 
the Advanced Management Training section. Two CSI staff would be responsible for 
Foundational Training and provide the continuity when the AOs would be posted out 
after the expiry of their term. Another slight deviation from the INSEAD report was the 
task force’s recommendation for the four AOs to be at least super-scale officers, i.e. 
Deputy Secretary-grade and higher than the Assistant Secretary and Principal 
Assistant Secretary-grades in the original proposal. Further, the task force asserted 
that the four AOs forming the faculty team should possess “relevant post graduate 
degree (which should not be restricted to just an MBA/MPA or its equivalent)”.40 The 
task force thought that training at INSEAD for the four Deputy Secretaries could be 
reduced from one year to nine months. The Advanced Management Course, the main 
SASC course, was envisioned to span over four months and comprised of between 20 
and 39 participants per course. 
Kirpa Ram Vij recalled that the Training Advisory Council spent a long time 
deliberating over the Administrative Staff College, and the CSI waited for a decision on 
the six or four Administrative Service officers to form the faculty team.41 The proposal 
was eventually not agreed to, because the Public Service senior leadership did not 
want to forego experienced AOs from line operational positions for such long periods of 
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time. But that decision would take some time to emerge, as the TAC and the Public 
Service leadership continued to consider the proposal.   
 
7.2.2 Leadership Development 
Meanwhile, the TAC completed a review of the training of Administrative 
Service officers. A four-phase AO training plan was introduced, beginning with a 
Foundation Course for recruits, progressing to management seminars for mid-ranking 
officers, and finally seminars for Permanent Secretaries and senior officers.42 Current 
management courses could then accommodate more Executive Officers and other 
Division 2 officers.  
The Foundation Course was most comprehensively developed. Its aim was to 
foster esprit de corps among new Administrative Service officers and “expose the 
trainees to the political, social, economic, cultural and administrative environment of 
Singapore and the neighbouring countries.” 43 As these AOs “were all coming back 
from Oxbridge”, John Ewing-Chow (who helped conceptualise the course) explained 
that, “Many of them still hankered after the Western, basically British experiences, like 
the musicals and concerts in London. … I felt they needed to be brought back to reality. 
So they had to spend some time in Meet-the-People sessions.”44 Observing Meet-the-
People sessions, essentially clinics where parliamentarians met residents appealing for 
help, returned scholars could better appreciate the “problems and issues that affect the 
ordinary citizen, and become more sensitive drafters of policies during their careers”. 45    
 With nights spent at Meet-the-People sessions, daytime formal curriculum was 
made up of Induction, Management and Written English modules.46 Teaching 
methodology emphasized practicality: between lectures and discussions were problem-
solving exercises, case studies, role-plays and management games aimed at 
knowledge application.47 The curricular was remarkable in the devotion to nurturing 
these cadets, such as learning – at a modeling agency – “table manners, how to sit, 
stand, dress, open and shut doors and make formal introductions.”48 Classes also 
visited every Permanent Secretary, 
so that the trainees can understand each Permanent Secretary’s thinking and 
style of working (the trainees will have to work closely with the Permanent 
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Secretary during their careers) and can understand each Ministry’s policies and 
functions and so see their own work in relation to that of the whole civil 
service.49  
Capping the Foundation Course was a tour of the capitals of the Association of the 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to expose AOs to these countries.   
 The Foundation Course represented the Public Service’s investment in 
nurturing its leadership at a very early stage of their careers. For the Public Service to 
forego two to three months of deployable manpower, having funded these officers 
through three to four years of overseas education, was a determined and disciplined 
commitment towards the long term development of these officers. The costs of the 
ASEAN tour were considerable, as Ewing-Chow related that Singapore embassies in 
the region “looked after us, provided the logistics, hotels, transport, visits to our 
counterparts.” 50 The Civil Service College today still continues to run the Foundation 
Course along the same format, albeit with updates, attesting to the usefulness of that 
concept developed by the CSI in the 1980s.51  
 A programme tested out at this time, rather than deliberately planned, was the 
Organisational Management seminars by Moneim El-Meligi.52 A professor from Rutgers 
University, El-Meligi had put his years of worldwide consultancy with major 
corporations into a series of OM seminars. In 1981, the CSI organised a test-run where 
Public Service leaders were billeted into hotels for seven days to insulate them from 
any disruptions, in order to focus on issues of leadership and people management. The 
permanent secretaries and chief executives were so impressed that El-Meligi’s OM 
seminars became a regular feature on the CSI’s calendar. Ewing-Chow recalled, 
“When else can you get busy PSs and CEOs to take one week off and live-in without 
going back to the office and interrupting their sessions? Participants had a great time 
learning and particularly introspecting and discovering themselves and each other.”53 
For the moment, Moneim El-Meligi’s Organisational Management seminars filled the 
gap in executive training for senior officers in the Public Service.  
 
7.2.3 Improving Language: Strengthening Command, Control and Communications 
The Prime Minister’s 1979 meeting resulted in a preoccupation on clear and 
concise communication by the CSI and Public Service: “The written English we want is 
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clean, clear prose….. not elegant, not stylish, just clean, clear prose. It means 
simplifying, polishing and tightening.”54 Panels were set up in ministries to help civil 
servants write ‘proper English’. Guidelines on writing memoranda were incorporated 
into the Instruction Manual regulating government procedures, and distributed across 
the Public Service.55  
The CSI was directed to intensify its language courses. The first programme 
was for 180 top Administrative Service officers which, CSI’s Head of Language 
emphasised, was not grammar remedial but for the AOs “to learn simple, clear and 
precise styles of writing.”56 Courses were also rolled out for officers down the hierarchy, 
including Division 2 officers, police inspectors, tax officers, etc. The increase in the 
number of courses CSI had to conduct did not correspond with an increase in 
resources, though part time staff were engaged to assist existing trainers.57  
In retrospect, these efforts to improve language helped professionalise the 
Public Service. Despite adapting itself to lead Singapore from a self-governing to a 
developmental state in 20 years, the bureaucracy was bogged down by communication. 
The severity of the problem, amplified by the Prime Minister’s personal intervention, 
begged the questions: was the Public Service’s leadership not aware of the problem? 
Had they not attempted to address this earlier? The language drive resulted in a 
consciousness among public officers for clearer communication. Ewing-Chow, 
reflecting on this episode 30 years on, assessed:  
I will put this down as another important accomplishment that is often forgotten, 
that communication up and down the ranks, if it’s clear, concise, crisp…. I think 
that’s an important aspect. That’s why they are still at it. The job is never done. 
How many years later, through our education system, the people are still not 
writing the way they should write. So that’s important.58 
 
In a population where the majority’s mother tongues are not English, the 
language environment even for those speaking English as the first language can be 
corrosive. Despite English-education replacing Chinese-medium schools over the 
years, the Civil Service College still teaches written communication to facilitate the 
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Public Service’s communication, command and control.59 This may be taken for 
granted in the bureaucracies of English-speaking countries or civil services of 
homogenous societies such as China, France, Japan or Korea. But clear 
communication in a multi-lingual society may require deliberate and determined efforts. 
In the case of the Singapore Public Service, recognition of the importance of clear 
communication began with the CSSDI’s transformation to the CSI. 
 
7.2.4 Remaining Relevant: Productivity, Computerisation & Even Matchmaking 
 Meanwhile, changes in the economy and bureaucracy shaped the CSI’s 
evolution. In 1979, Singapore again faced global recessionary pressures, triggered by 
another oil crisis. The People’s Action Party government, empowered by a 78% 
electoral landslide, restructured the economy towards high-value products. To raise 
labour productivity, a national committee concluded that “for the productivity movement 
to gain momentum, the public sector in Singapore should set an example in improving 
productivity, work attitudes and human management.” 60 
 Within the Public Service, at about the same time, several studies were looking 
into how to attract and retain capable staff, focusing on the personnel systems of the 
Shell Oil Company and the French and Japanese civil services. This led to the 
adoption of an ‘employee-centred management philosophy’, with its aims matching 
those of the productivity movement: improving work attitudes and efficiency.  
The CSI was tasked to operationalise the productivity movement in the Public 
Service by starting-up Work Improvement Teams (WITs). WITs aimed to enhance the 
efficiency by engaging civil servants to improve their daily work.61 For a quick multiplier 
effect, CSI adopted a train-the-trainers approach, training up WITs leaders who would 
return to their ministries to “spread the Gospel” by setting up more WITs and training 
more WITs leaders.62 By 1983, the CSI had trained 757 WITs leaders; 885 WITs were 
established throughout the bureaucracy. WITs Conventions and Management 
Development were other channels CSI used to propagate the productivity movement 
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across the Public Service.63 The 1985 economic downturn – when per capita incomes 
fell for the first time since independence – gave WITs the impetus to expand further 
across the bureaucracy.64 By the end of the 1980s, the number of officers involved in 
WITs rose to 76,000 or 45% of the Public Service workforce. While it later “went off into 
a numbers game”,65 WITs laid the foundation for future waves of public sector reforms.  
 Another example of how training was used to introduce change in the Public 
Service was computerisation. Computerisation spun off from the national productivity 
movement and the bureaucracy was again asked to lead the way: “To stimulate 
computer utilisation in Singapore, it is important for the Government to take the lead 
and demonstrate its willingness to computerise.”66 The CSI started with computer 
‘appreciation’ courses for senior civil servants to familiarise the leadership with the 
impending changes.67 At the same time, it partnered with the Computer Services and 
Management Services Departments from the Finance Ministry to launch various related 
courses. The computerisation drive was later taken over by the specially-created 
National Computer Board but the CSI played an instrumental role with the initial 
training to start off the computerisation programme across the Public Service.  
 The CSI even went into matchmaking. In 1984, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
expressed concern that women with university-degrees were deferring or foregoing 
marriage and procreation.68 If female-graduates failed to pass on their superior genes, 
the PM feared, the quality of Singapore’s already shrinking population would 
deteriorate. The uproar, together with other issues, resulted in the People’s Action 
Party suffering its worst electoral showing. Nevertheless, John Ewing-Chow recalled 
that the Public Service Division at the Prime Minister’s Office decided that “training 
would be an important activity to bring romance” and the CSI was tasked to play its part:  
Lim Ang Yong [CSI trainer] and I designed the curriculum and did the training…. 
40 guys and 40 girls met at the Bukit Timah campus. … Taught them how to 
dance, we made them dress, bring a suit and gown, made the guys go to the 
door, carry a rose and invite the girls to go down on the last day for the end of 
course celebration, big dinner, dancing, learning cha-cha.69   
With sensitivity revolving around this – what the government termed – ‘social 
development’ policy at that time, not much publicity was allowed on the CSI’s efforts: “I 
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am sorry the press cannot quote this”, Ewing-Chow apologised to reporters, “as there 
is a moratorium on this subject but in the lighter vein, this course must be the ultimate 
in promoting reproductivity among graduate civil servants.”70  
The CSI also proved useful in foreign policy. In 1982, Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew and Malaysia’s premier, Mahathir Mohammad, directed, “INTAN [Malaysia’s 
National Institute of Public Administration] and CSI … to work together and through 
joint activities promote closer ties between our two countries’ civil servants.” 71 Kirpa 
Ram Vij, then-Director/CSI, recalled: “[It] so happened that in [Kuala Lumpur], the guy 
who was running the show was a guy by the name of Talib. He was my classmate in 
University! So that helped a lot with INTAN.”72 The CSI-INTAN cooperation resulted in 
joint programmes on Leadership and Organisational Management, which saw 
participants from both the Singaporean and Malaysian civil services.73 Management 
Development also devoted an edition on Malaysia.74 The cooperation between the CSI 
and INTAN fluctuated with the ups and downs in relations between Singapore and 
Malaysia. In the context of this study, the CSI had once again proven its usefulness.  
 
7.2.5 Some Comparisons 
Comparison with INTAN, and other civil service schools, is timely at this 
juncture to locate the state of the CSI’s development. By the 1980s, INTAN had 
developed considerably to wield significant influence in the Malaysian civil service. As 
one of eight divisions in the Public Services Department (see Table 7.5), INTAN 
reported to the Prime Minister through the department’s Director-General, equivalent to 
permanent secretary, and the Chief Secretary, the highest civil service appointment.75 
INTAN had four functional departments: Management Studies, Development Studies, 
Research and Consultancy, and Employee Department Centre.76 Under Management 
and Development Studies departments were several schools responsible for running 
courses on subjects like development administration, community development, land 
administration, etc. INTAN also conducted courses on supervisory and clerical training,  
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Table 7.5: The Malaysian National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), circa 1980 77 
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basic management training and ‘Top Management Seminars’. While the main mode of 
delivery was lecture, INTAN also adopted syndicate discussions, site visits, research 
projects and other learning methodologies.   
INTAN played a strategic role in the personnel management of the leadership 
cadre. All applicants seeking admission into the Administrative and Diplomatic Service 
(ADS), the premier scheme of service in the Malaysian civil service, were required to 
undergo a one-year diploma course at INTAN. The Director of INTAN reported that,  
before a person is appointed to the ADS, he must get a professional certificate 
from INTAN. … and the one-year training in INTAN is not easy. You have to go 
through all kinds of tests. If you don’t get through it, then you will not be taken in. 
And despite that, every year, for example, we have about 2,000 people applying 
and we take in about 200 to 250.78 
Although the Public Services Department was responsible for the posting of ADS 
cadets, INTAN’s views contributed towards the posting order.79 The performance of 
senior officers at mandatory INTAN courses also influenced their promotions to 
Superscale G-grade. Occupying such central position in the selection and promotion of 
the leadership, INTAN naturally commanded strong support across the civil service, 
particularly its leadership.80 
The CSI obviously did not enjoy the same influence wielded by INTAN. 
Although the CSI was responsible for the induction of the Administrative Service cadets, 
the Foundation Courses had only been operating for several years, and the two or 
three months at CSI were not equivalent to a whole year the Malaysian ADS cadets 
spent at INTAN. Singapore’s AOs neither sat for pre-promotion courses at the CSI nor 
depended on the CSI’s appraisal for their promotion. The level of identification with the 
CSI among AOs was probably not strong, compared to the support INTAN would enjoy 
among the Malaysian leadership corps, and this would prove critical in the subsequent 
evolution of the CSI. 
In Hong Kong, the Government Training Division was renamed to Civil Service 
Training Division in 1971.81 Four years later, another name change led it to become the 
Civil Service Training Centre.  Beyond the name changes were a mixture of 
continuation and expansion. Staff establishment doubled to 119 from the original 50 
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officers. The language training functions continued to feature at the Training Centre but 
consolidated in a Language Unit (compare Table 7.6 with Table 6.8).   
The Civil Service Training Centre provided Hong Kong’s administrative officers, 
modelled after Britain’s Administrative Class, with induction and short courses on basic 
requisite skills.82 These included topics like staff appraisal, selection interviews, 
committee chairmanship, etc. But the centrepiece of the administrative officers’ training 
appeared to be a year of academic studies at the prestigious Oxford or Cambridge 
universities. Subjects covered included comparative governments, international 
relations, public administration and urbanisation, as well as electives ranging from 
economics, sociology, administrative law, constitutional law, history and philosophy.  
For departmental officers at directorate grades, which were the upper echelon 
of the hierarchy, the Civil Service Training Centre organised seminars on new 
management concepts while intermediate grade officers could attend Administrative 
Course on management procedures and practices.83 Departmental officers with 
supervisory responsibilities at the lower rungs of the bureaucratic hierarchy could 
attend courses at the Training Centre on principles of supervision, communications, 
motivation, etc.   
In comparison to Hong Kong’s Civil Service Training Centre, Singapore’s CSI 
had a smaller complement of staff directly engaged in training duties. Numbers apart, 
both Hong Kong’s Civil Service Training Centre and Singapore’s CSI had over time 
developed in sophistication, evident in the gradual devotion of resources in specialised 
subjects, especially management programmes for higher echelon officers.  
In Britain, the Civil Service College set up in 1971 offered more lessons than 
yardsticks for comparisons. While the Civil Service College’s establishment brought to 
fruition arguments for formal centralised training, strong beliefs remained – particularly 
among the civil service leadership in Whitehall – in ‘sitting by Nellie’ on-the-job training. 
Against this background, the performance of the Civil Service College was less 
than spectacular. Rodney Lowe, the official historian of the British Civil Service, 
remarked that the quality of teaching was poor: “Students’ enthusiasm for the majority 
of courses and their willingness to return…were both noticeable by their absence.”84 
Even after several years of operation, the College was only able to train 6% of the Civil 
Service, while departments and external providers accounted for the overwhelming  
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Table 7.6: Hong Kong Civil Service Training Centre, 1983 85 
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majority of training in the bureaucracy.86  The 1974 Heaton-Williams Committee found 
much of the training at the Civil Service College to be “over-academic” in nature.87 In 
trying to develop civil servants fast-tracked for leadership positions and simultaneously 
providing technical education to the broader strata of the bureaucracy, the College was 
deemed to lack clarity in its objectives. Lacking involvement in the work and life of the 
Civil Service, the College could not win the confidence of the Civil Service leadership in 
Whitehall.88 Unable to rise up to its remit, the newly appointed principal in 1979, Brian 
Gilmore, was instructed to either, “Kill it – or cure it.”89  
Despite a “revival of sorts” in the 1980s under Gilmore, Whitehall’s continuing 
preference for practical experience over formal training meant that the Civil Service 
College remained at the periphery of the bureaucracy.90 The advent of New Public 
Management turned the College into an Executive Agency in 1989, having to compete 
with the private sector for the training-dollars of government departments in order to 
survive. Pyper observed, “The implications of this are important … There is a marked, 
and increasing, diffusion of responsibility for training within the civil service.” 91 Looking 
back years later, the official account remarked that, “the pressure of … remaining 
commercially competitive had driven it [the College] towards middle management 
training and away from strategic organisational and senior leadership concerns.”92  
The travails of the British Civil Service College through the 1970s, 1980s and 
into the 1990s epitomised the dilemmas of training across most bureaucracies, not 
least the Singapore Public Service. Should training be formal and centralised or 
decentralised and learning-by-doing? Should curriculum be academically-rooted or 
practitioner-oriented? Would scholars or civil servants make the best instructors? 
Should emphasis focus on developing leadership élite or should resources be 
distributed evenly to skilling up civil servants across the hierarchy? The tension 
between leadership development and broad-based training, in particular, would 
dominate deliberations and events in the Singapore Civil Service Institute soon enough.      
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7.3  Changes and Challenges 
 In Singapore, the Civil Service Institute was to witness several significant 
changes as it awaited a decision on the Administrative Staff College proposal. With 
contracts of the expatriates expiring, local CSI staff began taking over as Heads of 
Language and Management Training, namely Teo Hee Lian and John Ewing-Chow 
respectively.93 In 1981, the CSI was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the 
Public Service Commission (PSC) to centralise the management of Division 1 
officers.94 By the middle of that year, it had become clear that the Administrative Staff 
College would not materialise. Kirpa Ram Vij, who saw his CSI posting as a tasking to 
set up the Administrative Staff College, left the CSI.  
Looking back, Vij recognised that “we were short of experienced staff to 
become the faculty members”.95 Foregoing six experienced Administrative Service 
officers from operational posts for five years to undertake training positions, as the 
proposition appeared in the eyes of the senior Public Service leadership, was simply 
not tenable. 30 years on, Ewing-Chow concurred that the Administrative Staff College 
would be ‘overkill’: “Though I envied INTAN where they had the pick of the returning 
postgraduate MBA and PhD AOs to teach a few years before getting promoted to 
operating departments and ministries, I agree that such a scheme would not be 
appropriate for Singapore.”96 With the Administrative Service cadre only 250 strong and 
“extremely busy fighting to survive. INSEAD’s proposal was a luxury, an overkill and it 
did not take into account the reality of the size of the potential students.”97  
At the same time, training was not a priority, despite all the rhetoric. Tan Boon 
Huat who was responsible for posting AOs, remembered:  
To put it bluntly, at one time, the people who were posted to CSI or CSSDI, 
were people who were in trouble. The people who got [into] trouble in HQ or 
somewhere else. Problem, so exiled. That mentality! That was the mentality of 
the top leaders then: training not important.98 
With some permanent secretaries refusing to release capable staff and CSI’s 
reputation as a ‘sin bin’, AOs themselves were understandably reluctant to be posted to 
the CSI. Tan conceded: “We couldn’t get Admin Officers to go [to CSI].” 
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the individual said, ‘You want me to go training? Training is a dead end place!’ 
They didn’t see that going into training is part of their career development. But I 
supposed it’s chicken and egg. Part of it was the curriculum was not developed, 
and the value was not seen. The evolution took a long time. 99 
 
Indeed, CSI’s development was hampered by the constant changes. The heads 
of the two training sections were typically changed within one to two years. In this 
circumstance, how much attention was available to develop rigorous curricula? Was 
there supervision over the implementation of these curricula; were there reviews and 
improvements over training activities? Was there capacity to project and draw up 
longer term plans?  
The changes continued with Vij’s departure. The position of Director of the CSI 
was assigned to Teo Hee Lian. She was only 29 years old. Teo recalled: 
I took over from Kirpa Ram Vij. The understanding was that it was an interim 
thing. I had no interest in administration. That was one of the reasons why I left 
the Administration Service. I had no interest in management or administration. 
So after a year or two, when John was definite that he would stay, I actually 
wrote to PSC and said I’m stepping down and he can take over.100   
John Ewing-Chow thus became the first Director of the CSI who did not hail from the 
Administrative Service.101 Teo was Deputy Director while remaining as Head, 
Language. The Head, Management Training post vacated underwent another change 
to Lim Ang Yong.102  
 A very important change took place in 1983. In that year, the CSI was 
transferred to the Public Service Division (PSD), newly created within the Ministry of 
Finance (see Table 7.7).103 The PSD arose from a consolidation of all personnel 
management functions, including the Public Service Commission’s responsibility over 
the Administrative Service officers and the jurisdiction of MOF’s Personnel 
Administration Branch over Divisions 2, 3 and 4 officers. Although the PSD was a 
division within the Finance Ministry, the establishment of a permanent secretary at its 
head, and the Head of Civil Service as permanent secretary, meant that it was 
effectively a full-fledged ministry and one of higher standing than the rest.104 This 
change in the CSI’s reporting lines to the PSD would – finally – be more enduring, with 
the CSI’s succeeding agencies continuing to report to the PSD.   
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Table 7.7: Civil Service Institute in the Public Service Division, 1983105 
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As part of the centralisation efforts, CSI was eyed to take over more 
responsibilities, beginning with jurisdiction of all civil service examinations. Until then, 
examinations ranging from probationary to promotion were variously under the charge 
of the Public Service Commission and the Finance Ministry. The CSI demurred: “CSI’s 
present staff cannot cope with this new workload.”106 From 1984, nevertheless, the CSI 
took over responsibility of civil service-wide examinations.107 CSI was also tasked to 
training civil servants, particularly clerical officers, for their probationary and promotion 
examinations. As Sim observed, with 17 CSI-staff performing training functions and the 
public service totalling 147,383, the trainer to public officer ratio was 1:8,670.108  
In 1984, the CSI Director took the unusual step of convening a ‘Presentation of 
CSI’s Programmes’ to permanent secretaries and heads of departments. Invited to the 
session were also members from the media, remarkable considering that Ewing-
Chow’s presentation might not reflect well on the Public Service. After presenting CSI’s 
highlights, he appealed to the permanent secretaries and department heads to release 
staff for training. He also asked senior officers to support CSI’s invitation to lecture 
because it still lacked sufficient number of trainers to meet the range of training needs. 
With external lecturers costing up to $4,000 per day, permanent secretaries and 
department heads would be more effective and efficient. Finally, Ewing-Chow asked 
senior officers to counsel staff attending training: “Some come to CSI courses without 
knowing why they are here. Others came and realise that they are in the wrong course. 
Still others come for a break from their routine work.”109      
The 1970s, John Ewing-Chow and Teo Hee Lian reflected, was “a time when 
the priority going to pressing issues related to economic restructuring, housing, health, 
education, and defence [and] further development of training in the public sector had to 
take a back seat.”110 10 years on, the CSI’s difficulties did not improve. A young 
Administrative Service officer at that time remembered that “my boss didn’t allow me to 
go” for induction.111 From reluctance to release officers to attend training or to staff the 
CSI, from individuals’ unwillingness to take up CSI postings to their tentative attitudes 
towards training, these attitudes have not abated over the years. The persistence of 
such attitudes could no longer be excused away by the priorities of state-building; a 
culture prioritising nation-building goals at the expense of training had emerged.  
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If public sector training was overlooked in the 1970s when priorities focused on 
the economy, housing, education and defence,112 the CSI’s difficulties did not appear to 
have improved a decade later. A young Administrative Service officer at that time 
remembered that, “I didn’t even go for Foundation Course, because my boss didn’t 
allow me to go.”113 From reluctance to release officers to attend training or to staff the 
CSI, from individuals’ unwillingness to take up CSI postings to their tentative attitudes 
towards training, these attitudes did not appear to have abated over the years. The 
persistence of such attitudes could no longer be excused away by the priorities of 
state-building. Perhaps a culture had developed that prioritised nation-building goals at 
the expense of training and development.   
For CSI, the constant changes and state of flux did not help its development. 
Adjustments necessitated by regular changes in superior departments, reporting lines, 
organisational leadership and expanding scope of activities would have prevented the 
CSI from drawing up longer term plans to remain relevant to the Public Service. 
 
7.3.1 The Institutionalisation of a Civil Service Training School 
 By the mid-1980s, the CSI had evolved into an established institution of training 
for the Singapore Public Service. From 1981, Singaporean civil servants began to take 
over the leadership positions within the CSI. These positions had required external help 
since the setting up of the Staff Training Institute. The heads of language and 
management training were respectively an expatriate specialist and a seconded 
academic. When their contracts expired, these posts were left vacant for some time 
before other overseas expertise could be secured to fill these posts. In 1981, 
Singaporean civil servants were finally assessed to be capable of taking over the 
positions of heads of language and management training.  
Parallel with this was the gradual filling up of the CSI’s established capacity. 
Since the setting up of the STI and through the period of the CSSDI, the civil service 
school had long faced difficulties in recruiting staff with the requisite skills to take up 
training positions. Up till 1983, the CSI had never managed to achieve its full 
complement of training officers. Although the establishment of the training sections 
provided for 20 trainers, the personnel strength averaged between eight and 10 at any 
one time.114 By 1984, the CSI was finally able to fill 13 of the 14 training positions.  
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The growth in capacity allowed CSI to increase its courses, including for 
Divisions 3 and 4 officers. Until then, the CSI “channelled most of its efforts towards 
training Division 1 officers because it could not get enough trainers.”115 Ewing-Chow, 
who was Director/CSI from 1981 to 1985, took the ‘public sector’ clientele in the 
Institute’s formal objective seriously: “I viewed the whole Public Service as my boss 
and CSI and I responded to requests that had national and public service wide 
impact.”116 Consequently, apart from programmes impacting across the Public Service 
like productivity and computerisation, the CSI expanded courses for the rank-and-file. 
The number of courses for Divisions 3 and 4 officers grew from four when the CSSDI 
was set up, to seven in 1985; in proportion to the CSI’s overall offerings, courses for 
the two lower divisions rose from 12.5% in 1976 to 19% in 1985 (see Table 7.8).  
Table 7.8 Number of CSSDI/CSI Courses by Divisions, 1975 - 1996117 
Year Division 1 Division 2 Divisions 3 & 4 Total 
1976 13 (40.6%) 15 (46.9%) 4 (12.5%) 32 
1980 14 (50%) 10 (35.7%) 4 (14.3%) 28 
1985 19 (51.4%) 11 (29.7%) 7 (18.9%) 37 
1990 19 (41.3%) 15 (32.6%) 12 (26%) 46 
1992 50 (55.6%) 24 (26.7%) 16 (17.8%) 90 
1994 73 (50.7%) 40 (27.8%) 31 (21.5%) 144 
 Division 1 Divisions 2 & 3 Total 
1996 73 (48%) 79 (52%) 152 
 
Events in the mid-1980s had dramatic effects on Singapore and its Public 
Service but did not affect the growth of the CSI. The 1984 election resulted in the ruling 
People’s Action Party securing 64% popular votes but still losing two parliamentary 
seats to the opposition.118 While this would have been a landslide victory in other 
democracies, it was shattering for the PAP which had a complete parliamentary 
monopoly and over 75% popular votes since independence. To echoes of government 
not sufficiently heeding citizens’ voices as a key cause of electoral setback, the Public 
Service faced “increased pressures to be more attentive to ground feedback … to be 
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more responsive to citizens and to view them as stakeholders with a legitimate interest 
in government rather than agents to be controlled.”119  
At the same time, the 1985 worldwide recession and Singapore’s economic 
review that followed led to large scale corporatisation of government functions.120 
Accompanying the strains of ‘small government’ and new public management was the 
perspective to view citizens as customers. Treating citizens as customers and public 
communication took on added emphasis across the bureaucracy and CSI. A Public 
Contact Improvement Programme was developed to train frontline counter staff to 
“serve the public with a friendly, polite, helpful and attentive manner.”121 A Public 
Relations Planning course was also designed to train Division 1 managers in “Creativity 
and PR Planning… Marketing and PR Interface, The Customer Relations Process”.122  
The growth in CSI was particularly evident in the improvement to training for the 
lower strata of the Public Service.  Under the leadership of David Ma Kok Leung, who 
became director in 1986 after Ewing-Chow left for the private sector, CSI launched the 
COSEC programme. Short for Core Skills for Effectiveness and Change, COSEC was 
a suite of courses put together for Division 3 officers to build up their “skills in 
communicating better, getting along with others, solving problems that arise on the job, 
knowing the importance and quality needs of the job, and using the computer.”123 By 
the time Teo Hee Lian resumed as director after Ma was posted out, courses for 
Divisions 3 and 4 officers grew to 26% of the CSI’s overall offerings.124 Setting aside 
resources to address the needs of lower-rank officers reflected a recognition, at least 
on the part of the CSI, that frontline staff were equally important and worthy of 
investment as the leadership cadre.  
The quantitative and qualitative growth in rank-and-file training was in tandem 
with that for the Division 1 leadership and the overall course offerings for the Public 
Service. Courses for Division 1 officers rose steadily from 13 in 1976, or 41% of the 
CSSDI’s total of 32 courses, to 19 or 51% in 1985. From 1992, while the share of 
Division 1 courses remained largely at about half of the CSI’s expanding offerings, the 
absolute number of Division 1 courses swelled exponentially to 50 in 1992 and 73 in 
1994. In comparison, courses for Division 2 officers lagged behind those of their senior 
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and junior counterparts, but only in terms of proportion of the CSI’s overall figures. The 
absolute number of courses for Division 2 officers actually grew to 24 in 1992 and 40 in 
1990. A significant point worth emphasising is that the CSI’s efforts in expanding 
broad-based training were not at the expense of élite development. The evidence in 
Table 7.8 showed that Division 1 training had consistently constituted half of the 
Institute’s overall offerings of courses in the 20 year period.  
The rising tide of CSI’s overall number of courses was lifting figures in all the 
groups, benefitting large sections across the Public Service. By 1990, the total number 
of course offered by the CSI had increased to 46, from 32 when it first started as the 
CSSDI. That year also witnessed the CSI training 31,547 civil servants, the highest 
figure attained by the Institute. On average annually in the 1990s, the CSI was training 
20,000 officers. With the Civil Service totalling 90,246, the CSI was reaching out to 22% 
of the bureaucracy.125  In 1992, the number of CSI courses doubled to 90, and 
expanded further to 144 by 1994. By 1996, before the CSI was reorganised and 
absorbed into a new civil service college, the CSI was running 152 courses.  
Amidst attaining optimal staff capacity and improvements in course offerings 
was an apparent sense of rising confidence within the CSI. Most evident was its 1984 
engagement of the Public Service’s leadership before the eyes of the mass media. The 
CSI’s difficulties did not arise overnight and these would have been discussed regularly 
with superior and other stakeholder agencies through the bureaucracy’s routine 
communication channels. That the CSI chose to canvass the support of the permanent 
secretaries publicly hinted at a tinge of frustration with the impasse, even when the 
occasion was couched as the Institute’s report to stakeholders. More importantly, 
inviting the press to witness their accounting to and engagement with their leadership 
pointed to a level of boldness among the CSI’s management team, definitely not 
representative of the typical media-shy civil servants.  
The CSI’s institutionalisation did not mean it was not without shortcomings. One 
study pointed out that the agencies responsible for training public officers had not 
developed a standardised conceptualisation of ‘training’.126 Training methods and 
evaluation lacked formalised procedures, compounded by poor supervision. These 
weaknesses though did not detract from improvements in institutional organisation.  
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7.3.2 Ending in Tears: Questioning the Relevance of the CSI  
  By the mid-1980s, the CSI’s trajectory of development was pulling it away from 
the government’s longstanding focus on cultivating the Administrative Service élite. 
Although some of its programmes were geared towards the leadership cadre, the CSI 
was not rising up to become the AOs’ development centre. To be fair, the Staff College 
was curtailed not because of the CSI’s failing, but the Public Service leadership’s 
unwillingness to divert AOs away from policy-making posts to start the faculty team.  
The CSI actually recognised the importance of developing the AOs and had 
prioritised resources – at the expense of training rank-and-file officers – towards 
training the Praetorian Guards.127 But the Foundation Course and other CSI 
programmes for AOs were in the eyes of many among its audience, “only up to that 
level” and poor cousins to post-graduate courses at prestigious overseas universities:  
I think there [overseas universities], your exposure is different, the people who 
are with you, your classmates, are all very different, usually upper level. 
Anyway, it’s international, very multi-faceted so it’s quite different. The Admin 
Officers, you also don’t want to go the local MPA. 128  
Comparing the MPA programmes at Harvard University, for example, with in-service 
training at the CSI was unfair, but such was the impression in the minds of many AOs 
and Public Service leaders.129 And perceptions shaped policy.  
As the CSI was seeking to improve its relevance to the Public Service, its 
reputation among the leadership corps was suffering. The CSI’s responses to the 
national call in spearheading productivity, computerisation and even ‘social 
development’ drives, were regarded by some among the Public Service leadership as 
‘miscellaneous’: 
 [the Chairman] felt that at present CSI was conducting too many miscellaneous 
courses and had disproportionately few management development courses for 
Administrative Officers and senior departmental officers. He was of the opinion 
that if CSI concentrated on the training for this group of officers instead, there 
would be benefits and spin-offs for the whole of the civil service. The emphasis, 
therefore, should be on course to improve the management skills of the 
Administrative Officers, and senior departmental heads.130    
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 In a paper tabled before the CSI Executive Committee in 1982, the first of four aims listed by the CSI 
was “Training and development for Administrative Officers,” Paper No. 8/10/82, “The Civil Service Institute 
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Ewing-Chow related the perception of a very senior Public Service official: “I wrote it 
down: CSI, image of CSI – Division 3 training.”131 Tan Boon Huat verified the 
impression among public officers: “it’s okay up to that level, for the clerical, the EO 
[Executive Officers] level kind of training. For the real intellectual, more challenging 
kind of training, you know….[trailed off].”132 The harder CSI tried to be the training 
centre for the whole Public Service – expanding courses beyond those for AOs as it 
built up its staffing – it was increasingly seen as a training centre for Divisions 2, 3 and 
4 officers, i.e., not for the leadership. The general impression of the CSI – as early as 
the mid-1980s – was a school for the hoi polloi and not capable of training AOs.  
 The CSI’s reputation as a broad-based training school, rather than a leadership 
development centre, must have further contributed to its difficulties in attracting 
personnel with the requisite qualities. Over time, the CSI had grown from being an 
‘exile’ for officers in trouble to an established institution of training for the Public Service. 
Despite this, the challenge of securing talented officers to an instructional stint at the 
CSI persisted till the late 1980s. In particular, the Administrative Service leadership 
cadre of the Public Service were reluctant in taking up any CSI posting. David Ma 
lamented, 
Not many people would like to go to CSI, maybe, as a career. Unless you like 
training, otherwise you may not want to be there for long. So at one point in time 
we actually were thinking of getting those returned scholars to be posted to CSI 
for a short while. Somehow CSI still failed to attract people there.133  
 
In 1991, local newspapers disclosed that a new Civil Service College for 
training the Administrative Service leadership corps was being planned. Citing a “well-
placed civil service source”, the Straits Times revealed that this proposed institution 
would be “distinct from the Civil Service Institute (CSI).”134 That same year a deputy 
secretary had been designated as dean of the eventual college.135 In the following year, 
an Administrative Service officer was appointed deputy dean and visited several civil 
service training institutions in North America. A separate study examined the British 
Civil Service College and several other foreign civil service schools.  
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 Tan Boon Huat, Interview with Author, 14 Jan 2013, left unsaid that CSI was not seen to be capable of 
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The new Civil Service College formally inaugurated in April 1993.136 The 
Foundation Course, conceptualised and run for the past two decades by the CSI, and 
all training programmes involving AOs, were transferred to the CSC, removing the 
CSI’s role in training the Praetorian Guards. The monopoly of central training in the 
Singapore Public Service by the CSI, initially as the STI from 1971 and then the CSSDI 
between 1975 and 1979, had thus finally come to an end. From 1993 to 1996, the CSI 
became effectively a provider of vocational training. In 1996, the CSI ceased to be an 
independent entity following a broader reorganisation, which will be discussed in 
greater depth in a subsequent chapter. 
In the longer term, a brand new complex housing the new CSC and several 
think tanks was to be built at the CSI’s existing Heng Mui Keng Terrace’s premises. 
Because the CSI was perceived as a training centre for Divisions 3 and 4 officers, Teo 
Hee Lian who had resumed as Director of the CSI since 1988, recalled:  
we [the CSI] were seen as not compatible. So you can imagine how that 
comment went down with my colleagues. They were furious. And we were just 
told: make way. Some of my colleagues tried to point out that there was space 
there enough for everybody. But we were told: move out, because we were not 
compatible. …. We were even told to go and look at a school. I blew my top 
when they told me to move to a school. I said, ‘We are not moving to an 
abandoned school!’137  
 
The strong sentiments brought into focus the manner in which this 
reorganization was approached. The government was effectively creating two centres 
of training: one set up for leadership development, and the proposition for the CSI 
could be positioned as a specialized centre for functional training. Indeed, one senior 
official at the Public Service Division reportedly described the CSC and CSI as 
“strategic” and “tactical” in their respective places in training and development.138 They 
did not need to be mutually exclusive or competitive, with each catering to different 
genres, and could be seen as complementary. With hindsight, requiring CSI to vacate 
its long-standing premises for a new entity, following closely on the directive to transfer 
all AO training programmes it had developed and run to the new college, came across 
as hurried and could be more empathetic. It reflected the establishment’s emphasis on 
developing the AO élite, without addressing the impacts on the CSI. To belabour the 
point, while CSI was allocated $5 million from the 1995 budget for the bureaucracy, this 
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Table 7.9: Internal Structure of the Civil Service Institute, 1996 139 
(depicting organisation structure just before reorganisation into the Civil Service College) 
 
                                                          
139
 Chart depicts the CSI just before it was reorganised into the Civil Service College in 1996. Developed from information gathered from Govt Directory January 1996: 650-651. Lai 
reported that CSI had 60 staff with 40% of them performing the dual function of trainer and course administrator: Lai (1995) 24.  
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was catering to the training of more than 20,000 civil servants. In contrast, the CSC’s 
seemingly lesser $2 million allocation was only covering about 300 AOs and leaders in 
the Public Service.140  Greater levels of engagement and sensitivity, and more time, 
could have been employed to explain and carry out the organizational changes 
affecting the CSI and its staff.   
Eventually, seemingly to sweeten the bitter pill, the CSI was offered a plot of 
land. Teo found some satisfaction in the design of the North Buona Vista building: 
I told the architect the new building cannot look like a school, it cannot look like 
an office building….. I gave him a brief for the new building, I said, ‘The moment 
you step into the building, there must be openness, there must be air, there 
must be feeling you are liberated, things are possible.’…. We even built in 
space in that building for future development. We were specifically told we 
cannot have more [space] than we had in Heng Mui Keng Terrace. We knew 
we needed more. So we built that in surreptitiously.141 
 
Even before the CSI moved into the new building, scheduled to be completed in 
1998, unfolding events in the broader Public Service further affected the CSI. The 
Public Service Division which CSI reported to was transferred to the Prime Minister’s 
Office in 1994. But more dramatic changes came in 1996. The CSI was renamed the 
Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM) and merged with the Civil 
Service College,  renamed the Institute of Policy Development (IPD), to form a new 
Civil Service College (CSC). Miss Lim Soo Hoon, appointed Dean of the new CSC, 
remembered: 
bearing in mind that IPD was then called CSC, so CSI people were very upset. 
They said, ‘Why should we, we are twice the size of IPD, have to use the CSC 
name?’ …. The real reason was because CSI had baggage. As I told you 
previously CSI was doing all these broad-based training, the levels of people 
they were covering, Super-scale [officers at the highest grades] all the way to 
Division 4. There was a certain baggage, certain brand name. …. If we still 
called it CSI, people would still have the perception that it was the same thing. 
So we had to refresh it, re-brand it. And we thought that CSC was a very good 
name.142 
20 years since moving to the brand new Heng Mui Keng Terrace building as the CSSDI, 
the CSI ended its existence as an independent civil service training organisation. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
CSI was a focal point through which changes were introduced across the 
Singapore Public Service between 1975 and 1996. CSI expanded upon the foundation 
laid by the preceding Staff Training Institute to build up, extensively, the technical 
competencies of officers across the rank-and-file of the bureaucracy. As the volume 
and sophistication of its programmes grew, training an increasing number of civil 
servants, CSI evolved into an institution of training and reform for the Singapore 
bureaucracy.   
The CSI’s two decades, the longest period of any training initiative thus far, 
comprised of several phases. The first few years as the CSSDI laid the foundation for 
subsequent growth, such as integrating modern facilities, developing staffing capacities, 
and mapping training courses to career development of public officers. Although the 
overnight name-change to the CSI was only nominal, without material changes in 
organisational goals or structures, it demarcated a point when the Public Service’s 
central training school began to develop. The CSI, through its roles in offering 
language and communication courses and training in WITs and computerisation, 
was evidently the focal point through which reforms were introduced into and 
across the Singapore Public Service.  By helping to improve the language and 
writing of public officers, communications up and down the hierarchy and across the 
bureaucracy was enhanced, thereby facilitating command and control throughout the 
government machinery. The provision of requisite training seeded the productivity and 
computerisation drives across the bureaucracy, which eventually propagated across 
the whole country.   
By the early 1980s, the CSI was evolving into an established institution of 
training for the Singapore Public Service. The initial difficulty with recruiting personnel 
with the necessary expertise was gradually overcome as seconded academics and 
foreign experts bought time for the CSI to develop its own staff. From 1981, officers 
who rose up the CSI ranks and were groomed by the Institute, such as John Ewing-
Chow and Teo Hee Lian, began taking over leadership positions, including as director 
of the CSI. Gradually, the CSI was able to fill up its staffing establishment, providing it 
the capacity to improve its inventory of courses over the years. By the early 1990s, the 
CSI had doubled its total number of courses from its initial years as the CSSDI, and 
reaching out to more public officers across the various hierarchical strata of the 
bureaucracy. The CSI’s role in leading the productivity and computerisation drives 
across the Public Service was an acknowledgement of the CSI’s maturing capacity by 
the leadership of the Public Service. The most credible recognition of the CSI’s 
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institutionalisation was the political leadership’s deployment of the CSI as a foreign 
policy instrument in strengthening bilateral relations with Malaysia.  
The CSI’s institutionalisation also manifested through the rising level of 
confidence among its leadership team, the emergence of particular organisational 
interests and the identification with these interests by its staff. The decision by the CSI 
leadership to engage permanent secretaries on the Institute’s difficulties, especially 
before the gaze of the mass media, was particularly bold and pronounced. But, even 
away from the public domain, John Ewing-Chow and Teo Hee Lian were also active in 
pursuing the interests of the CSI during their respective tenures as directors. Ewing-
Chow, when he was director, strove to uplift the image of the CSI as a school for 
training the whole Public Service. Teo in turn represented the sentiments of the staff in 
holding onto – metaphorically but also literally – the CSI’s ground as the central training 
school of the bureaucracy. Thus, the forging of such close identification among the staff 
with the organisation and its peculiar interests, together with its capacity to train large 
sections of the bureaucracy, pointed to the CSI’s development  into a recognised 
institution of training in the Singapore Public Service.  
The dilemmas and tensions faced by the CSI, and the bureaucracy, should not 
be understated. Like civil services of other countries, the Singapore Public Service also 
faced quandaries associated with training. Seeking the optimal balance between on-
the-job training and formal training appeared to be sorted out with the setting up of the 
STI, and was definitely resolved by investing in modern facilities for CSSDI. The debate 
between an academic-oriented curriculum and a practitioner-based approach did not 
appear to be an issue from the start. Although academics enlisted in starting up STI 
continued into the transition to CSSDI, their contracts were short-term from the 
beginning and the curriculum they helped to draw up bent towards applied – rather 
than theoretical – training.  
The real tension for the CSI, as well as the bureaucracy, was between broad-
based training and élite development. On the formal organisational level, the Public 
Service appeared to aspire towards training up the whole bureaucracy. This goal was 
repeatedly stressed by the Minister for Finance during the STI period described in 
Chapter 4. Indeed, broad-based training seemed to be the raison d’être for the 
establishment of the CSSDI and the CSI, i.e., “The objective of the Institute is to 
enhance the effectiveness of the public sector”.143 The team of civil servants managing 
the CSI certainly took this formal organisational goal seriously. During their respective 
terms as directors, John Ewing-Chow, Teo Hee Lian and David Ma led the CSI to 
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improve the training programmes for the rank-and-file of the bureaucracy, without 
diverting attention away from developing the leadership corps. As the overall inventory 
of programmes grew, so did the number of courses for the élite, allowing leadership 
development to consistently constitute half of the CSI’s total course offerings. The 
permanent secretaries and chief executives who collectively formed the leadership of 
the Public Service seemed to support this goal of training the whole bureaucracy, at 
least at the formal organisational level.  
Informally, the leadership of the Public Service evidently rooted for an emphasis 
on developing the Administrative Service élite. In all purposes, these permanent 
secretaries and chief executives heading government agencies could be reflecting the 
position of the political leadership. The decision by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and 
Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee, immediately after self-government, to concentrate 
on cultivating a corps of Administrative Service leadership élite – a Praetorian Guards – 
did not appear to have changed over the years. The fact that these permanent 
secretaries and chief executives were predominantly AOs themselves should not be 
overlooked, even though not all of them would be driven by provincial outlooks. To be 
sure, many among these senior officers would have been very conscious of their 
responsibilities over their respective ministries and agencies, as well as their 
responsibilities over the whole Public Service, and even the Singapore state. Many of 
these Public Service leaders were involved in leading the bureaucracy in steering 
Singapore through the phases of state-formation and developmental state. In the eyes 
of some of these Public Service leaders, the best interests of the bureaucracy and the 
state was to focus on grooming scarce talents and to sustain and expand the training of 
the AOs. While not all of them might be completely like-minded, the prevailing 
consensus by the 1980s was to raise a dedicated centre for developing the AO 
leadership, and which should be set apart from the CSI. Thus, while at the formal 
organisational level, the Public Service leadership supported the CSI’s drive towards 
broad-based training, at the informal level, that endorsement was conditioned upon 
continued and sustained heavy emphasis on developing the AO leadership élite.    
Ironically, the CSI’s development into an institution of broad-based training, 
seemingly fulfilling its mission in the eyes of its staff, highlighted the CSI’s lack of 
capacity in leadership development from the perspectives of the Public Service 
leadership. The possibility of positioning the issue as flourishing the CSI as a centre of 
functional training on the one hand, and plugging a gap in leadership development on 
the other hand, was lost with the awkward handling of the CSI amidst the 
reorganisation. The interest of the Public Service leadership, and the government 
towards cultivating the AOs was demonstrated by the rush to set up the new Civil 
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Service College. From the viewpoints of those in CSI, this was a marginalisation – a 
literal displacement with the mandatory move away from Heng Mui Keng Terrace – of 
the CSI. CSI’s tenure as the sole central civil service training organisation finally came 
to an end with its renaming and subordination as a department under the banner of the 
Civil Service College in 1996.  
Leadership development in the new Civil Service College is discussed in the 
next chapter.     
161 
CHAPTER 8 
The First Dedicated Leadership Training Initiative: Civil Service College 
(1993 – 1996) 
In 1993, the Civil Service College was set up as a point to improve policy-
making and leadership development in the Singapore Public Service.  By locating the 
context against which the CSC was established, this chapter begins by highlighting the 
significance of the College: not only did CSC realise the bureaucracy’s long search for 
a credible leadership development scheme, strong political impetus drove – indeed 
provided the raison d’terré for  - the establishment of the Civil Service College.  
The chapter proceeds then to highlight the importance of personnel selection in 
setting up the bureaucracy’s latest training initiative. Selecting leaders with the vision 
and competence not only helped to overcome potential resistance against the CSC 
venture, it allowed the College subsequently to produce remarkable programmes. The 
CSC’s milestone programmes were by far its most notable accomplishment as they 
offered, for the first time, a comprehensive set of leadership development programmes 
for the bureaucracy’s Administrative Service and upper leadership echelon. More 
significantly, an in-depth examination of the CSC’s staffing and activities also reveals 
the high level of political attention accorded to the institution. This high level of support 
from the political leadership made possible the creation of the CSC as the point 
through which reforms were introduced into the leadership echelon of the Singapore 
Public Service.  
8.1 The Bureaucratic Imperative 
The first public inkling of the pending establishment of the Civil Service College 
came from a planted ‘leak’ in the national broadsheet. On 24 May 1991, the Straits 
Times quoted a “well-placed civil service source” revealing that a new institution for 
training Administrative Service officers was in the works: “we have gone past the study 
stage and some plans have already been drawn up.”1  
Leadership training had always featured prominently in the Singapore Public 
Service, as described in the preceding chapters. The raison d’être of the Political Study 
Centre, set up in 1959 when Singapore became a self-governing state, targeted the 
leadership of the bureaucracy, to socialise them to the tasks of state-formation. 
Equipping officers of the Administrative Service leadership cadre with the requisite 
management skills to lead the developmental state was the motivation for creating the 
Staff Training Institute in 1971. Throughout the 1980s, leadership development 
1
 ST 24 May 1991: 30. 
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continued to preoccupy the Public Service’s leadership when contemplating the subject 
of training. And, as described in the previous chapter, their dissatisfaction with 
leadership training efforts in the Civil Service Institute led to the decision for setting up 
the Civil Service College. Kishore Mahbubani, then Deputy Secretary at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, reflected the sentiments of his colleagues and permanent secretaries 
who constituted the leadership of the Public Service:  
I think the Civil Service Institute was always to provide skills-based training; 
more for lower level officials; teach them various skills they needed to know to 
do their jobs. Whereas Civil Service College was always intended for the 
highest levels of the Service, for the AOs, for the high flyers, to train them, 
develop them, socialise them.2 
 
 In 1992, Richard Hu, the Minister for Finance, formally announced plans to set 
up the Civil Service College. He observed that, “the Civil Service presently lacks an 
institutional focal point where tradition is preserved and values shared and transmitted 
through generations.”3 Singapore, hence, needed an equivalent of France’s Ecole 
Nationale d’Administration or Malaysia’s National Institute of Public Administration 
where public officers could be imbued with common values and traditions.  
On 29 Apr 1993, the Civil Service College was inaugurated, its official mission:  
To foster the development of a strong and vibrant senior Civil Service which will, 
in addition to the prevailing strengths of competence, dedication, integrity and 
meritocracy, have a strong sense of tradition, esprit de corps, enhanced 
managerial skills, a sensitive understanding of the new evolving political and 
economic realities (domestic, regional and global) and commitment to a long 
term vision of a secure, stable and successful Singapore.4   
 
A key reason for setting up the CSC was to forge a stronger esprit de corps 
among the Administrative Service officers.5 These AOs, who formed the leadership of 
the Singapore Public Service and whose role in policy-making was secondary only to 
the political leadership, had long been heading various government agencies across 
the bureaucracy. By the early 1990s, the Public Service had evolved from the 
traditional ministries to include 62 statutory boards; public officers – especially AOs – 
were also deployed to many government-linked corporations.6 Kishore Mahbubani, who 
was appointed the first Dean of the CSC, felt this diversification had led to too much   
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Table 8.1 Manpower Strength of the Administrative Service, 1974 - 19967
 
 
Table 8.2 HR Structure of the Administrative Service, circa 19938 
 Grade Corresponding Rank Monthly Salary 
Timescale* 
Administrative Assistant 
AA / SAA 
$2,715 - $3,550 
Senior Administrative Assistant $4,065 - $4,845 
Assistant Secretary AS $5,090 - $6,080 
Principal Assistant Secretary PAS $6,980 - $8,155 
Administrative 
Officer 
Superscale G 
Deputy Secretary 
$10,445 
Superscale F $11,390 
Superscale E 
Deputy Secretary /                           
Higher Deputy Secretary 
$12,445 
Superscale E1 $13,660 
Superscale D 
Higher Deputy Secretary /                
Senior Deputy Secretary 
$14,970 
Superscale D1 $17,180 
Senior 
Administrative 
Officer 
Superscale C Senior DS / Permanent Secretary $20,020 
Superscale B Permanent Secretary $24,020 
Superscale A 
Permanent Secretary / Senior PS 
$28,335 
Staff Grade I $33,490 
Staff Grade II Senior PS / Special PS $39,280 
Staff Grade III 
Special Permanent Secretary 
$46,120 
Staff Grade IV $54,220 
Staff Grade V $63,690 
* ‘Timescale’ refers to the general scheme of service. 
                                                          
7
 Personnel Development Branch, Public Service Division, Prime Minister’s Office, in Anthony Tan (1997) 
23. 
8
 “The Administrative Service,” Public Service Division, Prime Minister’s Office, 1993, in Anthony Tan 
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‘fragmentation’ of the Public Service.9 The leadership cadre needed to come together 
as a strong team. In fact, political scientist Seah Chee Meow observed in the mid-
1980s that “the bonds among the civil servants are not strong [and the] external 
respectability enjoyed by the civil service is not matched by strong intra-organisational 
cohesion.”10 Peter Ong, who was appointed the College’s Deputy Dean, elaborated in 
an interview years later: 
getting a group of folks... the PWD [Public Works Department] engineer, the 
SAF [Singapore Armed Forces] pilot, the Admin Officer, to come together, to 
have a collective instinct of what it will take for Singapore to survive and to grow 
to the next stage. We didn’t have that; we had functional training – write good 
English, leadership management training, supervisory skills. But not quite, we 
didn’t use ‘whole-of-government’ then, not quite getting the whole group of 
leaders together. So, a sense that the senior people in the system would 
progress through the system together, knowing each other, and having the 
collective instincts of what make this place tick and what would be needed to 
make this place continue to grow and develop into the next phase.11 
 
Another rationale for establishing CSC was to create a focal point for the élan of 
the Singapore Public Service. As early as 1975, Seah had warned that  
the bureaucratic ethos (such as pride in serving in the bureaucracy) is not 
effectively instilled among the bureaucrats who tend to be more susceptible to 
purely monetary considerations… due to the fact that many of the bureaucrats 
(especially those in the senior or division one grade) have not been in the 
bureaucracy for a long time. They have yet to internalise many of the norms of 
the bureaucracy.12 
 
 As the Public Service entered into the 1990s, the imminent retirement of a 
whole generation of officers raised the need to preserve the traditions and values which 
had emerged from and defined the Public Service. 
 To George Yeo, then-Minister of State for Finance, the bureaucracy needed, 
a tradition and a spirit. We needed institutional memory, myths and heroes. This 
was how the idea of CSC came about. …. I never had formal responsibility for 
CSC … but always took a close interest in them. At that time, I was probably 
the minister most convinced of the need for the CSC. 13  
CSC would cultivate three characteristics Yeo thought were essential for the Public 
Service’s leadership: intellectual leadership, moral leadership and an awareness of its 
role in society.  
                                                          
9
 Kishore Mahbubani, Dean, CSC, to Col (Res) Ho Meng Kit, PPS to SM, “Civil Service College (CSC),” 6 
Feb 1993, CSC Records 
10
 Seah (1987) 109.  
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 Peter Ong, Deputy Dean, CSC, 1993 – 1995, Interview with Author, 6 Jun 2012.  
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 Continuing to recruit from among the best and brightest would ensure that AOs 
could command intellectual leadership. But to George Yeo:  
That leadership is not only intellectual, it must also be moral.  That is the 
second condition for a successful civil service.  The moral basis of the civil 
service of the Roman Church is the Christian Bible.  The moral basis of the 
Chinese mandarinate was and may well again be Confucianism.  In Singapore, 
the moral basis of the Civil Service is gradually taking shape.  Some aspects 
are clear like intolerance of corruption and commitment to national 
independence, but others are not.  Our national values, when they are settled, 
must eventually be reflected in the way the Civil Service carries itself.  Moral 
leadership must not only be exercised, it must be publicly and visibly exercised.  
We cannot succumb to the free-wheeling ways of the private sector.  The free 
market idealised by Adam Smith works only when competition takes place 
within a moral framework that engenders regard for law and respect for human 
life and dignity.  That moral framework the Civil Service helps to provide.  The 
Civil Service has to be above the fray of the marketplace.14 
Finally, AOs needed a “collective self-consciousness of its role in society and of its 
corporate mission.  ….  As a group, civil servants must always be concerned with the 
national welfare and proud to be charged with that responsibility.”15  
 The CSC’s chief advocate was thus envisioning CSC as a transmitter of, what 
was essentially, the élan of the Singapore Public Service. Through telling and re-telling 
of ‘war-tales’ and even the perpetuation of ‘myths’ and ‘heroes’, this ‘moral leadership’ 
could be cultivated among new recruits and young officers of the Administrative 
Service.  
 
8.2 A New Political Context: Socialisation Revisited 
 Evidently, the Civil Service College was also meant to develop political acumen 
among the leadership corps of the Public Service, implicit in George Yeo’s vision of 
Administrative Service officers filled with a ‘collective self-consciousness of its role in 
society’.  
       The political context was instrumental in the CSC’s formation. The 1980s 
witnessed a dip in the electoral fortunes of the ruling People’s Action Party. Following 
the concession of its long-standing absolute monopoly over the Parliament, after losing 
a by-election in 1981, the PAP lost another Parliamentary seat in the 1984 General 
Elections; its share of popular votes fell by 12.6% to 62.9%.16 The PAP’s relatively 
dismal performance was attributed to the electorate’s resentment with the recent slew 
of unpopular measures and, in connection with that, a greater desire by citizens, 
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increasingly affluent and well-educated, to be consulted in policy-making.17 In the 
aftermath, the government responded with various initiatives to solicit feedback from 
the public; public communications training for civil servants intensified, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The 1988 polls again saw the PAP’s vote-share dipping to 61.8% 
although the party clawed back one Parliamentary seat.18   
 When Goh Chok Tong succeeded Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister in 1990, 
Goh premised his tenure upon an “open and consultative style of government”.19 The 
population appeared to be drawn to his affable personality and gentler style; with the 
economy buoyant, Goh decided to seek the electorate’s endorsement by calling for 
early polls.20 In the 1991 General Elections, the PAP – while returned to power – 
witnessed its worst ever electoral outing: the loss of four Parliamentary seats and an 
all-time low of 61% of the popular vote. This might have been a decisive win in other 
democracies but the PAP had until the 1980s monopolised all the seats in Parliaments 
and its vote-share never dropped below 70%. 
 
8.2.1 Development to Democratisation? 
 At around this time, a growing discourse in political economy on development’s 
causality relationship towards democratisation began to turn its lens on Singapore. The 
theory that economic development, by raising educational levels and social mobility, 
would raise a middle class seeking greater role in politics was not new and could be 
traced to Marx and Weber.21 The spate of political liberalisation in Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs) in the 1980s, from Taiwan and Korea to Thailand and the Philippines, 
renewed interest in the development-democratisation thesis.22 The influential roles 
played by the middle-class in the democratisation of these countries, middle-class 
rising from state-led economic development across these NICs in the 1960s and 1970s, 
a la Chalmers Johnson’s developmental state, appeared to lend credence to the 
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postulation. More significantly, the seeming validation of this theory heralded questions 
on whether similar democratisation would emerge in other Southeast Asian NICs or 
near-NICs like Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.23  
 For Singapore, the PAP’s electoral dips from the 1980s into 1991 against the 
background of an increasingly educated and affluent population appeared to signal a 
similar trend towards development-induced democratisation. Scholars even with the 
benefit of a few years of hindsight in the later-1990s were more circumspect whether 
Singapore would go the way of Taiwan, Korea or Thailand.24 However, for the PAP 
leadership in the aftermath of its debacle at the 1991 General Elections, the party’s 
future might not have appeared certain. What was apparent amidst the intense soul-
searching that followed was the need to respond to the changing political milieu.25  
      Among some of the PAP’s more public post-electoral reflections, which given 
the party’s introspective nature were clearly directed at an external audience, were 
some references to the Public Service. In an address to PAP activists, the Deputy 
Prime Minister (DPM), Ong Teng Cheong, admitted that some policies had hurt the 
poor and alienated Chinese-educated sections of the population.26 But, Ong wondered 
aloud: why was there this perception gap between how the people and the government 
view official policies? While urging party activists to attune themselves to the 
sentiments among the population, DPM Ong in the same breath called on civil servants 
to be “politically astute”:   
Sometimes, even the most well-meaning policy can end up a disaster if the 
Government bureaucracy shows no political sensitivity in implementing 
it. …there is sometimes room for accommodating people adversely affected by 
our policies. In such cases, there is no need for the bureaucracy to take the 
clinical view that no exceptions can be made. Government is about people, and 
rules are made by people.27 
To the Deputy Prime Minister, younger officers who have risen to important positions 
across government agencies might not wield the political acumen of older civil servants:   
When the PAP took office in 1959, one of the first things it did was to set up the 
Political Study Centre… to get senior civil servants… aware of the changed 
political environment... Perhaps the proposed Civil Service College is a good 
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place for the government to inculcate greater political sensitivity amongst 
younger civil servants. 28 
 
 Lest this be taken as making a scape-goat of the bureaucracy for the ruling 
party’s electoral woes, there was evidence that the political leadership had already, 
prior to the polls, detected a need for to sharpen the political sensitivity of civil servants. 
About two months before the 31 Aug 1991 general elections, the Prime Minister, Goh 
Chok Tong, exhorted Administrative Service officers, the leadership echelons of the 
Public Service:  
Administrative Officers should have political sensitivity. An understanding of the 
history of our young nation, and how it has influenced the attitudes and 
perceptions of the various communities in the population, is necessary. So too 
is the need to know the thinking and value system of the political leadership and 
electorate.29 
 
 The reference to the Political Study Centre draws comparison with the political 
milieu following self-government: new political élite consolidating their authority amidst 
a bureaucracy disconnected with the population. PAP leaders recognised the critical 
role played by civil servants in delivering public services and thus contributing towards 
their electoral legitimacy. Like their predecessors three decades earlier, the PAP 
leaders in the early 1990s turned to the ‘political education’ of the Administrative 
Service leadership echelon of the Public Service, its ‘Praetorian Guards’.30 This 
inculcation of ‘greater political sensitivity’ among the AOs was evidently a role 
envisioned for the Civil Service College. 
 
8.3 Getting the Right People: Personnel Selection and Organisational Structure 
 The first task in setting up the CSC was selecting the key personnel. The 
position of Dean of CSC was deliberated at the highest political level, Kishore 
Mahbubani disclosed: 
I was Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs when they made me Dean of the Civil 
Service College. The man who approached me and asked me to become the 
Dean was George Yeo, who was then 2nd Minister of Foreign Affairs….. I wasn’t 
privy to all the thinking that went into it; it was all decided at the Cabinet level.31 
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 When conferred the discretion to select his deputy, Mahbubani – conscious of 
the need to divide his time between CSC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he 
continued concurrently as Deputy Secretary – made sure that CSC had an effective 
leader at the working level. He specifically requested for Peter Ong as his deputy:  
The Deputy Secretary in PSD [Public Service Division] at that time was Tan 
Boon Huat. Tan Boon Huat gave me two choices, either somebody else or 
Peter Ong. But he said, ‘Peter Ong you have to wait six months.’ I said, ‘Peter 
Ong is very good, I’ll wait six months.’ So once Peter Ong came on board full 
time, then I just left it to him. I worked with him before, in APEC [Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation] meetings, I knew how good he was, and so I was very 
happy to get him back. Because I knew if you have somebody good, you just 
leave it to them to do it.32 
Ong, pursuing his Master in Business Administration degree at Stanford University in 
1992, revealed another consideration in his selection: “Kishore called me: ‘Would you 
want to work in CSC?’ Because they wanted someone who was familiar with case 
studies, being business schools we did case studies. So they thought I could contribute 
in terms of case studies.”33 
 The depth of thinking that went into selecting the appropriate staff at the CSC 
was further illustrated in the Assistant Dean appointment. Miss Patricia Lam, a young 
Administrative Service officer, recognised that – while she was left to define the 
parameters of her role – it was an opportunity for her own development:  
As I was a fresh graduate it was mainly a training post for me and I was very 
aware that I had no more experience than any of the MDOs [Management 
Development Officers, working-level staff].  … It was also a very flat 
organisation so we all did whatever was necessary.  I did everything from 
moving chairs and planning an office move; to writing speeches and later to 
filling in for Peter as far as I could. As time passed and things became busier, I 
took on more of the management – interviewing applicants, some staff 
performance appraisals, ministry-level meetings – and as much of day-to-day 
stuff as I could so that things didn’t have to go to Peter.34  
 
 The CSC was deliberately set up as a small organisation, having three 
Administrative Service officers managing a handful of working level staff (see Table 
8.3). The choice of only three AOs, and a combination of a senior, intermediate and 
subaltern, overcame the concerns that stalled the Administrative Staff College proposal 
in the 1980s: the detachment of four to six AOs from operational positions were at that 
time deemed too high an opportunity cost for that leadership development venture. 
Intended as a platform for the transmission of values and political instincts, CSC was 
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also envisioned to draw on senior public officers rather than rely on a large full-time 
faculty. 35  
Table 8.3: Civil Service College, 199436 
 
 
 The CSC was set up within the Ministry of Finance’s Public Service Division, 
the personnel management agency of the bureaucracy (see Table 8.4). This reporting 
line paralleled that of the Civil Service Institute, indicating that training continued to be 
seen as a subject of human resource management by the government. Originally, an 
option was to site the CSC as a centre within the CSI, to draw on existing resources, 
but the final decision was to establish CSC as a separate institution.37 Like CSI, CSC 
was funded by the PSD’s budget and did not charge participants or their ministries for 
the courses they attended. 
 Plans for the CSC also included a Board of Governors to advise the College’s 
executive team. It was mooted by the Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, 
revealing the very high level of political attention paid to the CSC.38 Like earlier 
counterparts, this board was chaired by the Head of Civil Service, but the CSC board 
for the first time had representation from private corporations, the media and academia 
besides permanent secretaries and senior civil servants.39 There was no additional 
information to either assess the effects of this Board of Governors upon the CSC or 
compare it with earlier predecessors. 
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 3 Management Development Officers 
 1 Executive Officer 
Dean 
Kishore Mahbubani 
 
 
Assistant Dean 
Ms Patricia Lam Yin May 
 
Deputy Dean 
Peter Ong Boon Kwee 
Personal Assistant 
to Dean 
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Table 8.4: Civil Service College within the Singapore Government, 1993 - 199440 
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In all, the Civil Service College’s personnel selection and organisational 
structure indicated high level political commitment and long term planning for the 
bureaucracy. In particular, with the Administrative Service officers so highly prized for 
their operational roles, appointing three AOs to head the CSC represented a deep 
determination to invest in the strategic development of the AO leadership cadre and the 
broader Singapore Public Service.   
 
8.4 Overseas Exemplars 
 Forming the Civil Service College represented the furthest Singapore had gone 
in studying foreign exemplars. In the 1980s, an Administrative Staff College proposal 
led to studies of various European training institutions. Nothing emerged from these 
studies, not due to shortcomings of these foreign models but an unwillingness to forego 
Administrative Service officers from operational posts to form the faculty for the 
proposed institution. 
In drawing up the Civil Service College, well-known centres of leadership 
training were thoroughly studied but the main consideration was adaptability to the 
local context.41 The Ecole Nationale d’Administration, Mahbubani pointed out for 
example, while held up as the yardstick for bureaucratic training was not practicable in 
Singapore’s circumstances: “ENA is very critical, because the ranking in the class 
determines which service you go to…. ENA basically was a very powerful institution 
that determines the career. We were not that powerful, we can’t get people for two 
years.”42 Deputy Dean, Peter Ong, added: “I don’t think it’s possible for any senior or 
high potential officers to be spared three years. If they could be, they cannot be very 
needed in their workplace.”43 Whether or not they were privy to complications 
forestalling earlier proposals, CSC’s planners avoided the lengthy secondment of AOs 
as permanent faculty. Mahbubani said: 
I did visit some institutions, British and so on. But we knew our circumstances, 
we were small. If you want to have a big institution, you are going to have 
throughput. Our Administrative Service was only 250, so Civil Service College 
can’t do that much. And we didn’t want to have full time faculty, we relied on 
either current leaders or retired leaders.44 
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The source of inspiration for the CSC was to be North America.45 Peter Ong 
was amidst his post-graduate studies at Stanford University in 1992, when he was 
directed to visit various leadership training institutions in the United States and Canada. 
He was most impressed by the Canadian Centre for Management Development, 
convinced that “you need to put leaders across whole-of-government together at 
various milestones of their lives.”46 
 
8.5 Political Support: Overcoming Doubters 
 The Civil Service College proposal was not without complications and the 
project soon encountered a doubter, and an influential one at that. Dr. Goh Keng Swee, 
retired Deputy Prime Minister, had upon learning of the CSC proposal expressed 
concern with the cost of building the CSC complex.47 Goh, the long-time Finance 
Minister known for his frugality, also had reservations over CSC’s ability to match the 
ENA in turning Administrative Service officers into French énarques. Although retired 
for a decade, Goh continued to be highly respected within the political circle and the 
bureaucracy. He was instrumental in re-organising the post-colonial Public Service, 
devising the strategies that led to Singapore’s economic development and setting up 
the Singapore Armed Forces. For 11 of his 25 years in government, he was Deputy 
Prime Minister. Fortunately, Goh raised his objections over CSC in private, though this 
he did with Lee Kuan Yew.48  While he had relinquished the Prime Minister post to Goh 
Chok Tong, Lee remained as Senior Minister in the Cabinet and ranked second only to 
the premier in government protocol. Mahbubani, as Dean of CSC, quickly found himself 
fielding high-level queries – and doubts – over the CSC.   
The CSC was fortuitous to enjoy some political support. Mahbubani was able to 
seek advice from George Yeo, by then Minister for Information and the Arts and 
concurrently Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, a consistently strong proponent of 
CSC in the Cabinet.49 More importantly, the CSC had the support of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Lee Hsien Loong. His endorsement of Mahbubani’s responses to various 
objections – the CSC complex was to be shared with other institutions and hence the 
costs were reasonable, and CSC was not seeking to replicate ENA – helped to assure 
Dr. Goh Keng Swee. Mahbubani, recounting this episode, credited then-DPM Lee 
Hsien Loong for saving CSC from still-birth:        
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[DPM Lee’s] support was absolutely critical. His support was critical in terms of 
making sure that Dr Goh’s opposition did not derail the whole process. In fact, 
the critical thing he did was that he called me in for a meeting. We had a 
conversation; most of it was what he was telling me. And then the notes of 
conversation were circulated to all the Permanent Secretaries …send a signal 
to all the Permanent Secretaries that the Singapore Government and he were 
strongly supporting the Civil Service College project. And that was how I got 
very strong support.50 
 
8.6 Training Programmes and Activities 
Conceptualised as a dedicated leadership development centre, the Civil Service 
College was able to concentrate its activities on developing the élite Administrative 
Service officers. Unlike earlier training initiatives, it did not have to put up with the 
inhibitions and distractions of attending to the other demands of the broader 
bureaucracy. The outcome of its focus on leadership development was a syllabus CSC 
termed ‘milestone programmes’.  
 
8.6.1 Milestone Programmes 
Milestone programmes were designed as training interventions scheduled at 
various ‘critical points’, or milestones, in the careers of senior public officers. In the 
schema developed by the CSC, three milestone programmes would provide the 
relevant training for Administrative Service officers and other public officers with 
leadership potential at different phases of their careers: the Foundation Course to 
induct new AOs, the Senior Management Programme for mid-career heads of 
departments, and the Leadership in Administration Programme for senior officers rising 
to the apex of the Public Service hierarchy. 
The Foundation Course, or FC, was developed by the Staff Training Institute in 
the 1970s. It aimed to induct scholars who recently returned from overseas – typically 
prestigious American and British – universities into their junior Administrative Service 
posts. FC’s curricula had remained similar as STI evolved into the CSSDI and finally 
the Civil Service Institute, a remarkable accomplishment considering that the 
leadership of the Public Service constantly deliberated over the training of AOs. In fact, 
it was their dissatisfaction with the CSI’s leadership training offerings that led to the 
decision to set up the CSC.  
The Foundation Course, thus transferred to CSC, continued to induct new AOs 
to the machinery of government, management and communication skills, and a tour of 
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the ASEAN capital cities.51 But in revamping the FC, Patricia Lam, recalled that 
teaching methodologies in graduate business schools served as reference: “A bigger 
influence on the design of the courses was the MBA approach – it was meant to be 
intense, cohort-building, mix hard and soft skills, and include leadership training.”52   
The Senior Management Programme (SMP) was a CSC invention, directed at 
talented public officers “between 30 and 40 years old and who are typically heading 
Departments or Divisions in their Ministries.”53 The resultant five-week SMP put 
participants through panel discussions, case studies and meetings with senior civil 
servants and ministers, with the curriculum focusing on principles of policy making in 
Singapore. The incorporation of adventure learning activities sought to foster esprit de 
corps among the participants. A final test dispatched participants acting as consultants 
to various ministries, to study potential problems and offer recommendations, exposing 
them to “the difficulties of reconciling policy formulation with operational and logistical 
considerations.”54  Capping each SMP was a study trip aimed at raising participants’ 
awareness of regional issues. A CSC official pointed out that attending SMP did not 
guarantee participants promotion but prepared them for the eventuality, should they be 
promoted, for working at the next higher grade.55 
At the apex of CSC’s pyramid of milestone programmes was the Leaders in 
Administration Programme (LAP) for “officers identified as having the potential for very 
senior positions in the public sector.”56 The 15 participants in the 1995 pilot run 
consisted of Deputy Secretaries, chief executives of statutory boards and top 
uniformed service commanders. Beside meetings with permanent secretaries and 
ministers, discussions among participants probed them to evaluate the principles of 
policy-making as Singapore developed. Like FC and SMP, a key aim in LAP was to 
forge cohesion among the participants. Initial feedback from participants appeared to 
reward CSC and its staff for their efforts: in particular, participants found “experiential 
learning and sharing of ideas in group discussions are useful learning tools.”57  
While the three sets of milestone programmes appeared neatly pegged to 
various optimal intervening career points of Administrative Service officers, drawing 
these up were not without their difficulties. Miss Lim Soo Hoon, who succeeded Peter 
Ong as Deputy Dean in 1995, pointed out that CSC’s small and recent set-up could 
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have limited their capacity in designing an appropriate curriculum: “[the officers] were 
all very green, first time working in the Civil Service. And here they were supposed to 
come out with the curriculum.”58 CSC staff held discussions with officials in charge of 
personnel policies at the Public Service Division and prospective participants; they 
studied several foreign leadership training programmes for applicable lessons.59 Their 
readiness to experiment, in the opinion of Lim Soo Hoon, and some beginner’s luck 
helped CSC pulled off the whole suite of milestone programmes:  
the good fortune for us was that we used basically the same template. Because 
it was so new, nobody had ever gone through any of these programmes. So 
whatever we gave, let’s say LAP, we could replicate and deepen it a bit more or 
increase the level of people coming to talk to you a bit more. Because none of 
the participants in LAP had ever been through SMP. So we were able to do that 
for a few cycles, before people started saying, ‘Hang on, the people who are 
going to LAP are the people who went through SMP, and therefore you cannot 
replicate.’60 
 
Another difficulty was attendance. While the Public Service Division had the 
power to send officers for milestone programmes, the task of ensuring officers’ physical 
attendance fell onto CSC staff.61 This was an awkward challenge, considering that 
most participants outranked CSC officers. Dean Mahbubani recounted: 
a perpetual challenge in Singapore, is that most senior civil servants think 
training is a waste of time, so they were very reluctant to come for the courses. 
And even when they came they would be focused always on their day jobs, and 
never fully properly immersed into training. 62 
Deputy Dean, Peter Ong, added:  
I remember it was very difficult, one of the key challenges, early challenges, 
was how to get the SAF to cough up their Chief of Defence Force, or Service 
Chiefs to come for LAP. How to cough up DSes [Deputy Secretaries], Perm 
Secs, and Managing Directors of Statutory Boards to come?  …it would not 
have been possible if DPM Lee [Hsien Loong] at that time did not personally 
play a very instrumental role. 63  
In a meeting involving senior civil servants, the Deputy Prime Minister urged 
supervisors to recognise the importance of training in the career development of their 
staff; the returns for giving up a key lieutenant for training would inevitably be 
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rewarding.64 Without the offer by DPM Lee – and other ministers – to meet with 
participants, securing the attendance of senior officers at the milestone programmes, in 
Ong’s opinion, “would not be possible.”65  
 All milestone programmes underwent rigorous internal reviews. Participants 
were expected to complete evaluation forms, which were customised to every course 
and “elaborate in order to assess their satisfaction with the courses and if refinements 
are in order.”66 Their feedback were summarised for submission to the Dean, before 
final reports were presented to the Public Service Division. These internal reviews are, 
however, not available currently. In lieu of such internal records, participants’ feedback 
in Ethos, the CSC’s newsletter, provided a sampling of their reception towards these 
milestone programmes: “the best civil service course I have ever attended, both in 
terms of learning and the camaraderie built up in the five weeks.”67 
 
8.6.2 Case Study as Modus Operandi 
 One of the decisions taken in conceptualising CSC was to adopt the case study 
method. Peter Ong explained that, “we didn’t want to go back to the Political Study 
Centre. We didn’t want it to be propaganda. And that’s why we use the case study.”68  
To inculcate élan and political instincts among highly-educated and intellectually sharp 
Administrative Service officers, the didactic style of learning would be counter-
productive. In comparison,   
Case study allows you to come to your own conclusions about what should 
have been done, what could have been done, and evaluate what was done 
against your own views…. We did that by giving all the raw data that led the 
policy makers at that time to come to their conclusions. And you use the same 
source document and decide whether policy makers did the right thing. That is 
the power of case study.69 
 
 In the academic-field of adult learning or andragogy in Singapore at that time, 
the case study method was very new. Existing case studies were either business-
management types or on foreign public policies. Yet for the Singaporean Administrative 
Service officers to be able to engage in realistic discussion and take away real lessons, 
case studies on public policies in Singapore needed to be drawn up. There were 
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obviously no lack of material to write up case studies on policy-making in Singapore but, 
planners for the CSC recognised, the challenge laid in selecting issues suitable for 
discussion.70 The guidelines that emerged from discussions on the matter directed 
topics to cover dilemmas of policy-making where no final answers were readily 
apparent. Case studies would aim to point out that policy-making was a continuous 
process, where policy-issues evolve over time, and that even the best policies needed 
to be reviewed constantly in the light of changing circumstances. Another objective 
these case studies would seek to highlight was the importance of the political context in 
policy-making, and that economically efficient policies needed to be packaged in 
politically acceptable ways in order to resonate and track with the citizenry.  
Having decided on writing up case studies based on actual Singapore policy-
making, the next challenge was identifying case writers. With the CSC designed as a 
small set-up, it simply did not have the capacity to write up case studies. At the same 
time, CSC planners thought that government agencies would be in the best position to 
write up case studies of topics within their jurisdictional portfolio; being domain owners 
these agencies would be familiar with the considerations and constraints of the policies 
being addressed. However, coaxing government agencies to deviate from their regular 
writing style advocating specific policy position was a struggle, as Peter Ong recounted:  
It took a long time just convincing ministries how to write case study, keep it 
open-ended. Because if I’m Ministry of Communications, MinComms, I want to 
write the COE [Certificate of Entitlement] case study convincing you why COE 
was the right way. … it was not easy to tell them:  ‘No, no, no, that’s not how.’ 
And we needed MinComms to write the case study, we needed MinComms to 
provide a lot of data. …. MinComms would not want to write it this way; they will 
want to write why COE was the best thing. So we have to convince them. And 
that was not easy. 71 
 
Lim Soo Hoon remembered that the ministries needed ‘persuasion’ from then-
Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong: “he called all the Perm Secs to a meeting, 
because we had complaints that ministries were not willing to step up to do case 
studies for us, he actually chaired a meeting to tell people to do these case studies.”72 
Eventually, the case studies CSC obtained from government agencies included those 
on the Certificate of Entitlement, a policy regulating vehicular congestion by requiring 
prospective owners to bid for eligibility, and the policy-dilemmas of healthcare financing 
and streaming students according to academic performance.73 In the light of worldwide 
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media attention on the judicial caning of an American teenager convicted for vandalism, 
a case study was drawn up on dealing with the international press.74   
Another difficulty was locating facilitators for case studies. So new was the 
andragogy in Singapore at that time that even local universities had very few qualified 
case study facilitators.75 Eventually, senior policy-makers led many case studies, 
injecting realism into these discussions: “The presence of the Ministers and Permanent 
Secretaries enabled participants to hear from the policy-makers themselves the 
detailed considerations that went into forming the various policies.”76 
Official evaluations on CSC’s use of case studies are not available but the 
reflections of one reporter were illustrative. Warren Fernandez, a Straits Times 
correspondent, joined a CSC Public Policy Perspectives Seminar in 1994. After 
labouring over a case study with fellow participants for some time, the reporter 
lamented: “It came as a disappointment to some, that despite a host of ideas being 
bandied about, no one could think of a sensible alternative to the dreaded Certificate of 
Entitlement (COE).” 77 Fernandez opined that the case study method uncovered the 
constraints of policy-making: “political debate in this country is often conducted in a 
vacuum. Charges are hurled without any clear idea of what the alternative might be. 
Demands are often made without much sense of their costs.”78 Fernandez, while not 
representative of all, was sold on the use of case study to examine policy-making:   
Perhaps the case study method, coupled with discussions of the constraints 
facing policy makers, would make for a fascinating general studies course at 
our universities as well. It would serve as a good way of focusing young 
Singaporean minds on the key issues that lie ahead of them. 79 
 
8.6.3 Seminars, Lectures, Talks and Publications  
 The Public Policy Perspectives Seminar (PPPS) was not listed among the 
CSC’s milestone programmes but it was pegged to the career development of 
Administrative Service officers. Targeted at scholars who had just returned from 
overseas universities, PPPS aimed to prepare them for the local policy-making milieu 
in which they would be serving.80 Through case studies of actual policies, PPPS 
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allowed participants to debate and even disagree over these policies.81 Hence, even 
before new AOs attended the Foundation Course, which was a two month long and 
much more comprehensive induction programme, PPPS was effectively a shorter and 
more concise milestone programme preparing AOs for the Foundation Course.   
As part of its mission to institutionalise and foster the élan of the Public Service 
among younger public officers, CSC organised a series of talks entitled ‘Reflections at 
Raffles’. These were essentially ‘fire-side’ chats with senior leaders of the Public 
Service,  created as a platform to allow younger Administrative Service officers to meet 
and learn from the experiences of their ‘elders’.82 Held at Raffles Hotel, hence the 
series’ title, these sessions were styled in an informal setting to encourage dialogue.  
‘New Insights Lecture Series’ sought to keep the Public Service’s leadership 
corps informed of external developments pertinent to their work. It featured speakers 
like the chief secretaries of the Malaysian and Hong Kong governments and leading 
thinkers such as Peter Senge who spoke on ‘Learning Organisation’.83 In conjunction 
with Canada’s Institute On Governance, CSC also ran a “Transforming Public Sector 
Leadership” workshop involving participants from Southeast Asia and Canada.84 These 
CSC programmes – while furthering training and development objectives – were also 
used as platforms for fostering relations with foreign civil services and governments.   
In 1994, a year after its inauguration, CSC published Ethos. Mahbubani 
introduced the periodical as a platform for communicating with CSC’s stakeholders: “To 
reach out to our constituency, we will need a vehicle for communication.”85 Contents 
focused on reports of CSC events, such as milestone programmes, seminars and 
lectures. In each issue was usually an article on the “latest issues and politics 
challenging Singapore’s public sector”, with subjects ranging from budgeting to 
personnel management.86 Like Bakti and Management Development, periodicals of 
earlier civil service training institutions, Ethos occasionally published speeches of 
ministers and interviews with leaders in the bureaucracy.87 Unlike Bakti, Ethos did not 
replicate articles from newspapers or other journals. Unlike Management Development, 
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Ethos did not publish academically formatted essays. In all purposes, Ethos was 
arguably more a corporate newsletter reporting on CSC and Public Service activities, 
though this was the role defined for it. 
 
8.7 Heralding Change, Preparing for Change 
 In June 1994, the entire Public Service Division was transferred from the 
Finance Ministry to the direct jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office.88 The 
government was evidently increasing its attention to the management of public officers, 
including their training and development, with the Civil Service College and Civil 
Service Institute remaining under the PSD (see Table 8.5).  
Changes at the broad bureaucracy-level also percolated to the Civil Service 
College. Kishore Mahbubani was around the same time promoted to Permanent 
Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where had been serving concurrently to his 
Dean, CSC portfolio. At the same time, rotations involving the senior leadership of the 
Public Service Division would affect the future direction of CSC. Mahbubani recounted 
the confluence of factors:   
Once I became Perm Sec, I really wanted to focus on MFA. It was very difficult 
to be Perm Sec and Dean at the same time. So I handed over. And there was a 
new [Permanent Secretary, Public Service Division, and eventually] Head Civil 
Service, Lim Siong Guan. Andrew Chew [preceding PS(PSD) and Head of Civil 
Service] was prepared to leave the CSC alone and say: ‘You do whatever you 
want to do.’ He didn’t bother me. Siong Guan had a much more clearly defined 
vision for Civil Service College. So he wanted a Dean that he could work with 
full time, not a part-time Dean. So he switched and got Soo Hoon.” 89 
 
Staff changes involving CSC began taking place, incrementally like chess-
pieces lining up for a masterful game-changer. In the first instance, Miss Lim Soo Hoon, 
an Administrative Service officer, was posted into CSC as Deputy Dean; this allowed 
Peter Ong to be take up another posting in the Public Service as part of his AO 
rotation.90 Another AO, Zee Yong Kang, replaced Patricia Lam as Assistant Dean in the 
same exercise. In July 1995, Mahbubani relinquished his CSC appointment to 
concentrate on heading the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and Lim Soo Hoon succeeded as 
Dean of CSC (see Table 8.6).91  
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Table 8.5: Civil Service College in the Prime Minister’s Office, 199492 
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Table 8.6: Civil Service College, 199593 
 
 
In her first address as Dean, Lim Soo Hoon immediately positioned the Civil 
Service College as an agent of change: “As an agent of change for the Civil Service, 
CSC is at the forefront of the efforts to create the Public Service for the 21st Century.”94 
The Public Service for the 21st Century, abbreviated as PS21, was the set of reforms 
initiated by the Committee of Permanent Secretaries in May 1995.95 With a broader aim 
of keeping Singapore competitive as the country became a developed economy, PS21 
sought to orientate the bureaucracy towards a culture of “service excellence” and 
“continuous change for greater efficiency and effectiveness”.96  
Among the series of follow-up measures was the target for every Public Service 
employee to receive 12.5 days of annual training by the year 2000. This obviously 
necessitated mobilising the bureaucracy’s training institutions. Indeed, within six 
months of Lim Soo Hoon taking over CSC, announcements were made that the Public 
Service’s training centres would be reorganised.97 CSC was renamed the Institute of 
Policy Development and merged with an Institute of Public Administration and 
Management, renamed from the Civil Service Institute. The new central training 
institution that emerged was named Civil Service College, with Miss Lim Soo Hoon as 
Dean. This reorganisation of CSC and CSI into the new Civil Service College is 
discussed in the next chapter.  
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8.8 Conclusion 
 The Civil Service College, from its formal inception in 1993 to its reorganisation 
in 1996, was paradoxically the shortest training initiative in the history of the Singapore 
Public Service, yet the most significant in the growth of training and development in 
that bureaucracy. The CSC finally brought to realisation a meaningful leadership 
development centre for the Administrative Service leadership corps after decades of 
futile experimentation.  
 In the evolution of training and development, the Civil Service College was a 
progression in the Singapore bureaucracy’s use of training for reforms. Its focus on 
leadership development and preparing the Public Service for the future sought to build 
up the strategic capacity of the bureaucracy. This, compared with the Political Study 
Centre producing a dependable bureaucracy and the STI and CSI equipping civil 
servants with technical competencies, was a step-up advancement in the continuum of 
executive development and training in the Singapore Public Service.  
The device of the conceptual framework rooted the subject in the proper 
contexts. From the perspective of the Public Service, besides raising a dedicated 
leadership development institute was the imperative of fostering the values and élan 
that epitomised the Singapore Public Service. From the perspective of the state in the 
analytic framework, a new generation of People’s Action Party leaders saw CSC as 
necessary to inculcate within AOs the political acumen required to finesse the 
formulation and implementation of public policies. From its conception, thus, the Civil 
Service College was envisioned as a point to introduce reforms into the 
leadership corps of the bureaucracy.  
Secondly, the realisation of the CSC highlighted the importance of strong 
political support for the development of training initiatives in the bureaucracy. Besides 
empowering it to overcome influential detractors, the strong political support allowed a 
very deliberate selection of the team of AOs whose vision and competence helped set 
up CSC. Kishore Mahbubani, Peter Ong, Patricia Lam and the very small team that 
made up CSC at that time deserved credit for germinating the ideas giving rise to the 
milestones programmes and their dogged determination in overcoming resistance 
towards the CSC proposal. Reflecting upon their roles, however, Mahbubani took a 
long view: “[This was] phase one, I was just foundational, Peter Ong and I were just 
foundational, putting in place the people, processes, organisation and so on and so 
forth.”98 More critically, in Mahbubani’s opinion, the most important factor in setting up 
CSC – indeed for saving CSC from still-birth – was the high level of political attention 
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accorded to CSC: “[then-DPM Lee Hsien Loong] took a personal interest, like in the 
LAP. He was personally interested in checking everything.”99 Peter Ong elaborated on 
the importance of political attention in helping CSC’s programmes:  
[then-DPM Lee] himself went through development in milestone programmes in 
SAF. So he understood what it meant to get Air Force, Army and Navy to work 
together, to have a shared sense of esprit de corps. When he was Minister for 
MTI [Ministry of Trade and Industry], we took policies of different agencies and 
put it together and said that all these required collective sense of understanding, 
what is micro-economic efficiency of policies, and then reviewing each one 
across different agencies. So what we saw in his thinking of CSC reflected his 
own experiences through the SAF and his own experiences of policy review 
across the whole-of-government – we never used ‘whole-of-government’ at that 
time. So he felt something was needed. And he personally chose many of the 
case studies.100  
Indeed, a particularly prominent factor in the genesis and development of CSC and its 
programmes was the high level of political support devoted to it.  
Finally, the most significant accomplishment of the CSC was not just the 
production of a set of leadership development programmes but in the enduring 
timelessness of this framework. For the first time in the history of the Singapore Public 
Service, there was a comprehensive set of training programmes at various stages in 
the career progression of the Administrative Service and senior officers. Although it 
inherited the Foundation Course from the Civil Service Institute, the CSC 
conceptualised and launched two additional courses: the Senior Management 
Programme for mid-career officers and Leaders in Administration Programme for 
senior officers. More important than drawing up these individual courses was CSC’s 
threading together all three programmes into a coherent suite of development 
interventions matching the career progression of AOs. The timelessness of this 
framework developed by CSC was demonstrated by the continued usage of these 
milestone programmes for leadership development by the present-day Civil Service 
College.  
 The new Civil Service College, resulting from the centralisation of the CSC and 
Civil Service Institute in 1996 to harness training as a point of introducing the Public 
Service for the 21st Century reforms, is the subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 9 
Instrument for Reforms: Aligning the Civil Service College for PS21 (1996 
– 2001)
In April 1996, the two existing central training schools of the Singapore Public 
Service underwent a major reorganisation. The leadership development centre set up 
in 1993 as the Civil Service College was renamed the Institute of Policy Development;  
the Civil Service Institute became the Institute of Public Administration and 
Management.1 Both institutes were then subsumed under a new Civil Service College. 
Within four years, the Civil Service College would be further restructured, detached out 
of the civil service to become a self-financing statutory board. 
This chapter shows that the series of organisational changes involving the Civil 
Service College were in reality a consolidation of the various training functions into a 
focal point to introduce administrative reforms. The series of re-structuring seemed like 
a myriad re-labelling of the training schools, but these were in reality part of a broader 
strategy to align the training institutions to support the reforms agenda. This started off 
by centralising the different training functions into an umbrella Civil Service College, 
preparing the transition into the next phase of the strategy. Following on was a 
controlled experiment, essentially, to compel training programmes aligned towards the 
reforms agenda, by introducing market principles into an institute. The success of this 
trial emboldened the leadership of the Public Service to then detach CSC from the Civil 
Service and convert it into a self-financing statutory board. Thus, rather than a 
seemingly arbitrary or piece-meal re-structuring of the training institutions, the various 
changes in names and structures were in fact set-pieces on a chess-board building up 
towards the goal of setting up CSC as a statutory board. But that was not an end-goal 
by itself; the ultimate objective of turning CSC into a statutory board was to orientate 
the training functions to support the agenda for administrative reforms.  
This chapter, thus, argues that the organisational changes between 1996 and 
2001 were part of a grand strategy to align the Civil Service College into a focal point 
for introducing reforms across the Singapore Public Service.    
9.1 PS21 - The Emerging Bureaucratic Context 
The reorganisation of the central training schools of the Singapore Public 
Service in 1996 was driven by broader developments in the bureaucratic context, 
specifically PS21. “Public Service for the 21st Century”, launched in May 1995, was a 
1
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series of long-term reforms. According to Lim Siong Guan, Permanent Secretary in the 
Prime Minister’s Office, the objectives of PS21 were:  
To nurture an attitude of service excellence…[and] foster an environment which 
induces and welcomes continuous change for greater efficiency and 
effectiveness [with the ultimate outcome] a Public Service always on the lookout 
for improvement, for better ways of doing things, questioning if it should carry 
on doing what it is doing, asking what else it should be doing.2  
 
PS21 coincided with the wave of administrative reforms sweeping across the 
world in the 1990s: ‘small government’, decentralisation and application of private 
sector managerial techniques on public administration, i.e. New Public Management. 
The official account of the Singapore bureaucracy noted that “devolution – the 
loosening of central controls – was a key theme for the Public Service throughout the 
1990s.”3 But in an interview for this study, Lim Siong Guan distinguished PS21 by its 
quest for ‘excellence’:  
The whole impetus for PS21 has nothing to do with the idea of ‘small 
government’ and so forth. However, there’s a lot we learnt. …the things that 
happened in the times of Thatcher, we studied them a lot. They are good ideas 
on what can be done to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The most 
fundamental idea of all [with PS21] is this idea that it is not good enough to be 
efficient, it is not good enough to look for effectiveness.  
There is this whole concept of ‘excellence’ – and ‘excellence’ is being the best 
that you can be, it’s a never ending journey, being the best that you can be – 
which to me is a different paradigm than just ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’. I 
think most of the time when we talk about what happened with ‘small 
government’, they are very much confined to the idea of ‘efficiency’ and 
‘effectiveness’.4 
 
Although the Singapore Public Service was known for its “competence, 
efficiency and integrity” by the 1990s, there were areas needing improvement: 
reducing the dependence on rules and precedents in making decisions, 
fostering a more open attitude to change and innovation, greater empowerment 
at the lower levels of the Public Service, more emphasis upon performance and 
outputs to ensure higher quality services, and making public servants in dealing 
with the public more flexible, courteous and helpful.5 
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Indeed, Lim Siong Guan, who came to be regarded as the chief advocate of PS21, was 
conscious that the Singapore Public Service should neither rest on its laurels nor be 
lured into a sense of complacency:  
The reason why the motto [for PS21] was ‘Be in time for the future’, was 
because of this sense that the Singapore Public Service already had such a 
high standing worldwide, it had a high standing for efficiency and competence 
and integrity. So if everybody in the world say, ‘You are already so good,’ and 
the people in the Service therefore also say, ‘We are already so good,’ then 
how do we move our people to be thinking about how can we be better?  
That’s why the motto came out to be ‘Just in time for the future.’ It is to say, 
‘Who of you can claim we are good enough for the future?’ The future is 
unknowable, the future is uncertain? And so who in the Service, not even the 
political leadership, can claim to know? And that’s why the motto is ‘Be in time 
for the future.’ The idea of PS21 is to be able to work in that future and that 
future is really what we are prepared to imagine, visualise, take initiative, try out 
and hence the whole idea about engaging people and imagining the future. 6 
This need for further reforms, in-spite of the already stellar accomplishments of the 
Singapore bureaucracy, was recognised by the Committee of Permanent Secretaries – 
the apex leadership body of the Public Service – which threw its support behind PS21.7 
The operating milieu of the Singapore Public Service, in any case, was already 
evolving: “first, a public that is increasingly demanding higher standards of service, and 
second, an economy that is increasingly outward-oriented.”8 
 
9.1.1 The Political Dimension 
 The political dimension of PS21, even though it was a project of the 
bureaucracy, cannot be missed. With the Public Service often regarded by the 
population as ‘the government’ – everyday-citizens do not bother with the legal 
distinctions between the political leadership and the career bureaucrats in daily 
discourse – a Public Service that could not measure up to the citizenry’s growing 
demands could have repercussions upon the ruling People’s Action Party.  
The dipping electoral fortunes of the PAP had led to a framing of the 
development-democratisation discourse upon Singapore, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. After its share of electoral votes fell through the 1980s, the PAP suffered its 
worst-ever performance at the 1991 General Elections.9 Development-democratisation 
theorists inevitably wondered if Singapore was heading the way of Taiwan, Korea, 
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Thailand and the Philippines.10 The developmental-state, i.e. state-led rapid 
industrialisation and economic-social development as espoused by Chalmers Johnson, 
had expanded a middle class whose rising educational levels and affluence were 
leading them to seek greater participatory roles in the political system. While the 
development-democratisation nexus unfolded in several East Asian Newly-
Industrialising Countries, scholars refrained from plotting the trajectory of Singapore.  
The PAP leadership was naturally not unaffected by its electoral performance, 
whether or not they were informed of the development-democratisation theory. Political 
considerations evidently figured in the ruling party’s interactions with the bureaucracy in 
the aftermath of the watershed 1991 polls. The political leadership certainly felt that 
there were occasions the government’s “most well-meaning policy” was undermined by 
civil servants taking “clinical view” in implementation.11 Part of the raison d’être in the 
1993 setting up the Civil Service College was to sharpen the political acumen of 
Administrative Service and leadership echelons of the Public Service.  
With a focus on greater efficiency and effectiveness in policy-making and 
service delivery, PS21 could not be divorced from the political context at that time. 
While an initiative of the Public Service, with another election due within two years 
following the 1991 electoral setback, PS21’s drive to raise service standards among 
public officers could reasonably be expected to also be directed at arresting further 
electoral slippage.  
However, Lim Siong Guan, who led PS21 clarified that PS21 was wholly a 
project of the Public Service; the political leadership did not play any part in the 
bureaucracy’s administrative reforms. In an interview for this study, Lim explained that,   
We [the Public Service] never cleared the [PS21] initiative with the political 
leadership. I took a position like this: political leadership makes policy decision, 
PS21 is about delivery. ‘How well do you deliver policy?’ That’s a specific, to my 
mind, a specific responsibility of the Public Service. It’s got nothing to do with 
the political leadership, that’s why it was never cleared with the political 
leadership. 
Basically to my mind it’s like this, there’s no need to ask for permission for these 
things. You are doing something which is good, you are doing something which 
is your responsibility, you are doing something which intends to really raise the 
capabilities of the Public Service and raise the standards as well as the 
achievement and capabilities of Singapore, why do you need to ask for 
permission, just carry on. 
To be quite frank, I took the position that PS21 is the responsibility of the Civil 
Service.  12   
                                                          
10
 Rodan (1993) 52; Hewison, Rodan and Robison (1993) 2-3; Anek (1997) 15-16; Heng (1997) 135. 
11
 Ong Teng Cheong (1992) 18. Also “Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong, at the Third 
Administrative Service Dinner, 5 July 1991”,.  
12
 Lim Siong Guan, Interview with Author, 20 Nov 2013.  
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9.1.2 PS21 and the Review of Training in the Public Service 
PS21 was “the most comprehensive administrative reform to be introduced in 
Singapore.”13 Indeed, PS21 is a topic deserving dedicated study14 but to provide a brief 
context for the current discussion, PS21 constituted four focal areas:  
 staff well-being, focusing on the individual public officer;  
 service quality, focusing on the customer, i.e. the citizenry;  
 Work Improvement Teams and Staff Suggestion Schemes, focusing on 
developing officers towards an attitude of continuous improvement; and  
 organisational review, focusing on structuring government agencies towards 
strategic improvements.15  
Most of these initiatives were already operating for several years. WITS, for example, 
started in the 1980s. PS21, hence, was really “an extension of existing schemes and 
campaigns”.16 But the combined effects of these concurrent efforts under the PS21 
banner, and the main thrust of PS21, were to improve the quality of public services 
delivered to the citizenry.  
A parallel emphasis of PS21 was in the area of training, which relates directly to 
this study. Training was recognised as a medium to improve the quality of public 
services: “Mr Lim Siong Guan … believed that people development was a very 
important part of raising the professionalism of the Public Service.”17 Lim himself, the 
architect of PS21, centred the subject of training within the context of the reforms in a 
fitting metaphor:  
if you see the [civil servant] standing on a platform, around him are the 
demands of the public and …you need to serve them with quality service. At the 
same time, he’s under continuous pressure from the top, from his bosses, on 
how to improve the organisation, and for want of a better word, we use the term, 
Organisational Review.  So you look at this guy, and he’s being squashed, he’s 
being squashed from the side, he’s being squashed from the top.   
So we say, ‘How do we develop his muscles? How do we make him strong 
enough to be able to handle this?’ And that idea was Excel – Excellence 
through Continuous Enterprise and Learning. The way to develop his muscles 
was to build up his competency, build up his skills-level, most of all build up his 
                                                          
13
 Quah (2010) 147. However, John Burns, “Explaining Civil Service Reforms in Asia,” The Civil Service in 
the 21
st
 Century: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Jos C.N. Raadschelders, Theo A.J. Toonen & Frits M. 
Von der Meer (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 76 countered that PS21 “achieved few 
measurable results.”   
14
 Lim Siong Guan, in his interview for this study, pointed out that PS21 cannot be taken in isolation; PS21 
is tightly linked with two other initiatives: Scenario Planning and Currently Estimated Potential. Scenario 
Planning explores future challenges facing Singapore and capacities needed in the face of these scenarios. 
Currently Estimated Potential, apart from developing civil servants to their fullest potential, helps to identify 
talented officers and develop them in preparation for leadership positions. Lim Siong Guan, Interview with 
Author, 20 Nov 2013.  
15
 A summary of the four areas is found in Saxena (2011) 89 and Commonwealth Secretariat, Current 
Good Practices and New Developments in Public Service Management: A Profile of the Public Service of 
Singapore (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1998) 21.  
16
 Prime Minister’s Office, 1995, p. 2, quoted in Quah (2010) 147. 
17
 Lim Soo Hoon, Dean, Civil Service College, 1995 – 1998, Interview with Author, 15 Jun 2012 
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confidence.  And confidence is built up by doing stuff, and succeeding.  That’s 
why we have continuous enterprise. Try, learn, succeed.18 
 
Lim Siong Guan, as Permanent Secretary in charge of the Public Service 
Division and hence responsible for personnel matters in the Public Service, set “the 
target of delivering 12.5 days of training per year for each employee by the year 2000, 
partly to improve the quality of public service, and partly to enhance the long term 
employability of public servants” 19 This 100 hours was a five-fold increase in the 
commitment towards training, until then averaging 2.8 days.20 Ms Lim Soo Hoon, who 
would play a critical part in the Public Service’s use of training to introduce reforms, 
elaborated: “what to me was important about the policy was that, first, the signal that 
you believe in it, that it was an entitlement. That meant your boss cannot say: ‘I can’t 
spare you [to go for training].’ Everyone has a right to go for training.”21  
 As part of the PS21 reforms, a review of training was initiated. At that point in 
time, the two central training schools were the Civil Service Institute and the Civil 
Service College. The Civil Service College, with Kishore Mahbubani as Dean, was 
responsible for training the Administrative Service leadership of the Public Service, as 
described in the preceding chapter. According to Ms Lim Soo Hoon, “the original CSC, 
was more like a think-tank. Whereas Mr Lim [Siong Guan’s] was a more practise-
oriented approach … introduce policy development, introduce training on policy.” 
Around this time, Mahbubani was promoted to the position of Permanent Secretary at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
Once I became Perm Sec, I really wanted to focus on MFA. It was very difficult 
to be Perm Sec and Dean at the same time. ….And there was a new Head Civil 
Service [sic] Lim Siong Guan. Andrew Chew was prepared to leave the CSC 
alone and say: ‘You do whatever you want to do.’ He didn’t bother me. Siong 
Guan had a much more clearly defined vision for Civil Service College. So he 
wanted a Dean that he could work with full time, not a part-time Dean. So he 
switched and got Soo Hoon.” 22 
 
In March 1995, Ms Lim Soo Hoon was posted into CSC as Deputy Dean, 
allowing incumbent Peter Ong to take up another assignment as part of his 
Administrative Service rotation. Within four months, Ms Lim succeeded Kishore 
Mahbubani as Dean. Almost immediately, Lim Soon Hoon began positioning CSC “at 
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 Lim Siong Guan, Interview with Author, 20 Nov 2013.  
19
 Lim Siong Guan 38.  
20
 ST 28 Feb 1996: 23.  
21
 Lim Soo Hoon, Interview with Author, 15 Jun 2012.  
22
 Mahbubani, Interview with Author, 20 Jun 2012. Lim Siong Guan was appointed Head of the Civil 
Service in 1999; at that point in time in 1995, Lim Siong Guan was Permanent Secretary of the Public 
Service Division. 
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the forefront of the efforts to create the Public Service for the 21st Century”23 launched 
just two months earlier.  
The other central institution at that time was the Civil Service Institute. In the 
1990s, as described in an earlier chapter, CSI had over 100 programmes annually 
catering to 20,000 civil servants or 22% of the bureaucracy.24  But a predominantly 
rank-and-file clientele resulted in the CSI’s image as a broad-based training school.25 
“Those who wanted a little bit more, I supposed a little bit more sophisticated, more 
branded training,” Lim Soo Hoon remembered, “they would probably go outside CSI.”26 
Yet, for the Public Service to achieve its PS21 aim of providing every civil 
servant with 100 hours of annual training, the bulk of these training would undoubtedly 
have to be undertaken by CSI. Evidently, while PS21 was being conceptualised, plans 
were also underway to level up the training institutions to meet PS21 aspirations. Ms 
Lim recounted, “When I moved up, Mr Lim [Siong Guan] said he wanted to consolidate 
training. He gave me the task of merging the old CSI with the new animal called 
CSC …. So when I joined, I was given the task of merging CSI and CSC.” 27  
 
9.2 The New Civil Service College – Rebranding the Institutes 
9.2.1 Consolidation of Training Functions   
 On 1 Apr 1996, a new Civil Service College was thus established under the 
Public Service Division, which in turn was within the purview of the Prime Minister’s 
Office (see Table 9.1).28 This reporting line, similar with those of preceding central 
training schools, continued to locate training and development as a subject within the 
personnel management portfolio, and a matter of high level attention to the government.  
The new CSC, with Ms Lim Soo Hoon as Dean, consolidated the existing 
training institutions under its control (see Table 9.2). The Institute of Policy 
Development continued with leadership development among the Administrative Service 
officers and senior echelons of the Public Service. The Institute of Public Administration 
and Management, with Ms Teo Hee Lian remaining as director, continued with the
                                                          
23
 Lim Soo Hoon, “Foreword,” Ethos Second Issue (1995): 2.  
24
 The average Civil Service establishment in the 1990s was 90,245. Training Programme 1990/91: iii; 
Training Programme 1991/92: 1; Training Programme 1994/95: 1; Budget FY1995/96 : 81; Budget 
FY1997/98: 66.  
25
 John Ewing-Chow, Interview with Author, 11 Jun 2012; Tan Boon Huat, Interview with Author, 14 Jan 
2013. 
26
 Lim Soo Hoon, Interview with Author, 15 Jun 2012.  
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Directory, Jul 1996: 683-695; IPAM, Training Directory 1997/98 (Singapore: IPAM, 1997) iii 
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Table 9.1: Civil Service College in the Prime Minister’s Office, 1996 29 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Directory, Jul 1996: 683-695. Organisational units arranged left to right according to the sequence they were presented in the original documents. 
Civil Service 
College 
 
Prime  
Minister’s Office 
Elections 
Department 
Public 
Service 
Division 
Corrupt 
Practices 
Investigation 
Bureau  
Personnel 
Admin Branch 
Personnel 
Devt Branch 
Personnel 
Guidance Unit 
Foreign 
Talent Unit 
Scenario Planning 
Office 
Social Devt 
Unit 
PSC 
Secretariat 
Institute of Policy 
Development 
Institute of Public 
Admin & Mgmt 
Civil Service 
Consulting Group 
PS21  
Office 
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Table 9.2: Structure of the Civil Service College, 1996 30 
 
                                                          
30
 Directory, Jul 1996: 690-695. Organisational units arranged left to right according to the sequence they were presented in the original documents. 
Institute of Public 
Administration & Management 
Director, 
Ms Teo Hee Lian 
 
Administration  
 
Management 
Development 
Centre 
 
Planning 
Unit 
Audio-
Visual, 
Graphic Art 
Business 
Promotion 
Unit  
Training 
Support 
Services 
Allocated 
Provision & 
Examinations 
Productivity 
& Quality 
Development 
Centre 
 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
Centre 
 
Corporate 
Support 
Development 
Centre 
 
Finance & 
Personnel, 
General Services  
Building 
Management & 
Projects, 
Library Services 
Dean 
Ms Lim Soo Hoon 
Institute of Policy 
Development 
Director, 
Ms Chang Hwee Nee 
 
Civil Service 
Consulting Group 
Director, 
Lim Ang Yong 
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training of the broader Public Service. A Civil Service Consulting Group (CSCG) was 
created to provide training consultancy services to government agencies.   
The restructuring appeared to have been well-thought through in advance. Lim 
Soo Hoon, the newly appointed Dean, explained:  
the structure is important to support the policy…[because] you signalled to 
everyone, individuals as well as the bosses, that training was critical. And then 
we were very clear about different segments of people who needed to be 
trained. What were the capability-gaps that we needed to fill? So those were the 
early days, and the structure was important to make sure that you have people 
dedicated to focusing on different areas. 31 
 
Before the newly reorganised CSC could fully support PS21 reforms, however, 
some house-keeping was necessary: harmonising the various training institutes into a 
common CSC organisational culture. IPAM staff, in particular, were reeling from what 
they perceived as the relegation of their institute into the shadow of IPD. Since the 
latter’s establishment in 1993, as the then-Civil Service College, IPAM in its earlier 
permutation as CSI had to cede its leadership programmes and then its premises to 
the newer Civil Service College. Ms Teo Hee Lian, then-CSI director, recalled: “we 
were seen as not compatible. …. we were just told make way [for the new College].” 32 
When the reorganisation was mooted, CSI staff did not understand why their institute 
with a longer history and larger staff complement should be subsumed under the name 
of a smaller Civil Service College. The rationale was not a deliberate favouring of the 
leadership centre, according to Lim Soo Hoon, who was tasked with the reorganisation:  
The real reason was because CSI had baggage. … CSI was doing all these 
broad-based training, the levels of people they were covering, Super-scale 
[apex grades] all the way to Division 4. There was a certain baggage, certain 
brand name. …. If we still called it CSI, people would still have the perception 
that it was the same thing. So we had to refresh it, re-brand it. And we thought 
that CSC was a very good name.33  
 
Looking back, more time to consult with staff could have generated wider 
acceptance for the changes. Time, however, was a luxury that Ms Lim could not afford:  
when I did this first merger, I mean, that was probably one of my first 
experiences doing something like that. Of course on hindsight now, we can say, 
I could have handled it better, I could have done this, and I could have done 
that. But one of the problems I had then was there was no assurance how long I 
would be there for. And I think this is one of the biggest problems that AOs 
sometimes faced, we move from place to place. And sometimes people will be 
quite cynical: ‘You guys come and shake up the place, change, change, change. 
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 Lim Soo Hoon, Interview with Author, 15 Jun 2012.  
32
 Teo Hee Lian, Director, CSI and IPAM, 1989 – 1998, Interview with Author, 3 Jan 2012.  
33
 Lim Soo Hoon, Interview with Author, 15 Jun 2012. 
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And before the thing is over, you guys just disappear and leave the mess 
behind for other people to clear up.’ 34 
Lim wanted to see through the changes, to avoid leaving CSC and its staff in a lurch.  
In any case, the CSC’s restructuring was not an end in itself but to ready the 
training institutions to serve PS21 reforms. The reorganisation could be formalised 
overnight on 1 April 1996, but to realise the necessary changes – including training 
activities – required time. The inventory of courses disseminated among public officers 
that year continued to be issued in the name of Civil Service Institute; Training 
Programme 1996/97 contained no indications of the organisational changes concerning 
it.35 A new section of courses, compared with previous years’ training directory, made 
reference to PS21 but most were existing courses re-arranged under the PS21 
headline. In the one year since the launch of PS21, only two new dedicated PS21 
courses were developed. 36     
 
9.2.2 Aligning Training for Reforms 
 The changes intended by CSC’s re-structuring began to show a year later. 
Changes in the Institute of Policy Development were, while less apparent on the 
surface, crucial. IPD continued its milestone programmes for the Administrative Service 
but the curriculum had a new emphasis.37 Lim Siong Guan, who as Permanent 
Secretary of the Public Service Division oversaw the bureaucracy’s personnel and the 
CSC, saw IPD playing a critical role, beyond developing the leadership corps, in forging 
among the leaders of the Public Service a ‘Coordinated Vision’:    
what we required is what I called ‘Coordinated Vision’. As opposed to what 
people generally talked about ‘Coordinated Action’, to try to coordinate the 
activities of various ministries and all that. I didn’t consider that to be the 
primary need; I considered the primary need to be ‘Coordinated Vision’. In other 
words, can the people across all the ministries and stat [statutory] boards, do 
we have a common idea of the kind of challenges Singapore faces, the kinds of 
opportunities that we can use, and a vision therefore of what Singapore wants 
to get to and what we can be.  And the Admin Service plays a primary role, not 
just the Admin Service, really the senior leadership of the public sector all 
across, the CEOs of statutory boards, everybody plays an important factor in 
this. And to me that was the critical goal of the IPD.38 
 
The re-alignment of the Institute of Public Administration and Management with 
PS21 reforms was most pronounced. A new Director of IPAM, David Ma, was 
appointed following the retirement of Ms Teo Hee Lian. But more significant was his 
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 Lim Soo Hoon, Interview with Author, 15 Jun 2012. 
35
 Training Programme 1996/97.  
36
 Ibid: x, compared with Training Programme 1994/95: 6 and 8. 
37
 “Courses Update,” Ethos (Jan 1997): 17.  
38
 Lim Siong Guan, Interview with Author, 20 Nov 2013.  
 
197 
 
direct linkage with PS21 reforms: Ma was concurrently Head of the PS21 Office (PSO) 
at the Public Service Division. Overseeing PS21 initiatives across the bureaucracy in 
that capacity, Ma was posted into CSC as part of the plans to align training with PS21:  
since I was familiar with PS21, because I was then …Head of the PSO, Mr Lim 
[Siong Guan] said, ‘Since we needed to make training to support PS21’, I was 
put in as Deputy Head of the Civil Service Consulting... when Hee Lian retired, I 
just took over. I supposed the reason why I was posted there, people expect 
that this fellow is going to take over. The whole idea was to support PS21.39 
 
Among IPAM’s adjustments to support PS21, was a Training Framework that 
mirrored the PS21 Training Initiative. More significant than offering relevant training to 
public officers at various stages of their careers were aims beyond officers’ current 
work needs:  
Induction:  This is to introduce the officer to the job and his work 
environment upon joining the service. 
Basic:  This is training to enable the officer to perform his job adequately. 
It is given whenever an officer is recruited or given a new job.  
Advanced:  This is additional training to enable the officer to give superior 
performance on his current job.  
Extended:  This is further training to enable the officer to go beyond his 
current job to be able to handle related jobs on an incidental 
basis or higher level jobs in due course.  
Continuing:  This is training that is not immediately related to the officer’s 
current job but enhances his employability over the long-term.40 
 
At every career stage, IPAM developed “five groups of generic competence”: 
Managing service excellence courses help the individual understand the 
importance of quality management and service excellence and equip him with 
the tools and techniques to do an excellent job.  
Managing change courses help the individual develop a positive attitude to 
change and equip him with the skills to manage it.  
Managing/working with people courses develop the individual’s ability to 
better gain the cooperation and commitment of his colleagues. 
Managing operations and resources courses provide the individual with the 
necessary tools and techniques to manage his work unit effectively and 
efficiently.  
Managing self courses help build the individual’s confidence in himself and 
increase his effectiveness – both inside and outside his job functions.41  
The resultant matrix of lateral competencies cutting across every stage of the officers’ 
career progression would thus guide IPAM in drawing up programmes to support PS21.  
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 David Ma, Interview with Author, 8 Mar 2013. Also Directory July 1996: 689 
40
 Commonwealth Secretariat 39. Compare with Training Directory, 1997 – 1998: iv. 
41
 Training Directory, 1997 – 1998 :iv. This was the handiwork of Tina Tan, IPAM senior manager, and 
another IPAM staff. Tina Tan, Senior Manager, IPAM, circa 1997, Interview with Author, 31 Oct 2013.  
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9.2.3 ‘Diverge, then Converge’ – Expansion of Training Programmes to Meet PS21  
With a reforms-framework to guide course development, the training 
programmes began to align with PS21. As a benchmark, in 1996 the then-CSI only 
developed two PS21-related courses and rearranged some existing programmes under 
the PS21 tagline (see Table 9.3). A year after reorganisation into IPAM, the number of 
PS21-linked courses increased slightly to 15 (see Table 9.4). Their proportion to the 
overall number of courses – including regular staples such as management and 
supervisory training, vocational and functional skills – remained the same. But IPAM 
had increased its total course-offerings by 17% to 177 courses, training 20,000 officers 
or about one-third of all civil servants.42 Training Officer, Ms Ngiam Su Wei, 
remembered that IPAM was “introducing many different training programmes, just to 
ramp up…. I saw a surge in terms of the numbers [in order to cater to the PS21 target 
of] 100 training hours.”43 IPAM also began framing its courses according to the 
competency-career stages matrix developed to support the PS21 goals of cultivating 
attitudes of service excellence and continuous change among public officers.  
 
Table 9.3: PS21 and Regular Courses offered by CSI, 1996 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 Training Directory, 1997 – 1998: i; Budget FY1998/99: 64. There were 62,963 civil servants at that time.  
43
 Ngiam Su Wei, Training Officer, IPAM, circa 1997, Interview with Author, 9 Oct 2013.  
44
 Table computed from CSI, Training Programme 1996/97. Regular courses refer to those core training 
programmes pertaining to management training, supervisory training, vocational and functional skills, 
which were non-PS21 specific training. The total number of courses may be less than the sum of courses 
in each Division as some courses were targeted at officers across several Divisions.  
1996 Division I Division II Division III Division IV Total 
Regular Courses  78 35 25 2 140   
Management Training 73 - - -     
Staff Training - 30 20 2     
IT 5 5 5 -     
PS21 Courses 8 4 2 - 13 8.5% 
Total         153   
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Table 9.4: PS21 and Regular Courses offered by IPAM, 1997 45 
1997 Division I Division II Division III Division IV Total 
Regular Courses  93 40 29 1 162   
Managing Service Excellence 15 7 8       
Managing Change 10 2 1 0     
Managing People 34 15 6 0     
Managing Ops & Resources 14 3 3       
Managing Self 19 14 7 0     
COSEC     5       
Grad Diploma 1           
PS21 Courses 7 4 4   15 8.5% 
Total         177   
 
By 1998, PS21-courses increased to 25 (see Table 9.5). Although their 
proportion to the total IPAM courses dipped slightly to 7%, this actually highlighted the 
very substantial increase in IPAM’s regular programmes to 352 courses. IPAM was 
also aiming to accommodate 45,000 trainees or 69% of the total 64,963 number of civil 
servants.46 In 1999, IPAM reported training 92,000 officers, technically reaching out to 
all 67,795 civil servants, with some returning as repeat customers.47 By 2000, the 
timeline for the PS21 goal of offering officers 100 hours of annual training, IPAM was 
able to raise the total number of course-offerings to 458 (see Table 9.6).  
Table 9.5: PS21 and Regular Courses offered by IPAM, 1998 48 
1998 Division I Division II Division III Division IV Total 
Regular Courses  131 109 73 14 327   
PS21 Courses 10 8 7   25 7.1% 
Total         352   
 
Table 9.6: PS21 and Regular Courses offered by IPAM, 1999 49 
1999 Division I Division II Division III Division IV Total 
Regular Courses  173 131 96 22 422   
Managing Service Excellence 1           
Managing Change 14 5 3 2     
Leading/ Working with People 75 51 39 3     
Managing Ops & Resources 48 45 28 12     
Managing Self 19 18 19 4     
PS21 Courses 16 12 7 1.0 36 7.9% 
Total         458   
                                                          
45
 Table computed from Training Directory, 1997 – 1998. 
46
 Training Directory, 1998: ii; Budget FY1998/99: 64. With total number of civil servants rising slightly to 
62,963, IPAM’s 20,000 officers trained represented 32% of the Civil Service.   
47
 Training Directory, 2000: ii; Budget FY2000-2001: 65. 
48
 Table computed from Training Directory, 1998. 
49
 Table computed from Training Directory, 2000. 
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These developments were in line with, indeed, part of the broader strategy 
drawn up earlier. Mrs Tina Tan, an IPAM manager at that time, revealed that the spike 
in number of courses was planned out early in 1997: 
I had to write up the training paper where I had to project the training volume for 
five years, to 1.6 million training hours! I remember [asking], ‘Huh! Mr Ma, how 
am I going to achieve 1.6 million!’ Yeah, that was my target, to reach it in five 
years, from 1997.50 
Presented with the opportunity, Mrs Tan quizzed the Permanent Secretary (Public 
Service Division): “I had a conversation with Mr Lim Siong Guan. I said, ‘We are doing 
all these things, don’t know whether relevant or not.’ Because we had to push up all 
these [training] hours!”51 Lim’s rather philosophical reply confirmed, once again, that 
these developments were a purposefully drawn up plan in motion: “He [Lim Siong 
Guan] said, ‘Never mind, now is the time to diverge, later we will converge.’”52  
The tables of IPAM courses between 1996 and 1999 above also highlighted the 
continued emphasis on senior levels of the hierarchy. Courses for Division One officers 
dominated the inventory. This was an extension of the long-standing policy, since the 
inception of the Public Service, of nurturing talented personnel. The weightier emphasis 
could also reflect the point-roles Division One officers were expected to play in leading 
PS21 reforms among staff across government agencies.  
At the same time, the increase in course offerings was evident across all 
divisional levels, reflecting efforts to be equitable in training opportunities. Courses for 
Division Two, for example, leapt to 109 in 1998 from 40 the previous year, while those 
for Division Three jumped to 73 from 29. The exponential rise could be attributed to the 
small number of courses in earlier periods. But it also pointed to new efforts to develop 
training opportunities for the broader rank-and-file of the Public Service hierarchy.  
This exponential increase in the number of courses and capacity to 
accommodate so many officers in such a short period of three to four years was 
directly due to “12.5 [days of] annual training per [public] officer … reinforced upon us,” 
according to one IPAM training officer at that time. In Rinkoo Ghosh’s memories, “CSI 
to IPAM restructuring was pressure for us because LSG [Lim Siong Guan] said we 
need to offer training to ensure officers reach 12.5 days per year quota.”53  In other 
words, PS21 reforms was the raison d’être for the rapid expansion in IPAM’s capacity 
to provide training across the Public Service.   
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 Tina Tan, Interview with Author, 31 Oct 2013. 
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 Ibid.   
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 Ibid.   
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 Rinkoo Ghosh, Training Officer, IPAM, circa 1997, email correspondence with Author, 15 Sep 2013.  
 
201 
 
9.2.4 Injecting Catalyst for Change 
Amidst the quantitative growth in programmes, David Ma, Director IPAM, was 
conscious of the need to maintain the quality of IPAM’s training: 
The problem to me was, we can expand the courses but how do we know 
whether the courses are useful to people? …. ‘How to make our courses more 
relevant, more useful?’ So that when we expand, people would still say, ‘I want 
to come because yours is useful to me.’ 54  
Few options were available to monitor the standards of these courses, let alone 
improve their quality. Like many training institutions then, IPAM was using course 
evaluations to gauge the quality of its courses.55 Rather than objective measures, these 
were impressions by participants. To Donald Kirkpatrick, who researched the 
evaluation of training, this constituted “Reaction”, which was the most basic of four 
levels of evaluation.56 According to several training officers at that time, IPAM could at 
most – through end-of-course tests – attained Level Two, assessing whether learning 
had been internalised among participants.57 Only in one programme was IPAM able “to 
move from Smiles Sheet [Level One, Reaction] to Level Three – Behaviour.”58 Levels 
Three and Four, examining the effects of training upon participants’ behaviour at work 
and long-term job performance, were beyond the reach of IPAM.59 With successive 
cohorts of public officers, IPAM did not have the wherewithal to evaluate the large 
number of officers across government agencies three to six months after the end of 
their training. More important than want of resources, IPAM did not have the mandate 
to pursue a comprehensive evaluation across the bureaucracy.  
 In lieu of more practicable recourse, David Ma placed IPAM on Inter-
Departmental Charging funding model (IDC). Until then, the central training schools – 
as departments within the bureaucracy – had always been funded by the government. 
With Inter-Departmental Charging, Ma was cutting off his own funding:  
I got the Ministry of Finance not to give us the money but to give that money to 
all the ministries…. So instead of giving us the $10 million [for example, the 
Finance Ministry] would spread that $10 million among the civil servants. … we 
would organise courses, and we would charge the ministries for a fee.60  
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 David Ma, Interview with Author, 8 Mar 2013.  
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 Ibid.   
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 These are Reaction, Learning, Behaviour and Results. Donald L. Kirkpatrick and James D. Kirkpatrick, 
Evaluating Training Programmes: The Four Levels (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2006) 21.  
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 Ghosh, email correspondence with Author, 15 Sep 2013; Ngiam Su Wei, email correspondence with 
Author, 14 Oct 2013.  
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 Level 1 evaluation, gauging the Reaction level of participants, are often referred to as ‘Smiles Sheet’, the 
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Level 3 evaluation for a Learning Organisation programme because it spanned over a one year period. 
Ghosh, email correspondence with Author, 15 Sep 2013.  
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 David Ma, Interview with Author, 8 Mar 2013.  
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Transferring training budgets to the ministries also prodded them to be responsible for 
the training of their staff. Mylvaganam Logendran, a manager at IPAM then, recalled 
that the previous practice left ministries and participants with the impression that 
training was ‘free’: “people when they felt like coming, they came; when they didn’t feel 
like coming, they didn’t come. That was not fair. You have a class here, you have to 
pay the trainers, you have the equipment, refreshment was based on the number of 
participants.”61 The Inter-Departmental Charging model, in contrast, made civil servants 
“understand that there’s a cost to training.”62  
The risk while ‘ring-fenced’ was stark.63 According to some IPAM officers at that 
time, although the central training budget was distributed among the ministries, the 
ministries’ options were limited to spending the money for IPAM courses, or not send 
their staff to IPAM; ministries could not use the budget on training by external providers. 
The salaries of IPAM officers, being civil servants, were also assured even should 
IPAM fail to attract anyone to its programmes. Yet, should government agencies decide 
not to subscribe to IPAM’s programmes, IPAM could face relegation into obsolescence.  
To complicate matters, economic outlook deteriorated dramatically in mid-1997 
as currency crises spread across Southeast Asia. The People’s Action Party 
government empowered by a “decisive victory” at elections earlier that year – winning 
81 of the 83 Parliamentary seats and 63.5% popular vote bettering its 1991 outing – 
initiated a series of fiscal measures.64 As events turned out, the Singapore economy 
managed “better-than-expected”65 7.8% growth. 
For IPAM, government agencies’ subscription to its programmes did not dip. As 
it grew the number of courses in accordance to the PS21 goal, the number of civil 
servant-participants rose to soak up the supply. On reflection, Ms Ngiam thought:  
in a way, IDC would be a ‘test’ for us to see if public sector agencies would 
send their officers to CSC for training.  If our programmes were good, we 
should be able to see better subscriptions to our programmes.  So, in a way, 
IDC was one way to ensure that we offer quality training programmes to the 
Public Service. 66  
 
Meeting the needs of external government agencies cloaked the real subjects 
of this Inter-Departmental Charging model. Although IDC sought to maintain the quality 
of courses, Ma – by staking IPAM’s viability to the internal market – wanted to impress 
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upon staff the imperative of delivering high-quality programmes to the internal market. 
IDC was essentially an application of the New Public Management principle – though 
Ma said he was not influenced by it – of injecting competition to improve services: “with 
competition, you made sure that your courses have to be useful. Otherwise, ministries 
don’t have to come. They can go anywhere. They can go to the universities.”67 The real 
end-goal, hence, was to instil within IPAM staff an attitude of service excellence. In all 
purposes, Inter-Departmental Charging triggered off PS21 reforms within IPAM. For the 
training institution to be the point of introducing reforms into the bureaucracy, it first 
needed to undergo that reform.  
 
9.3 Becoming a Statutory Board 
9.3.1 Market-Competition to Stimulate Quality Training 
 Sometime in 1998, Brigadier-General Yam Ah Mee, who had just completed his 
service in the air force, was posted to the Public Service Division as part of his 
Administrative Service posting. As Deputy Secretary (Development) to Permanent 
Secretary Lim Siong Guan, BG Yam oversaw the PS21 Office and Strategic Planning 
Office and was concurrently Dean over the Civil Service College (see Table 9.7). One 
of his first tasks was to inject fresh impetus into the PS21 movement, suggesting an 
‘innovative and entrepreneurial Civil Service’ as a new goal for the reform drive. This, 
Yam recalled, met with,  
a lot of concerns, by some groups of people that the Civil Service, if it would to 
be entrepreneurial, it would tilt too much towards profit-driven. So eventually 
after many months, Eddie Teo was the Permanent Secretary by then, we 
managed to settle on the term, ‘an innovative and enterprising Civil Service’. 68 
 
At the same time, the Scenario Planning 2020 exercise led by the Strategic 
Planning Office under his charge convinced Yam that, “we needed to have a very 
innovative and enterprising Civil Service in order to be very nimble, very forward 
looking, future ready civil servants in order for us to position ourselves to deal with the 
challenges of the scenarios.” 69  
The Civil Service College at that time included three units: IPAM, the Institute of 
Policy Development and the Civil Service Consulting Group. BG Yam recalled that they 
“were operating like four [sic] different departments, each had a department director  
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Table 9.7: Public Service Division and Civil Service College, 199870 
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and they were all [receiving] Civil Service budgeting.”71 Earlier differences between 
staff of IPAM and IPD lingered, the physical distance between the two separately-sited 
institutes not bridged by any collaborative opportunities.72 David Ma, Director IPAM, 
remembered that, 
there was a bit of envy in a way that IPD’s income was guaranteed. Because of 
the AOs. As long as you have the AOs, as long as the government says we are 
going to train the AOs, then IPD. But the future of IPAM, not sure. Because if 
you don’t have money, then you’re in trouble.73 
IPAM Training Officer, Ngiam Su Wei, added, “It’s a bit of a very strange situation, 
where it’s two sister-departments: one sister department is the one that served the elite 
group and did all the high profile things; and then IPAM, left with the run-of-the-mill 
programmes and the ordinary folks.”74 A CSC-commissioned survey also found some 
agencies “not pleased or satisfied with IPAM’s provision of training courses.” 75  
Such a Civil Service College, in the minds of BG Yam Ah Mee, was not in 
synchrony with the PS21 goal:  
the training arm, the development arm of the Civil Service…cannot operate like 
this.  Because if the directors, trainers, administrators operated in a Civil 
Service context, almost like an iron rice bowl, how did you make sure your 
programmes were up to date, totally relevant, high quality, and kept abreast of 
the needs of the Civil Service and forward looking . So I felt that while we 
championed for PS21, scenario planning, we really needed to change the 
mentality.76  
 
At this juncture, Permanent Secretary Lim Siong Guan broached an idea he 
had been mulling over for some time with BG Yam: replicating IPAM’s application of 
competition across the whole CSC. The motivation remained similar: compelling CSC 
to produce high-quality and relevant training programmes by detaching it from the 
Public Service Division, effectively cutting it off from the ministry’s funding. The risks 
between the two instances were different, though, as David Ma explained:  
with Inter Departmental Charging, that means we were still a government 
department. If … we really couldn’t survive, couldn’t make the ends meet, we 
would still go back to our bosses and say, ‘We have no money, help us.’ And if 
you are part of a department, I think they can’t say no to you. They may be very 
unhappy, but they will still have to bail you out, because you are a 
department.77 
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Cutting the whole CSC adrift from PSD, on the other hand, would effectively remove 
any last resort to the Civil Service for help. In plain words, CSC would have finance 
itself, pay for its staff and overheads, by from the courses it would sell.  
At the same time, without being constrained by the strictures of Civil Service 
regulations, CSC would have the flexibility to manage its own personnel according to 
its organizational needs. To allow CSC to produce quality programmes, it must be 
empowered to recruit trainers and staff with the necessary competencies and 
capacities, at the corresponding rates of remuneration. Correspondingly, in order to 
operate in a market environment, CSC should have the leverage to let-go of 
redundancies.  Lim Siong Guan would elaborate afterwards:  
The only way the Civil Service College can keep up with all the developments in 
the training and work marketplace is to co-opt competencies wherever they are 
found. ….If you have a trainer who has been with you for 30 years but carries 
the same set of skills, you can’t bring in changes. So you need a structure that 
can bring people in and out – something which public departments can’t do.78 
 
9.3.2 Public Sector Remaining the Focus 
 Yam Ah Mee was prepared to give it a try, despite Lim Siong Guan mentioning 
that “he asked a few people but nobody wanted to take up this change.”79 Yam saw 
eye-to-eye with Lim that training played a critical role in supporting the PS21 reform: 
when Mr. Lim, two-three months after I came in, said that we should operate 
like this, where people pay to attend [training courses], and the four units [of 
CSC] should earn their rights, earn their positions in the way they deliver quality, 
I said, ‘Yes, I was prepared to do this.’ …. That’s where it got started, about 
two-three month after I came in, in 1998. Because I firmly believed that you 
really needed an innovative and enterprising Civil Service College in order to 
have an innovative and enterprising Public Service, so that we would be nimble 
enough for the future.80 
  
While convinced that competition could draw out quality programmes from CSC, 
questions remained over the model to structure the training institution. One option was 
to completely privatise CSC, allowing market forces to ensure efficiency. But Lim, Yam 
and their senior management team were conscious that focusing on the lucrative 
private sector training market, which would necessarily result from privatisation, could 
lead to a void in the training of less profitable core public sector skills.81 A corporatized 
CSC would also lose its links to the government.82 Beyond the principles of competition 
                                                          
78
 Lim Siong Guan, quoted in ST 12 Jul 2001:  H7.  
79
 Yam Ah Mee, Interview with Author, 23 Dec 2011.  
80
 Ibid.  
81
 “An Interview with Chief Executive Officer and Dean, Civil Service College, BG(NS) Yam Ah Mee,” 
Ethos (Nov 2001): 4.  
82
 Jaime Teong, Director, Corporate Development, CSC, 2001 – 2007, quoted in Saravanan (2003) 42.  
 
207 
 
and efficiency, the ultimate goal of the exercise was to align CSC to produce training 
relevant for the development of a stronger Public Service. Moreover, remaining within 
the public sector would allow CSC to draw on some of the resources within the 
bureaucracy, such as senior civil servants as trainers. For these reasons, Lim, Yam 
and their senior staff agreed, CSC while separated from the Civil Service must still 
remain within the public sector.  
 The most optimal option, taking all into consideration, was to structure CSC as 
a statutory board. As an agency enacted by legislation specifically with the mission to 
carry out training for the public sector, CSC’s focus would not be distracted from 
training the Public Service. At the same time, set adrift outside the financial resources 
of the Civil Service would compel CSC to be market-driven, ensuring high standards in 
the development of its courses and programmes. The flexibility to operate at an arm’s 
length from the Civil Service, conferring CSC the flexibility to recruit the necessary 
competencies, would also boost its capacity to operate in an open market environment.  
With the philosophical considerations worked out, Yam Ah Mee began plans to 
turn CSC into a self-financing statutory board.83 He convened an internal study into 
CSC’s financial situation; preliminary figures suggested that the Civil Service’s annual 
training and development budget was around $40 million, almost all of which was spent 
in CSC’s programmes. To ensure objectivity and independence in assessment, Yam 
engaged an external consultancy to conduct a comprehensive viability study. The 
evaluation by Ernst and Young, after a six-month study, confirmed that the total training 
demands of the Civil Service indeed amounted to about $40 million. The overall 
conclusion was that, if CSC could retain its existing customer base, proceeding with the 
self-financing model was feasible.  
His confidence buoyed by empirical analyses, BG Yam proceeded with formal 
submissions. The exact justifications were still fresh in his mind a decade later:   
I wrote a paper to form a restructured self-funded statutory board. I remember 
that the first question that was asked was: do we need CSC to be a statutory 
board? …. My arguments were: (1) we needed to be an innovative and 
enterprising Civil Service, therefore the training and development arm should 
first be innovative and enterprising; (2) if you really believe in being innovative 
and enterprising, then if the money came on a silver platter, you’ll never be very 
innovative and enterprising. So its best that we operate as a self-funded 
statutory board, so that you would not think there’s a grandfather behind, you 
have to earn the money.84  
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9.3.3 Finding the Money 
 Although BG Yam Ah Mee was fairly confident that CSC’s courses could 
finance its operations, this source of revenue could only be available after the courses 
were delivered and invoices paid. In the interim, which Yam and his management team 
assessed to range between six and seven months, CSC needed an operating capital of 
$10.8 million.  
While Singapore rebounded strongly from the 1998 regional financial crises, the 
economic outlook for the year 2001 was increasingly ominous. The 11 Sep suicide 
attacks on the United States worsened the already pessimistic sentiments; GDP 
contracted 2.2% and unemployment reached 6%.85 Against this outlook, BG Yam and 
his management team needed to convince bankers to extend a $10 million loan based 
on potential success of products yet to be sold, customers yet to be secured, and 
revenue that were still far from being clear. Approaching the DBS Bank, BG Yam 
recalled: “I had to show the bank the study we did with Ernst and Young: it’s quite do-
able, don’t worry. These are my programmes, we know what we do. This is the strategy. 
I had to give them a value proposition. So the bank supported us, I signed this.”86  
  Joining Yam in signing the loan instrument from the bank was Eddie Teo. Teo 
had by then succeeded Lim Siong Guan as Permanent Secretary at the Public Service 
Division and would become chairman of the board of directors governing the proposed 
autonomous CSC. Even with his boss joining him in undertaking the loan, BG Yam 
could not help but felt the gravity of that decision: “after I signed the $10.8 million, the 
first three nights I actually didn’t sleep very well. This was the first time I borrowed 
$10.8 million and I knew that in 6½ months, about seven months, it would run dry, 
unless we did well. I really didn’t sleep well.”87 
 
9.4 CSC as Self-Financing Statutory Board 
On 1 Oct 2001, CSC formally became a self-financing statutory board under the 
purview of the Public Service Division, in the Prime Minister’s Office (see Table 9.8).88 
In the debate leading to the Parliament’s passing of the Civil Service College Act, two 
legislators while supporting the motion sought – and received – assurances that the 
CSC would keep civil servants across all levels of the personnel hierarchy abreast of  
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Table 9.8: Civil Service College as a Statutory Board, circa 2001 89 
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Table 9.9: Civil Service College Organisational Structure, circa 2001 90 
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professional developments.91 Opposition Member of Parliament, Chiam See Tong, 
argued that placing CSC under PMO could subject it to undue political influence. To 
this, Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, clarified that the Civil Service College 
was a “completely neutral outfit”:  
It runs staff courses, courses for middle management, courses for senior 
management, courses on governance, courses on good English writing, 
courses on how to be a good civil servant….professional educational courses 
which need to be run for civil servants at all levels, from the top Permanent 
Secretary potential, all the way down to the clerical officer or the EO. So it is a 
completely neutral outfit.92 
 
9.4.1 Structure for Oversight and Control 
While the CSC was established as a statutory board outside of the Civil Service, 
its organisational structure positioned it firmly under the control of the Public Service 
Division. The CSC Act provided for a Board of Directors to exercise independent 
oversight over the College but the designation of the Permanent Secretary (PSD) as 
chairman left no doubt that the predominant authority over CSC would remain with 
PSD. Up to 14 directors of the board could be appointed by the minister in-charge of 
the Civil Service,93 but without provision for these positions to be advertised meant that 
the selection process was managed internally, most plausibly led by the senior officials 
within PSD. The designated secretary of the board was the newly-established position 
of ‘Dean and Chief Executive Officer’ responsible for the College’s daily operations. 
With BG Yam Ah Mee, as Dean/CEO, concurrently Deputy Secretary at PSD, reporting 
to the Permanent Secretary, the management structure effectively entrenched the 
Public Service Division’s control over CSC. 
To offer additional guidance to the CSC management team, a high-level 
Advisory Panel was appointed, led by Lim Siong Guan, by now promoted to the 
position of Head of the Civil Service. The panel also included two heads of foreign 
bureaucracies: Joseph Wong, Secretary of Hong Kong’s Civil Service, and Mdme 
Jocelyne Bourgon, President Emeritus of the Canadian School of Public Service and 
former Clerk of the Canadian Privy Council. 94  
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The new CSC consisted of three main departments (see Table 9.9). The 
Institute of Policy Development remained focused on the development of the 
Administrative Service and leadership corps of the Public Service. IPAM’s programmes 
covered leadership, governance, public administration and PS21 initiatives. The Civil 
Service Consulting Group and a Personnel Guidance Unit (PGU), transferred from 
PSD, merged to form CSC Consultants.  
The Personnel Guidance Unit was set up in 1996 when Lim Siong Guan was 
Permanent Secretary to provide PSD with psychometric assessment capacity in 
recruiting government scholars. According to Roger Tan, Assistant Head of PGU at 
that time, PGU also helped statutory boards and government-linked companies in the 
selection of job applicants, but these services were fee-paying for agencies outside of 
the civil service structure.95 With all of its overheads funded from PSD’s budget, the 
charging of fees-for-services introduced the principle of costs in services into PSD. 
Significantly, this predated IPAM’s introduction of Inter-Departmental Charging in 1997. 
Publicly, PGU’s inclusion into CSC added psychological consultancy to allow CSC to 
offer integrated services.96 From the perspective of PSD, Tan pointed out, merging 
PGU with IPAM, IPD and CSC Consultants also separated the service-provision units 
to allow PSD focus as a policy-making ministry.97   
 
9.4.2 Supporting Departments 
A Business Development department was established to broaden CSC’s 
customer base. Even Yam Ah Mee, as Dean/CEO facing pressing matters, had to 
canvass for clients:  
the business development marketing group, I joined them going round to talk to 
permanent secretaries, talk to CEOs. …. And then we said we should also think 
about going overseas for the Civil Service, to position Singapore on the world 
map in the area of training and development.  At that time we were doing work 
in ASEAN countries, little bit in China. We should intensify and grow the ASEAN 
countries. 98 
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While the initial aim was financial bottom-line, over time and with growing confidence, 
BG Yam seized the opportunity to use training for broader diplomatic goals.  
in 2001 when we started the restructured statutory board, I went to Dubai, 
Bahrain, Qatar – I went to many places – Canada, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Australia, all over the place.  I went to Dubai five times in one year, to make 
sure that all these things come through. I did a lot of travelling to engage. … 
Why? For the purpose of positioning Singapore on the world map in the area of 
training and development, in the area of training quality. 99  
 
With the weight of financial viability weighing heavily over CSC, a Finance 
Department was set up within the College to keep a constant watch over money 
matters. In order to instill real- world competition and fiscal discipline into the 
organization, Yam deliberately refrained from sourcing from within the public sector 
when selecting the personnel to oversee finances.   
I recruited a Director/Finance from outside, totally from the private sector. I said 
your role is to go through all these numbers, and make sure that from the 
finance angle, it’s a doable thing. Although I had a consultant who provided me 
their views, Ernst and Young, internally,[I had] my Finance Director, who was 
also Director/HR concurrently. …  bearing in mind that I only started with six to 
seven months of rolling capital, we were very tight with resources, tight with 
people.100 
 
9.4.3 Starting Out 
 Having laid out the preparations, the time came for the Civil Service College, 
modeled as a self-financing statutory board, to set forth into the market. The principal 
concern preoccupying BG Yam Ah Mee, Dean and Chief Executive Officer, and his 
senior management team and in fact all levels of staff in CSC, was undoubtedly 
financial. Yam set up a system to monitor operations and CSC’s performance:  
we switched over. Every day when the courses finished, by the next day I 
already knew. I got my Finance, HR and operations side. I already knew: 
yesterday, how many people came for programmes? What was the feedback of 
the course, of the trainer? If we went like this, how much were the earnings? 
How much were the costs? I was going day by day tracking of quality, delivery, 
results, bottom-line.101 
This tight feedback loop allowed Yam and his management to make decisions on the 
fly: whether adjustments were needed, what improvements to be made, etc.  
Operating at such high intensity, especially after an emotional transition from 
government department to statutory board, was undoubtedly strenuous and exacting 
upon staff, from management to rank-and-file officers. Yam recalled that some CSC 
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officers had chosen to remain as civil servants when given the option when CSC 
restructured, rather than faced the uncertainty over CSC’s viability and their livelihoods: 
Quite a number left on transition because they felt it was very tough to move 
from civil servant to restructured statutory board staff overnight. You now have 
to earn your income based on the quality of courses and programmes. The civil 
servants who [previously] must come to you now can go anywhere. You have to 
go and market, sell the product, convince the permanent secretaries, convince 
everyone, that my programmes were good. But everyone was looking at 
alternatives outside. 102 
Altogether, IPD and IPAM witnessed a reduction of 13 staff, from 138 before October 
2001 to 125 after CSC became a statutory board.103  
However, this was remembered differently by some at the staff level. Michelle 
Wong, a Course Administrator at IPAM at that time, recalled: 
As one of the Division 1 graduates then, we weren’t so much the affected ones, 
but I think it was the Division 2 and Division 3 officers, probably at that time 
more Division 3 officers, who felt it more. I think there was some unhappiness 
with how the transition was being communicated to them. Because it was 
basically something like, ‘You go over [to CSC as a statutory board staff], then if 
you find that things are not suitable … you will be out of a job.’ Somehow, 
maybe the way how the comms [communications] was handled, and I don’t 
know whether it was deliberate or not. So I think there was a feeling like job 
insecurity.  And because of that, some people didn’t want to go over, and even 
those who remained there was some residual unhappiness about how the 
whole thing was being handled.104  
 
 Indeed, those responsible for personnel matters leading up to CSC’s change 
into a statutory board agreed the subject required delicate handling. Mrs Jaime Teong, 
Human Resource Manager at the Public Service Division, recalled that management’s 
preference was for all existing CSC staff to be “novated” into CSC statutory board 
officers when CSC changed its legal status.105 Yet, earlier expansion to meet the PS21 
training demands had resulted in rapid rise in CSC staff numbers. IPAM, in particular, 
had a substantial number of personnel on temporarily hired terms. With the prospects 
of a self-financing CSC less than crystal clear, apprehensions over job-security were 
real among some CSC staff, especially those recently drafted into IPAM or whose 
competencies might not survive open-market competition. At several town-hall style 
dialogues aimed at assuring staff, senior PSD officials promised staff choosing to 
remain as civil servants, i.e. not transferring into CSC statutory board terms: they would 
not lose their jobs. But PSD, according to Jaime Teong, had difficulty securing 
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positions in civil service agencies to emplace officers who chose not to transfer with 
CSC into statutory board terms.  
In other recollections, staff chose to leave CSC not at the point of its becoming 
a statutory board but amidst the intense atmosphere thereafter. Ngiam Su Wei, by this 
time promoted to manager in IPAM, said: 
the reason why people left, from my perspective, was more like: they looked at 
the new place, it no longer resonated with them, and therefore they left. Can’t 
blame Yam Ah Mee, he had to bring in private sector people, so he brought in 
private sector people, like Finance [director]. The way she [Director/Finance] 
operated was totally different from last time, maybe a more nurturing finance 
chief, or a more ministry way of doing things.106  
In the memories of some working-level staff, a highly demanding environment within 
CSC was emerging overnight: “we had to ramp up our capacity very quickly. It literally 
meant a sudden change of introducing different types of programs.”107   
More exacting was the sudden emphasis on meeting performance targets. Ms 
Ngiam recalled: “We were suddenly given targets that we had to achieve, and it’s in 
dollar amount…. you are accountable for your area, you have to grow your area, you 
have to bring in the targets… Suddenly we swing to the extreme of becoming profit-
driven.”108 Roger Tan, Deputy Director of CSC Consultants, added,  
when we became a stat-board, that time damn ‘jialat’ [‘very difficult’ in Chinese 
colloquial vernacular] and it didn’t help that the CFO [finance director] was so 
aggressive. Every meeting we were scolded upside down, kept being 
‘pressurized’ to go for new money. So it was a culture shock for most.109  
For some among the staff, the acuteness and magnitude of the series of sudden 
changes to their environment could be tough to bear. One informant revealed that,  
one of the staff passed away. Don’t know whether [it was] because in the 
pursuit of numbers and profit, whether it causes the person to look at it, and 
then after that. I think it could be heart-attack. …. We heard his wife… [tapered 
off]. We heard that he every night would look at how to do better, how to bring 
in … [tapered off]. 110 
 
Yam Ah Mee received “many nasty letters who said that: why were we doing 
this? How come this Director/Finance from the private sector? It’s private sector 
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penetrating into Civil Service! Why everything needed to do double fast time?” 111 Some 
complaints reached “Mr. Lim Siong Guan [Head of Civil Service], went to Mr. Eddie Teo 
[Permanent Secretary, PSD], went even beyond that.”112 The Minister in-charge of Civil 
Service then was Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who would obviously be 
aware of these developments.113 
 Fortunately for Yam, the leadership – both the political leadership and top 
echelons of the bureaucracy – were prepared to hear him out. Not that he looked 
forward to these meetings under the circumstances: “I had to explain to Mr. Lim Siong 
Guan, Eddie Teo, many people: we were doing the right thing, it’s moving well. …we 
were doing this, I’m moving this part, I’m moving this part, I needed to move this part 
like this, so we operated like this.”114 Yam and CSC were allowed to continue, at least 
for the time being.  
 Internally, Yam also had to manage CSC staff: “I had to tell my Director/Finance, 
‘Slow down a bit, I know you are doing the right thing, but the approach cannot be 
rough.’”115 Yam did remove the personnel management duties from the finance 
director’s portfolio. And, according to Jaime Teong whom the Dean brought in to take 
over HR functions, Yam considered letting go of the Director/Finance.116 While he 
retained the finance director for the time being, Yam had to devote a lot of time 
engaging staff: 
almost every month I had to do pep talk with our staff: ‘Don’t worry. We would 
show the results. Across, this was our overall performance; respective 
departments, this was your performance; this was feedback from our 
participants; this was our outreach to so many ministries and so many statutory 
boards; these were the new participants, local and overseas.’117 
 
 Officers who were more senior in the hierarchy appeared more able to 
appreciate the measures within the context of CSC’s drive for survival. Manager, 
Logendran, pointed out that there was a prevailing “fear of the unknown, we were going 
into new area. Can we make it?” Hence every avenue was sought to reduce cost and 
maximize revenue because, “Survival was the word! …if your bottom-line was changed, 
breakeven was important, you must do x number of courses…. In fact we used to rent 
out our auditorium for the evening classes. Not for us, but for the private sector, just to 
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get the revenue.”118 There were at least some officers within CSC who had greater 
level of confidence in the leadership team. One manager said,  
We knew who the captain of the ship was and although we say there may be 
stormy waters, we were confident who the leader was, who was leading us. So I 
think the leader is very important. If they believe in it and they are there, they 
stand by us, we will have the confident that it (the change) will work. So I would 
say that there were risks involved, but I think if everyone put in their effort and 
everybody do [sic] their rowing and it means everybody has got to row and 
synchronise their rowing over the stormy days, at the end of the day we work as 
a team and that’s important to achieve the target we have before us.119   
 
As part of the autonomy vested in CSC, Yam linked staff remuneration to their 
performance. Foregoing the Civil Service formula of pay increments with years of 
service, CSC’s new framework pegged remuneration to outcomes:  
First tier was how well Civil Service College overall performed? If we were in 
the red, I would say: so sorry I don’t pay you, I have no money to pay you at all. 
We went bankrupt, then we went bankrupt. We had to operate such that we 
operated together. This level we make sure we do well.  
Tier No. 2 was by department. So even if we did very well, then I would break 
down into IPAM, IPD, CSCI. Because if your department did very well, I should 
recognize you even more compared to others.  
Tier 3 is you as an individual, how did you do? Maybe IPAM did very well but 
you as an individual didn’t. Notice that all these three tiers were all tied to 
training development, mindset changes, delivery quality, training standards. But 
very line of sight – to individual, to team, to their department, overall.  
Then the last tier, Tier No. 4, I needed everyone to have the right mentality, 
Civil Service ethos and values, PS21, improvement, innovation, continuous 
improvement, WITS, SSS [staff suggestion scheme]. So Tier 4 was about other 
areas not just to your training and your delivery.  
So I had four tiers, every part of it was tied to how well we conceptualized, 
delivered, how innovative and enterprising, and what were our customers telling 
us, and the results. 120 
As an organization in the training and development business, CSC also built learning 
and development into its personnel development plan. Training was positioned as staff 
entitlement, and higher learning offered as incentives. Well-trained staff, from the 
organization’s perspective, would expand its capacity.  
 
9.4.4 Taking Stock 
 Evaluating public sector organisations is difficult – their level of success cannot 
be simply derived from the amount of revenues generated from their activities. The 
problem with assessing public sector organisations is principally over the complexity 
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involved in quantifying public service; what cannot be measured is difficult to evaluate. 
Perhaps one approach is to assess CSC against the objective it set for itself.   
 When the Civil Service College transitioned into a self-financing statutory board, 
it aimed to provide high quality training that was relevant to the Public Service. The 
Dean/CEO was determined that CSC would succeed. The circumstances were far from 
conducive: the national economy contracted 2% and global outlook was greatly 
undermined by the 9/11 attacks.  
Against this context, Yam Ah Mee recalled evaluating CSC’s performance after 
one year of operating as a self-financing statutory board:  
the first year quite a number of ministries and statutory boards, assuming they 
used to come to IPAM so much, I saw that most of them, because they had a 
chance to try outside, they tried. Almost 50 – 60% they did with IPAM, the other 
30 – 40%, some as much as 50% they tried outside in the first year.121  
 
While the picture appeared grim on the one hand, CSC’s efforts at broadening 
its customer base would prove rewarding. Following many rounds of canvassing, 
statutory boards which had previously not subscribed to CSC’s programmes and new 
government agencies were apparently won over by CSC. These new training deals 
together with overseas projects would prove a lifeline to CSC:   
So in my first year the total revenue brought in was $43 million [Financial Year 
2002]. In fact, for the three years, it was about $43 million [FY2002], $39 million 
[FY2003], $43 million [FY2004]. Beyond expectations.  
The reason was that while we reached to the usual ministries, although they did 
lesser, we did more, we did local and overseas. And then I found that 
subsequent second year, they all came back. Because after they tried outside, 
then they said that outside not so customized, may not be so good. And the first 
year we had a net surplus of a couple of millions.122 
Yam’s greatest relief was the resolution of the cause of his many sleepless nights: “And 
within the first year I returned to DBS [Bank] $10.8 million, we paid back $10.8 million 
to DBS. 123 And with the remuneration framework pegged to financial outcomes, CSC 
staff were “rewarded for all the hardwork.” 124 
While CSC appeared to have achieved the fiscal independence aspect of its 
objective, Saravanan in his 2004 study questioned some of the financial figures: 
When I thoroughly scrutinized the business resources of the CSC, I was 
informed that the CSC still receives funds from the PSO and the Managing For 
Excellence (MFE) office [both in the Public Service Division]. This funding 
amounts to about 15% to 20% of the total revenue of CSC. Thus, without the 
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funding, the CSC’s current financial viability would not be as sound as it has 
claimed to be.125  
This, Senior Manager Logendran explained, was part of the initial measures designed 
to cushion CSC’s migration to the full market; selected CSC programmes were 
“subsidised 50%, then 30%, 20% for five years.”126  
Saravanan also questioned CSC’s proposition as a public sector organization:  
operating on the middle of the private-public spectrum will affect the strategic 
focus of any organization. The tension created by the need to balance both of 
the functions can take a toll on the organization. Important public service values 
and ethics such as accountability, integrity, responsibility and loyalty may be 
eroded by the competitive liberal private sector values. Thus, the durability of 
this model can only be seen with the passage of time.127  
Saravanan might be right, except no empirical evidence was presented to substantiate 
these assertions. The difficulty in Saravanan’s thesis lays in the principal problem of 
quantifying public sector values and performance, as mentioned earlier.  
 Another approach is to evaluate CSC’s performance as a public sector 
organization against the rationale for retaining it within the public sector. The key 
reason, to revisit for context,  was to ensure that CSC continued to provide training for 
the Public Service even as corporatization set it up to chase after the more profitable 
segments of the market. In fact, the reason for injecting competition into CSC was to 
compel it to develop high quality and relevant training, with the ultimate aim of 
providing these for the Public Service.  
In this regard, CSC showed itself remaining focused on the public sector. Civil 
servants continued to attend CSC’s programmes, reflecting their ministries’ approval of 
CSC’s courses. Statistics listed in CSC’s annual reports in the immediate period after 
its conversion into a statutory board did not appear to show a digression into the 
private sector: there were no records of participants from outside the Public Service.128 
Further evidence of CSC’s continued focus on the Public Service could be 
found in its overseas ventures. Profit would be the obvious motivation for such 
international projects but these represented a small percentage in proportion to CSC’s 
overall more domestically-oriented programmes. In 2002, for example, CSC undertook 
four foreign consulting projects while, apart from the already heavy focus on training 
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local civil servants, committed to 35 local projects.129 Even so, part of the reason for 
pursuing these overseas projects was evidently driven to serve and advance the 
interests of the Singapore Public Service:  
We worked with UNDP [United Nations Development Programme], we worked 
with ADB [Asian Development Bank], we worked with CAPAM [Commonwealth 
Association of Public Administration and Management], we worked with ASTD 
[American Society of Training and Development]. Why? For the purpose of 
positioning Singapore on the world map in the area of training and development, 
in the area of training quality.130  
 
A more valid evaluation of CSC’s transformation, achieving financial self-
sufficiency and remaining rooted in its Public Service-focus, was the high ‘cost’ upon its 
staff. Evidently, most staff were fatigued by the rapid ramping up of programmes and 
stressed by the sudden preoccupation with performance targets. The organizational 
culture, already far from cohesive with lingering differences between IPAM and IPD 
officers, became even more competitive and adversarial under the circumstances. Yet, 
this ‘cost’ might be inevitable in order to ‘unlock’ the full potential of the organization 
and its staff. Pointing to the doubling in output of some departments before and after 
CSC’s ‘stat-boardisation’, Roger Tan, reflected 
if you look at it from the not-so-good point of view, it increased the workload 
tremendously. But if you look at it from another point of view, you might wonder 
how much spare capacity we had been harbouring in the old set-up, that there 
was hidden capacity there that we didn’t unleash…. The moment you turned it 
the other way around and say, ‘I’m going to pay you based on performance, I’m 
going to pay you based on whether you meet your KPIs, the more you earn, the 
more bonus you get.’ Straight away, human behavior changes and you can 
unleash, almost doubling. It’s quite a good illustration of how market forces can 
unleash all these sleepy government performance.131  
 
Several managers who had served longer stints in the central training school of 
the Public Service took a longer view of the CSC’s circumstances transitioning into a 
statutory board. Logendran, a manager who joined during the CSI period, said,  
If you ask me, now looking back at it, I think sometimes you have to do some 
things which were not pleasant at the time, but it was the right thing to do. …if 
you are already given this mandate, you have to go ahead and do it. What were 
the options?132  
Mrs Tina Tan, who started her career with CSI, addressed criticisms that the focus on 
financial viability led CSC to lose its public sector focus:   
People on hindsight said that, ‘We lost our way.’ But I don’t think so. …. You 
asked me to start a stat board [statutory board], you don’t give me the capital, I 
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must make sure that everything can be paid for, including my staff’s salaries, I 
have to pay rental. So I must make sure that the ‘business’ is viable. But I don’t 
think we have deviated from the mission. We also did programmes that were 
needed by the people at that time. …to say that we had lost our way, I don’t 
think that was correct.133  
Logendran continued,  
if we had remained there [within the civil service structure], then honestly I think 
we may not be where we are now. Having gone through it, to me there is a very 
good lesson for us. Baptism of fire or whatever you can call it. I thought that 
having gone through it, it made us wiser and stronger, than if we continued to 
remain there, I’m not sure we will be where we are now. Because we have gone 
through it, we understood what we needed to do, what we needed to focus 
on.134  
All other CSC officers interviewed for this study were in agreement that the intense 
focus on survivability at that time was necessary, despite the strain on staff, and laid 
the foundation for today’s Civil Service College.135  
 
9.5 Conclusion – A Stand Alone College 
 The transformation of the Civil Service College, from its establishment in 1996 
to its transition into a statutory board in 2001, was a remarkably purposeful and well-
planned alignment of training functions to support PS21 reforms in the Singapore 
Public Service. The eventual CSC was the result of decades of tinkering, rebadging, 
organizational restructurings – all representing attempts by the senior echelons of the 
Public Service to get the model they wanted. The decision to detach it from the Civil 
Service, from where the previous generations of training schools had all originated and 
been subsidiaries of, was effectively an implicit criticism of the erstwhile structure. But 
the training schools’ long-standing position as subsidiaries within the Civil Service 
meant that the task of detaching them would require deep deliberation and careful 
planning.  
The conceptual framework overlaid the period in this chapter with sharp 
contextual focus. The promulgation of PS21 and the centrality of executive 
development and training in that reforms-drive did arise from within the bureaucracy. 
The Singapore Public Service, already efficient and operating at high-performance 
level, was seeking to leap for even higher bounds. Yet the state in the analytic 
framework continued to loom large. An even more efficient and effective Public Service 
would certainly held the electoral fortunes of the ruling PAP government, amidst much 
talk of development-democratisation theories at that time. Ultimately, even though Lim 
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Siong Guan might not have cleared the ‘reforms-through-training’ agenda with the 
political leadership, the political masters by withholding any objections for it, by tacitly 
endorsing it, and by approving budgetary allocations for it, was instrumental in 
supporting PS21 and CSC.  
In retrospect, the eventual emergence of CSC as a self-financing statutory 
board, as the ultimate end-state of a series of restructuring, was clearly already 
conceived alongside the promulgation of the PS21 reforms. Between 1996 and 2001, 
each phase of CSC’s transition was an incremental but progressive step towards that 
final permutation. The two existing central training institutions were first merged into 
one central CSC to consolidate control over the bureaucracy’s training functions, in 
preparation of the subsequent phase of reorganization. This was the introduction of 
competition into IPAM, to push its staff to rapidly expand capacity, in order for the 
Public Service to realise the PS21 goal of offering public officers with 100 hours of 
annual training. On hindsight, this was clearly a trial, a controlled-experiment, for the 
follow-on replication of market-competition across CSC. Cutting CSC adrift from 
government funding, ‘empowering’ it autonomy to be responsible for its own finances, 
was the ultimate measure in compelling staff to produce or perish. Yet, by making it a 
statutory board anchored within the public sector ensured that CSC would continue to 
focus on relevance towards the Public Service. The emergence of CSC as a self-
financing statutory board was thus the unfolding of a well-laid plan, five years in the 
making, like the coming-together of a patiently assembled set-piece on a chess-board.  
Lim Siong Guan, the Permanent Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office and 
the architect of PS21, affirmed that the CSC’s restructuring was a purposeful alignment 
of the training institution to support the Public Service’s reforms. In an interview for this 
study, Lim recounted the strategy that was unfolding at that time: 
The whole idea is very plain: Civil Service College is a critical node, it is a 
critical agency, for doing good for the whole Civil Service, on both counts, about 
the vision for the future of the country, and about knowledge and building 
experience and shaping the culture of the Service. I considered CSC as a 
critical instrument in shaping the culture and values of the Service. And 
therefore if there is any big change that you want to make in the Service, I 
consider the Civil Service College as the instrument for this. 136 
Drawing on the CSC as that instrument for PS21 might have been convenient for Lim, 
since he oversaw CSC. But, more significantly, Lim recognised the importance of the 
Civil Service College as a dedicated agency to shape the bureaucracy through training: 
Certainly this feeling that we needed an agency which saw its task as shaping 
the Civil Service. Any time you wanted to make a change, we could get people 
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to go through the Civil Service College to imbibe these new ideas and 
approaches.137 
 
Another indication of this purposefully planned-out transition was the carefully 
pre-staging of key personnel. The appointment of Ms Lim Soo Hoon into the original 
Civil Service College by Lim Siong Guan, ostensibly to fill a routine vacancy of Deputy 
Dean, was really to position her for plans already charted out. Lim Siong Guan, as 
Permanent Secretary at the Public Service Division, was responsible for the 
movements of senior personnel across the bureaucracy. More significantly, Lim was 
the architect of the PS21 reforms movement. Within four months of her ‘deputising’, Ms 
Lim Soo Hoon would become Dean, succeeding Kishore Mahbubani who was 
‘coincidentally’ promoted at this time. This allowed Ms Lim to consolidate the two 
central training schools into a new Civil Service College within a year. David Ma was 
another example of well-crafted personnel plans to facilitate organizational change. As 
head of the PS21 Office before taking over IPAM, Ma would naturally forge coherence 
between the training functions and the reforms movement. Brigadier-General Yam Ah 
Mee further amplified this positioning of key personnel into positions of influence, ready 
to carry out the various respective phases of moves on the chess-board. Critically, all 
these leaders, from Ms Lim Soo Hoon to David Ma to Yam Ah Mee, shared Lim Siong 
Guan’s conviction on the role of training in supporting PS21.  
Lim Siong Guan, when asked how he was able to spot the right people to carry 
out the particularly fitting tasks, responded: 
I’m not so sure that I spotted the right people. I tell you, fundamentally, my 
approach is not about spotting the right people.  I think I have more strength 
taking the people that are available and bringing them to the point where they 
say, ‘This makes good sense! It’s exciting stuff to do! Let’s go get it done well!’  
By and large, when we talk about Yam Ah Mee, David Ma, remember they are 
members of the Admin Service, they start with the intellectual capacity. What 
we need to draw upon is the emotional dimension, the sense of engagement of 
what I’m trying to do, which I find, no matter where I go, that if it’s an exciting 
idea, people are drawn in. And if you make them part of it and say, ‘I’m not 
giving you directions on this, but do you all agree this is where we want to go 
and this is what we want to become? If you agree, then carry on, what are your 
ideas? Let’s talk about it.’ And I find every place I go, people are motivated by 
this.138 
 
This highlights the importance of organizational leadership amidst this aligning 
of training for reforms, especially in defining and articulating the vision to the secondary 
layer of key personnel. Lim Siong Guan was evidently able to communicate his idea of 
PS21 to a large cross-section of the Public Service; the conviction manifesting through 
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Lim Soo Hoon, David Ma and Yam Ah Mee as they carried out each of their phases of 
change demonstrated the success of Lim Siong Guan – not only in articulating – but in 
securing a deep identification with the vision. The challenge, as it appeared in the case 
of CSC’s reorganization, laid in these secondary leaders breaking up the grand-
strategic intellect of the vision into concrete clarity in order to assure rank-and-file staff 
preoccupied with actual operations and very real subsistence motivation. The case of 
CSC’s transformation amply demonstrated that leadership is key, not just at the broad 
strategic apex but at each and every level of the hierarchy, in order to carry through 
implementation. 
Another notable feature of this aligning of training functions for reforms was the 
lack of reference to any foreign models. In the preceding years, the training schools 
had drawn on expatriate expertise to run programmes or studied overseas institutions 
like the British Civil Service College, France’s Ecole Nationale d’Administration and the 
Canadian Centre for Management in starting up training centres. The travails in Britain 
to keep the UK Civil Service College relevant and viable might have marked out the 
pitfalls to be avoided rather than offer lessons to be replicated.139 The distinct absence 
of any foreign influence in the restructuring of Singapore’s Civil Service College pointed 
to a progressive level of institutional maturity. CSC had plausibly ventured into 
uncharted waters: no foreign training institutions had attempted such an alignment of 
training functions to directly facilitate administrative reforms.   
In fact, CSC’s transformation was rather inspiring for Hong Kong’s Secretary for 
the Civil Service. Joseph Wong, a top civil servant in Hong Kong overseeing the 
territory’s bureaucracy and invited to sit on CSC’s Advisory Panel during this time, was 
impressed by CSC. He recalled that, although CSC lost the monopoly over civil service 
training and had to compete with the private sector, it was able to finance itself. This, in 
Wong’s mind, was because CSC had “very clear targets” working towards financial 
self-sufficiency.140 The statutory board-status also helped by freeing up CSC from 
unnecessary red-tape and cumbersome regulation.  
In contrast, Hong Kong’s Civil Service Training Institute (CSTI) – having 
evolved from its earlier nominal permutations – was at that time not conducting many 
courses of its own. Instead, by contracting out most of the training services to vendors 
in the private sector, CSTI was effectively a course secretariat or training broker for the 
Hong Kong bureaucracy.  Joseph Wong, the most senior official responsible for Hong 
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Kong’s civil service, while sufficiently impressed by Singapore’s CSC to muse modeling 
Hong Kong’s CSTI after Singapore’s CSC, nevertheless intimated that these options 
were constrained by Hong Kong’s particular context. Financial pressures within the 
bureaucracy resulted in the CSTI eventually absorbed into the Civil Service Bureau. In 
any case, Hong Kong’s political context at that time, Wong pointed out, meant that the 
government of the day, while having jurisdiction over the bureaucracy, did not have 
sufficient control over the legislature to extend to CSTI the statutory autonomy similar 
to CSC. In comparison, while Singapore’s CSC was granted autonomy to grow out of 
the civil service, Hong Kong’s CSTI in the same period lost much of its autonomy to 
become a smaller subordinate entity under its larger parent department. The political 
and bureaucratic context, in the analysis of Joseph Wong, divined the training 
institutions of Hong Kong and Singapore down different paths.  
Finally, in evaluating the Civil Service College as a self-financing statutory 
board, challenging as it may be faced with the complexity of quantifying and measuring 
public services, the original objective had been achieved. CSC managed to remain 
financially solvent amidst the competition from the private sector training market. More 
significantly, this fiscal viability attested to the relevance of its training products, and 
with the overwhelming majority of its clientele being government agencies, a relevance 
that was focused upon the bureaucracy. With PS21 a continuous long term reform 
movement, the Civil Service College has truly become a focal point for introducing 
reforms into the Singapore Public Service.  
226 
CHAPTER 10 
Findings, Analysis and Reflections: Explaining Singapore’s ‘Reform-
through-Training’ 
Having examined five phases of executive development and training in the 
Singapore Public Service at the central level, this study now surveys the 40 years of 
evolution holistically. This chapter begins by considering the significant changes in 
executive development and training in the Singapore bureaucracy over time. It asks: 
what precipitating factors led to these shifts and why? And, amidst these regular 
changes, what can we identify as the continuities and defining characteristics of 
executive development and training of Singapore’s public officers? Finally, 
contemplating these four decades, what can we conclude as the Singapore model of 
executive development and training of its public bureaucracy?  
10.1 Change and Continuity: 40 Years of Executive Development and Training 
From the onset, the new Singapore Public Service contrasted sharply with the 
bureaucracy of the colonial era, and this sharp distinction shaped the character of 
executive development and training in the post-colonial Public Service. The colonial 
bureaucracy, as recounted in Chapter 4, was driven by the métropole’s directive to 
exploit Singapore’s location as a base for Britain’s Far Eastern empire at minimum 
operating cost. That political imperative determined the character of the bureaucracy 
administering Singapore. Not only was it small, to keep costs low, the colonial 
bureaucracy was bifurcated into a small British élite directing a broad swathe of locally-
recruited, cheaper manpower to staff the rank-and-file appointments. With a singular 
focus on safeguarding the British military bases, unconcerned with local social or 
economic development, the colonial bureaucracy’s leadership was disconnected from 
the population and street-level bureaucrats largely indulged in petty corruption. Training 
in such a colonial bureaucracy was not a priority and perfunctory. 
The Singapore Public Service at 1959, re-organised after 140 years as agents 
of the colonial authorities, was starkly unsuitable for the tasks of decolonization and 
self-government. The new locally-elected government found a bureaucracy steeped in 
colonial organizational culture and in need of reform. Chapter 5 pointed out that, 
against the broader context of state-formation, the emerging political élite – i.e. the 
People’s Action Party leadership – sought to consolidate their authority. Yet the 
colonial-era bureaucracy was not conducive for the PAP’s delivery of public services, 
the platform through which the PAP needed to secure electoral votes and its viability. 
The local population continued to see civil servants as aloof and rent-seeking. To 
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reform the Public Service, the PAP set up the Political Study Centre which, through the 
guise of training, socialized the leadership of the bureaucracy into a new appreciation 
of the nation-building milieu. As senior civil servants enjoined their political masters in 
shared interests, a symbiotic relationship emerged between the political leadership and 
the bureaucracy. With newly-socialised superiors tightening supervision, discipline 
across the bureaucracy also improved. The survival of the PAP government through 
internecine party struggles, merger with Malaysia, sudden independence and several 
elections was in no small part due to the Public Service’s ability to translate the PAP’s 
political visions into actual public services. That turn-around of the bureaucracy, from 
its politically disconnected and self-serving image, to one that was dependable to the 
regime, can be traced to the reforms introduced through the Political Study Centre.  
The priority accorded to training the leadership élite highlighted the bifurcated 
system of personnel management and training and development. Chapter 6 pointed 
out that, with the bureaucracy pressed into an “economic general staff” to direct the 
capitalist developmental state in the 1970s, senior civil servants needed to quickly pick 
up in management skills. Evidently, the focus in every training initiative, whether the 
Political Study Centre, or the Staff Training Institute or later the Civil Service Institute, 
started with the élite Administrative Service leadership corps in mind. This emphasis on 
the élite was not a random or personal choice by this investigator; rather, this study 
reported the reality of the highly-selective Administrative Service cadre as a 
longstanding focus of the Public Service and the government. Training was focused on 
‘training the leaders’ and cultivating leadership. Although the HR structure of a 
leadership apex presiding over all other staff across the base of the hierarchy was a 
colonial legacy, it was allowed to continue after independence (see Tables 10.1 and 
10.2). A decade after self-government, for example, the number of Division 1 executive 
and professional positions had grown in proportion to the total establishment, from 4% 
to 7%. But the bureaucracy’s personnel structure remained pyramidal: a small Division 
1 presiding over the supervisory, technical and manual grades forming the base of the 
hierarchy. Executive development and training, correspondingly, took on a bifurcated 
character. 
The purpose in prioritizing the leadership élite was apparently to employ them, 
post-training, as spearheads of reforms across the bureaucracy. The productivity 
movement and computerization drive in the 1980s, as described in Chapter 7, 
demonstrated this modus operandi in action. In each instance, the Administrative 
Service officers were first trained up, in order for them – upon returning to their 
respective posts across the bureaucracy – to introduce and lead these reforms among 
the staff under their supervision. In this process, reforms were quickly cascaded down 
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and across the depth and breadth of the whole hierarchy. Hence, while every training 
initiative first targeted the leadership élite, this prioritization sought to equip them as 
spearheads to introduce and disseminate reforms across the whole Public Service.  
 
Table 10.1 Personnel Structure of the Singapore Public Service, 1959 1  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.2 Proportion of Civil Servants in each Division (Actual Numbers & 
Percentage), 1959 – 1969 2 
  Total Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 
1959 28,253 1,200 4,628 9,841 12,584 
    4.25% 16.38% 34.83% 44.54% 
1969 57,650 3,794 16,327 16,257 21,272 
    6.58% 28.32% 28.20% 36.90% 
 
 
                                                          
1
 PSC Report 1959 – 1960: 4.  
2
 Ibid; SAR 1969: 228.  
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Despite the leadership-priority, the dilemma between élite and broad-based 
training did tend to preoccupy the Singapore bureaucracy. As the training schools grew 
and began to institutionalize their presence, training programmes for all personnel 
across the hierarchy expanded amidst the prioritisation accorded the Administrative 
Service corps. So significant was the growth of broad-based programmes in the early 
1980s that some among the Public Service leadership saw the Civil Service Institute 
becoming a school for the rank-and-file. Perhaps the lack of headway in parallel efforts 
to set up a staff college for the AOs sharpened the debate: Should resources be 
concentrated on developing talented leaders with pivotal roles over the bureaucracy, or 
should attention be evenly distributed among all officers to skill up the whole 
bureaucracy? The establishment of the Civil Service College in 1993, as addressed in 
Chapter 8, institutionalised the emphasis on executive development. But the hurry to 
transfer leadership programmes from CSI caused staff in the latter to see a hollowing 
out of their raison d’être. Such angst as an organisation, although unintended, 
nevertheless, had the effect of constantly engaging the bureaucracy – including its 
leadership – in contemplating the subject of training, and its use as a point of 
introducing reforms into the Public Service.  
The Public Service for the 21st Century movement launched in 1995 was the 
epitome in harnessing the use of training to introduce reforms across the bureaucracy. 
As described in Chapter 9, this drive in the 1990s to improve public services was 
envisioned with training playing a pivotal role. Yet, skilling up public officers in 
functional competencies belied the more ambitious goal of PS21: to imbibe in public 
officers a lifelong quest for excellence and learning. For training institutions to lead this 
attitudinal socialisation, they had to undergo their own reforms of sorts. Key personnel 
were appointed over the training institutions to consolidate executive development and 
vocational training under a new Civil Service College in 1996. The injection of 
competition thereafter compelled CSC staff to attune themselves to the market and 
ensure that programmes were relevant to their public officer-clientele. The Civil Service 
College was thus oriented into a constant quest for relevance, becoming a fitting agent 
to lead the introduction of PS21 reforms of continuous change across the Singapore 
Public Service.  
In sum, the use of training to socialise the leadership of the Public Service 
broke the bureaucracy from 140 years of colonial-era organisational culture and mind-
set. The focus upon training as a tool of reforms was itself a fundamental change from 
the neglect for training during the colonial period. The colonial legacy lingered in the 
bureaucracy’s personnel system, though; 10 years after decolonisation, the pyramidal 
HR structure of a small élite apex presiding over a large base of rank-and-file remained. 
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This personnel structure correspondingly determined the bifurcated character of 
training and development in the Public Service. The priority in training and grooming 
the leadership élite, a continuity in the 40 years under investigation, was a function of 
its role in spearheading change and adaptation across the bureaucracy, another 
constant in the period. Above all, amidst the changes in various training initiatives in 
the course of these four decades – whether these be re-naming the training institutions 
or changing their organisational structures – the enduring constant was to ensure that 
executive development and training remained relevant to the operating milieu of the 
bureaucracy.  
 
10.2 Agents of Change 
The first phase, employing training to socialise the leadership levels of the 
bureaucracy, was evidently initiated by the political masters. Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew, deputy premier Goh Keng Swee and various other ministers were actively 
involved in conceptualising the Political Study Centre, drawing up its curriculum, and 
even in leading its training programmes. In 1995, the Public Service was by then 
completely responsible for its training and reforms agenda. Lim Siong Guan, the 
permanent secretary in charge of the Public Service, was able to launch the Public 
Service for the 21st Century initiative – harnessing training and development to pursue 
that reforms drive – without clearing it with the political leadership. Between the first 
phase spanning 1959 to 1969, and 1995, there was no evidence from the data 
examined that the political leadership was itself as actively involved in the 
bureaucracy’s subsequent training as it was initially with the Political Study Centre.  
One exception was in 1979 when the Prime Minister changed the name of the 
training institution. Yet, the very intervention suggested that Lee Kuan Yew was not 
involved, not consulted, in the setting up of that institution. This indicated that the 
political leadership had granted some degree of latitude, certainly adopted a more 
‘hands-off’ stance since the first phase, for the bureaucracy to run its own training. 
Another notable episode occurred in 1991 when then-Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng 
Cheong expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of political acumen among civil servants 
in formulating and implementing public services. This might be one of the reasons 
leading to the subsequent establishment of the leadership development institute. But, 
at the same time, it certainly pointed to a similar ‘hands-off’ latitude by the political 
leadership towards how the bureaucracy run its training. Hence, while the ‘reforms-
through-training’ agenda was initiated by the political leadership in the first instance, 
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this agenda was over time handed over to the bureaucracy, with the political masters 
intervening only when the bureaucracy was adjudged to require specific direction.  
But in Singapore, there was no single individual or group in the bureaucracy 
that can be identified as leading the executive development and training trajectory or 
reform agenda. Even as the bureaucracy gradually assumed leadership of its ‘reforms-
through-training’ agenda, there was no evidence among available records suggesting 
any extraordinary role among civil servants in shaping this enterprise. Lim Siong Guan 
was an exception, prominent in driving the Public Service for the 21st Century 
movement and its advocacy of strategic training. That aside, accounts in the preceding 
chapters showed that senior officers with responsibilities for training, over the course of 
the 40-year period, went about their assigned duties, unremarkable in their routine 
professionalism. From permanent secretaries and directors of training institutes 
providing leadership, to trainers designing and delivering programmes, to staff 
supporting training activities with administration and logistics, they carried out their 
responsibilities in the Westminster tradition of a professional bureaucracy. All the 
officers interviewed for this study stressed that they were part of a team, a collective 
that drove reform, efficiency, effectiveness and integrity. None attempted to take 
personal responsibility or ‘glory’ for initiating or driving reform changes at particular 
junctures. Thus, mundane as it might be, even as the Public Service took over the 
mantle of the ‘reforms-through-training’ drive, it did not arise from the particular efforts 
of any individual officer. The use of executive development and training to reform the 
bureaucracy was the result of the collective and routine industry of all civil servants 
involved, carrying out their responsibilities professionally in the Westminster tradition.    
So how might these changes in the leadership of the ‘reforms-through-training’ 
agenda be explained - from domination by the political leadership to improved 
management and strategic leadership by the bureaucracy? What was the significance 
attached to executive development and training in the Singapore political system and 
bureaucracy? The objective in the first phase, using training for political socialisation of 
the bureaucracy, was evidently to produce a Public Service that was reliable. In the 
eyes of the political leadership against the context of state formation, civil servants 
needed to be loyal – as opposed to remaining steeped in their colonial-era 
organisational culture – in order for the nation-building programmes to be carried out. 
When the bureaucracy proved dependable over time, the training agenda turned 
towards competency-building. In part, this was necessitated by Singapore’s drive 
towards a capitalist developmental state. More importantly, the political masters had 
shifted their attention away from political socialisation, and towards the economic 
underpinnings of Singaporean society, because by the 1970s they had sufficiently 
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consolidated their authority. In any case, the turn towards growing civil servants’ 
functional competencies in management training, finance, human resource 
management, language and communications, etc. was obviously directed at building 
up a more capable Public Service, which in turn would facilitate the electoral viability of 
the political élite. Far from gratifying particular political parties or personalities though, 
this build-up of the Public Service’s neutral competency allowed it to carry out its work 
of governing with greater efficiency and effectiveness. Executive development and 
training, thus, served to gear up the bureaucracy to pursue and carry out the course of 
action as the executive agent of the elected government of the day.  
This perspective also acknowledges that the relationship between the political 
masters and the Public Service swung from close alignment to disconnectedness from 
time to time. Both PAP leaders and senior civil servants beheld one another with 
apprehension at the threshold of decolonisation in 1959. The political masters, through 
socialisation at the Political Study Centre, reoriented civil servants to their worldview. 
After working together to pull Singapore through the developmental phase in the 1970s 
and 1980s, Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng Cheong’s complaint of the Public Service 
losing political sensitivity hinted at a gap in the political-bureaucratic partnership. This 
account seems to suggest a swing between connectedness and disconnectedness in 
the bureaucracy’s relationship with the political leadership.  
Yet, from the viewpoint of the PAP, as the political masters who have received 
the electoral mandate by virtue of the Westminster system of government, the 
bureaucracy was an instrument to carry out that mandate. The question was not one 
between connectedness and disconnectedness. Rather, it was directing the Public 
Service to carry out the will of the government of the day, by persuasion where 
possible but by imposition of the government’s authority if need be. Most evident was 
the socialisation thrust upon the bureaucracy, but the Political Study Centre also 
helped senior civil servants appreciate that their interests laid with the PAP leadership. 
This nexus of interests between the PAP government and the leadership of the Public 
Service helped lead Singapore through the developmental phase in the 1970s and 
1980s. When the bureaucracy ventured to pursue PS21 ‘reforms-through-training’ at its 
own initiative, facilitating the government in realising its policies and programmes, the 
political masters supported the Public Service.    
A direct relationship can thus be discerned between the amount of trust shown 
by the political masters for their bureaucracy on the one hand, and the latitude they 
allowed the bureaucracy to pursue its ‘reforms-through-training’ agenda. The greater 
the ability of the bureaucracy to inspire the confidence of the political masters, the more 
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prepared the latter to grant the bureaucracy discretion to pursue its reforms. 
Conversely, the political leadership that was distrustful towards civil servants would be 
more inclined to rein in the bureaucracy.  While some scholars thought that in systems 
where “politicians and bureaucrats are ‘interlinked’, the capacity for administrative 
reforms goes down,”3 the close partnership between political masters and civil servants 
in Singapore facilitated, rather than inhibited, reforms in the bureaucracy.  
Table 10.3 A Heuristic Chart Suggesting the Relationship between  
the Political Leadership and the Bureaucracy 
 
 
10.3 The Central Location of Training & Development in the Bureaucracy  
 The central location of the training institutes within the Singapore Public Service 
is noteworthy and an indication of the importance accorded to executive development 
and training. When the locally elected government took over from the British colonial 
authorities in 1959, the bureaucracy it inherited included the Staff Training Centre 
located within the Ministry of Finance. As the Political Study Centre was drawing upon 
the resources of the Staff Training Centre at its infancy, it was also set up, alongside 
the Staff Training Centre, within the Establishment Division of the finance ministry. The 
training function, like most bureaucracies across the world, was part of personnel 
matters; manpower, in turn, was regarded as resources to be planned and allocated, 
and thus housed within the finance portfolio. And there in the Ministry of Finance the 
subject of training and development resided for 20 years, as the Staff Training Institute 
and the Civil Service Institute subsequently.  
 The creation of the Public Service Division in 1983 signalled increasing 
attention to personnel management, including the subject of training and development. 
The Civil Service Institute came under the jurisdiction of PSD in this reorganisation. Yet, 
for the time being, PSD remained a subordinate unit under the oversight of the Ministry 
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of Finance; training and development – and personnel matters – continued to be 
regarded as resources to be centrally managed. Nevertheless, the establishment of the 
PSD as a distinct organisational entity pointed to increasing attention paid to personnel 
matters, including the subject of training and executive development.  
 The growing importance of personnel matters in the Singapore bureaucracy 
culminated in the reorganisation of the Public Service Division into a full-fledged 
ministry in 1994. The central training institutes – at that time, the Civil Service Institute 
and the Civil Service College4 – together with the other constituent departments of the 
PSD came under the direct jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office. The eventual 
separation of the consolidated Civil Service College from the bureaucracy into an 
autonomous statutory board, while seemingly a distancing from the bureaucracy, did 
not in reality dilute the College’s central location within the Public Service: the CSC 
remained under the oversight of the Prime Minister’s Office through the PSD.  
 Training and executive development, therefore, had over the 40-year period 
studied in this thesis gravitated from the centre of government further inwards to be 
even closer to the locus of executive policy-making. This trajectory further into the 
centre, while part of the growing importance attached to personnel and establishment 
matters, indicated the increasing attention devoted to the subject of training and 
development in the Singapore government.  
 
10.4 Overseas Exemplars  
 The 40 years of evolution in executive development and training of the 
Singapore bureaucracy (1959 – 2001) was remarkable in its domestic initiatives and 
the negligible foreign influence. This study has drawn on several bureaucracies in other 
jurisdictions to contrast and sharpen the features of the Singapore case but the 
Singapore Public Service did not seek to simply replicate any of these overseas 
counterparts. Several study trips were made to the British Civil Service College at 
various times in the four decades but there was no evidence that Singaporean officials 
sought actively to model their training initiatives after the British institution. This is 
noteworthy considering that Britain was the colonial master and the relatively lack of 
experience with training in the Singapore bureaucracy following decolonisation. The 
interactions and even collaborations with training institutions in other jurisdictions, such 
as Malaysia and Hong Kong, were also more general exchanges of ideas, networking 
and as part of broader furtherance of diplomatic relations.  
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 This was the leadership development centre, renamed the Institute of Policy Development in 1996.  
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Academic institutions, in comparison, featured more prominently, but only just, 
in the early phases of Singapore’s executive development and training. The University 
of Southern California, sponsored by the Asia Foundation, dispatched a few academics 
to run leadership programmes for the Singapore bureaucracy in the 1970s. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, INSEAD, at the behest of the French government, headed 
proposals for an administrative staff college for Singapore. Both initiatives had limited 
effects – the American measure was a stop-gap while the French effort was 
inconclusive. A key concern, perhaps, was to limit the influence of foreign governments 
upon the bureaucracy, especially when both overseas ventures were funded by their 
home governments.  
The overseas exemplar that was purposefully studied by Singapore was the 
Canadian Centre for Management and Development. When Singapore decided to 
establish a dedicated leadership development centre in the early 1990s, officials set 
their sights on the CCMD. The use of case studies and other curricular design at the 
eventual Singapore Civil Service College drew much inspiration from the Canadian 
bureaucracy’s training school. Peter Ong, who visited CCMD in planning the Singapore 
CSC, was especially impressed by Canada’s use of training to forge networks for inter-
agency coordination among public service leaders.5 Whole-of-government coordination 
was to become a particularly prominent theme in the Singapore Public Service.   
Even so, the Canadian exemplar was not replicated wholesale into Singapore; 
Singapore drew on ideas that were practicable for its circumstances and adjusted 
these to suit its context. Indeed, a key feature in Singapore’s development of its 
executive development and training for the bureaucracy was eschewing the ideological 
or theoretical models for a pragmatic quest for what-works. Even when overseas 
training institutions were leading models in their own jurisdictions or internationally, 
such as Ecole Nationale d’Administration, the holy grail of public sector training, 
Singapore selected aspects that were relevant and applicable, and adapted these to fit 
into its contextual requirements.  
 
10.5 A Singapore Model of Executive Training? 
10.5.1 ‘Punctuated Equilibrium’ Model 
Surveying this 40-year evolution of ‘reforms-through-training’ in the Singapore 
Public Service, what model did Singaporeans develop? Was the Singaporean model 
designed to deliver ‘more of the same’ where executive development and training 
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simply grew in volume and quality but remained largely the same in content and 
delivery? Or were there deep and real changes in the evolution of executive 
development and training in the Singapore Public Service?   
The first proposition is certainly not persuasive. While the training programmes 
did grow in numbers and sophistication, the objectives of the training initiatives through 
the years changed dramatically. The initial goal of socialising the bureaucracy into a 
loyal and reliable Public Service quickly gave way to the objective of setting up an 
‘economic general staff’ to manage the developmental state. With the Public Service 
achieving its neutral competence by the 1990s, the goals of the Public Service for the 
21st Century initiative – building capacity for continuous change – were remarkably 
different. Far from the efficiency and effectiveness for the present, PS21 was casting 
for the future. Thus the Singapore model was certainly not ‘more of the same’.  
From their flow and rhythm weaving through the preceding chapters and the 
whole thesis, the changes in the Singapore bureaucracy’s training initiatives were 
episodic and suddenly intense amidst certain periods of stability and consolidation. 
Following the dramatic events that were the PAP government’s assertion of control 
over the Public Service after decolonisation, the first phase of political socialisation 
lasted 10 years. Recognition of a gap in management skills within the Public Service to 
oversee the capitalist developmental state resulted in the competency-building period 
spanning some two decades, before the future-oriented PS21 came to the fore. More 
significantly, each of these changes in training initiatives was heralded by shifts in the 
broader institutional contexts: competency-building to gear up for the developmental 
state, and PS21 in preparing the already-efficient bureaucracy for future unknowns.  
Such a phenomenon of episodic and fundamental changes amidst periods of 
continuity in the evolution of executive development and training in the Singapore 
Public Service draws comparison with the ‘punctuated equilibrium model’. Baumgartner 
and Jones developed the model to explain the dynamics of policy-making in the 
American political system. Yet, some of the characteristics in their model resemble 
aspects featuring in the current subject of discussion. This ‘punctuated equilibrium 
model’ is thus ‘borrowed’, like a conceptual metaphor, to help articulate the evolution of 
training in the Singapore bureaucracy.  
Similar to the ‘punctuated equilibrium model’, training in the Singapore Public 
Service can be seen as largely characterised by “long periods of stability … interrupted 
by [episodic] burst of frenetic policy activity.”6 As in the model by Baumgartner and 
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Jones, much of the stability and changes in the Singapore bureaucracy’s training 
initiatives can be traced to institutional cultures.7 The dictates of political masters within 
the broader political system accounted for much of the episodic and sudden changes in 
training initiatives, most memorable of which was the Prime Minister’s personal 
intervention to change the name of a training school. The extended periods of stability 
in training initiatives thereafter can be attributed to the ‘stasis’ tendency of the 
bureaucracy. Civil servants instinctively seek to work out the course of policies to their 
fullest, abiding by existing directives and processes, rather than actively reviewing and 
seeking change. Naturally, a theory designed for American policy making cannot lend 
itself to fully explain training in the bureaucracy. In as much as it helps to articulate the 
phenomenon highlighted in this study, the Singapore model of executive development 
and training as pursuit for reforms is very similar to a model of ‘punctuated equilibrium’. 
 
10.5.2 Sequential State Needs Model  
 Taking another analytical view of the four decades in the evolution of executive 
development and training in the Singapore bureaucracy, a second explanation can be 
discerned. In the course of this 40-year period, the state emerged from the onset of 
decolonisation as the principal actor: it defined the interests of state, it set the order of 
priorities, and it mobilised and employed all resources at its disposal – including the 
bureaucracy – to purse these goals.8 Seen from the perspective of state-centric actor, 
the Singapore bureaucracy’s progression from basic training after decolonisation to 
higher-order and more sophisticated executive development and training in the 1990s 
further resembles the graduating hierarchy of needs posited by Maslow. 9 
 At the threshold of state-formation in 1959, the first priority pertaining to the 
Singapore Public Service – as far as the emerging political élite was concerned – was 
ensuring that it was loyal and dependable. As detailed in Chapter 5, the newly-elected 
People’s Action Party government found a bureaucracy mired in colonial-era 
organisational culture, even hostile to the new nationalist government. Viewed through 
the prism of state-formation or state-centric theory, the immediate consolidation of 
authority by the new PAP élite targeted the bureaucracy. The loyalty of the Public 
Service had to be turned from the preceding colonial authorities towards the new state 
and its elected political masters; the values of the bureaucracy needed to change from 
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8
 Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” Bringing the 
State Back In, eds., Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer  and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 9-11.  
9
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colonial-era culture towards incorruptibility and service towards citizens and the new 
state. This first priority of creating a dependable and reliable bureaucracy was pursued, 
and largely accomplished, through political socialisation in the first decade of self-
government.  
 The second-order need, thereafter and alongside Singapore’s progression into 
a capitalist developmental state, was to equip the Public Service with the technical 
competencies to perform and carry out the government’s mission. As covered in 
Chapter 6, when Singapore turned towards rapid state-led industrialisation in the 1970s, 
the focus of training shifted from political socialisation to equipping senior civil servants 
with management skills. This shift in focus soon broadened into an expansion of the 
whole range of administrative competencies, ranging from financial procedures and 
personnel management to writing and communication. By the 1980s, the Civil Service 
Institute was able to emerge as a key training arm of the Singapore Public Service 
because it was able to offer a whole range of programmes for the training of almost all 
the officers across the bureaucracy and up-and-down its hierarchal strata. This 
institutionalisation of the CSI, as described in Chapter 7, signalled the fulfilment of the 
second-order priority.  
 When the Singapore Public Service was widely acknowledged to be efficient 
and effective, even as the state matured into a developed economy, the next order of 
priority was to develop a strategic capacity. By the early 1990s, the bureaucracy had 
established various structures and processes to ensure competent and effective design 
and delivery of policies and programmes. When it then launched the Public Service for 
the 21st Century reforms initiative, the intention was to turn the bureaucracy’s 
orientation outwards and into the future. PS21’s goal to prepare civil servants for long 
term future uncertainties and developments, i.e. to be anticipative of change, and to be 
responsive to changes in its operating environment, was a shift away from mere 
efficiency and effectiveness.  This build-up of strategic capacity was evidently a distinct 
progression from the earlier order of needs into the next higher order of priority.  
 This evolution in executive development and training in pursuit of reforms, from 
creating a loyal and incorruptible bureaucracy, to one with the competencies to 
administer efficiently and, finally, to a Public Service with a future-oriented strategic 
capacity, followed a path of sequential state needs. The Singapore bureaucracy was 
almost subscribing to a systematic progression, addressing basic and immediate 
imperatives at the outset, before escalating to higher-level concerns, in an orderly step-
by-step basis, before casting for longer term aspirations. The Singapore model, 
therefore, exhibited the characteristics of a strong state model addressing the 
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sequential needs and priorities of the state actor interested in rapid social and 
economic development.  
 
10.5.3 Training-Reform-Modernisation Trajectory? 
A larger question that arises when taking stock of this whole period: did training 
result in reforms of the Public Service which in turn led to Singapore’s modernisation? 
The empirical data lined up in this study points out that executive development and 
training did contribute towards the reforms of the Singapore Public Service, but the 
study also showed that training was only one of the contributory factors. In the state-
formation period, for example, the re-orientation of the bureaucracy from the colonial 
organisational culture was pursued – apart from socialising the leadership – by a 
combination of measures: campaign against corruption, tightening of disciplinary 
regulations and bridging civil servants’ disconnect with citizens by compelling them to 
undertake public work. Efficiency drives such as productivity and computerisation, 
while aided by training, were in themselves measures that improved the reliability and 
performance of the Public Service. At the same time, adjusting the remuneration of civil 
servants in the face of heightening competition for manpower in the booming economy 
helped retained talented officers to lead and implement reforms across the Public 
Service.  
Similarly, although a more efficient and high-performing Public Service 
contributed towards the modernisation of Singapore, the bureaucracy was one among 
many factors in Singapore’s success. The political vision of Lee Kuan Yew and the 
PAP leadership, while needing implementation by the bureaucracy, was certainly 
critical in laying out the strategic goal in transforming the colonial outpost into the 
vibrant city-state that is today’s Singapore. The political will in pressing the citizens 
together in pursuit of economic development, overcoming dissent and opposition, 
helped provided Singapore with the resources to finance comprehensive social 
development and reinvestment in further economic development.  
These are all factors the study refrained from belabouring in light of limitations 
in time and space, and with the focus of the dissertation on executive development and 
training. In sum, executive development and training certainly contributed to the 
reforms of the Public Service, and a more efficient and high-performing Public Service 
with high integrity certainly helped the modernisation of Singapore, but there are other 
contributory factors at the same time.              
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10.6 Framework for ‘Reforms-through-Training’ 
 In examining the use of executive development and training as a point to 
introduce reforms across the Singapore Public Service, the conceptual framework 
drawn up at the beginning of this study has proven useful. The framework was 
designed to anchor the study in its various contexts: while charting the evolution of 
training over 40 years, at the same time examine the dynamics of the body politic, 
economy, society and the bureaucracy upon the subject of executive development and 
training (see Table 10.4).  
Table 10.4 Conceptual Framework 
 
 
This framework has further helped identify factors facilitating the use of training 
in reforming the Public Service. The political leadership’s consistently strong support 
was the most crucial factor in Singapore’s use of training to spearhead reforms in the 
bureaucracy. The People’s Action Party leadership, upon their election to government 
in 1959, first started using training as a platform to socialize the senior officers of the 
bureaucracy. Subsequent training initiatives might arise from within the bureaucracy, 
from management training in the 1970s to productivity in the 1980s, but they owed their 
existence to the acquiescence of the political leadership. As projects financed by public 
money, they required the prior approval of the cabinet, not just the ministers overseeing 
the bureaucracy but also ministers whose portfolios sought funding from the same 
budget. Even when Lim Siong Guan attested that PS21 “was never cleared with the 
political leadership, because I saw the improvement of productivity and efficiency in the 
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civil service as the responsibility of the civil service leadership,”10 the location of the 
Civil Service College and Public Service Division within the Prime Minister’s Office 
meant that the ‘reforms-through-training’ programme must have received the prior 
blessing of the most senior-ranking political master. Consistently strong support of the 
political leadership provided the budget which sustained these reform-through-training 
initiatives.   
 High economic growth over the years provided the necessary wherewithal to 
finance executive development and training as recourse for reforming the bureaucracy. 
To be sure, the budget for civil service training was never extravagant in relation to the 
overall expenditure of the state.  But as the country’s coffers deepened following years 
of sustained economic growth, the amount of money devoted to the bureaucracy’s 
training in absolute terms increased exponentially. Hence, while the training 
expenditure remained less than 0.1% of the national budget between 1959 and 2001, 
the actual dollar value of the training budget grew from a mere S$53,920 (A$46,087) to 
S$24.5 million (A$21 million) during the same period. This meant that, even as the size 
of the bureaucracy increased, the amount of money invested in training each individual 
public officer grew from S$1.80 (A$1.54) in 1959 to S$3.71 a decade later, to S$16.41 
in the 1980s, to S$43.13 in 1990. By 2000, the training dollar per public officer had 
reached S$234 (A$200) (see Table 10.5). This latter figure compares very favourably 
with other international jurisdictions. 
Table 10.5 Training Expenditure in relation to National Budget, 1959 – 2000 11 
Years 
Total National Total Civil Service Training Expenditure 
Government Expenditure Establishment Total per officer 
1960 $274,314,430 29,900 $53,920 $1.80 
     
1969 $1,024,893,580 64,229 $238,190 $3.71 
     
1980 $7,635,000,000 69,226 $1,135,700 $16.41 
     
1990 $14,135,000,000 108,939 $4,699,000 $43.13 
     
2000 $28,994,000,000 121,637 $28,536,700 $234.61 
 
 In comparison, the training budgets of other bureaucracies were much lower. In 
2000, the Australian Commonwealth government set aside just A$3.938 million for the 
                                                          
10
 Lim Siong Guan, Interview with Author, 20 Nov 2013.  
11
 Budgetary allocations for the respective training institutions (Political Study Centre, Civil Service Institute 
and Civil Service College) during each period, except for the year 1969. For 1969, budgetary allocation 
was for the Training & Organisation Division comprising the Political Study Centre, Staff Training Centre 
and the Organisation & Methods Branch; data excluded allocations for O&M. Data drawn from SAR and 
Budget 1960 – 2001. Table tracks training expenditure every 10 years, where information is available.    
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development and training of all 113,322 officers of the Australian Public Service.12 This 
amounted to a training budget of A$35 per officer (see Table 10.5). In Hong Kong, 
HK$160 million (A$22 million) was allocated for the training and development of a total 
establishment of 198,605 civil servants.13 This translated to a training budget of 
HK$805 (A$110) per officer. Although three times that of the Australian figure, this is 
still half the budget committed to training the Singaporean public officer.  
Table 10.6 Civil Service Training Expenditure in Selected Jurisdictions, 2000 * 
Jurisdiction Total Training Expenditure 
Establishment Total per staff 
Singapore 121,637 SGD 28,536,700 AUD 24,386,448 SGD 235 AUD 200 
           
Australia 113,322   AUD 3,938,000   AUD 35 
           
Hong Kong 198,605 HKD 160,058,000 AUD 21,975,675 HKD 805.91 AUD 110 
 
          
* Malaysian data in Malay language; UK data not available 
 
Social development, also benefitting from the rapid economic growth, further 
facilitated training through reforms. Improvements to general standards of living 
inevitably raised the quality of human capital available to the Public Service. 
Specifically, rising educational levels altered the traditional structure of the personnel 
hierarchy: The proportion of Division 4 posts (manual, unskilled grades requiring little or 
no formal education) shrank from 45% of the establishment in 1959 to 37% a decade 
later (see Table 10.7; compare Table 10.8 with Table 10.1). In contrast, the number of 
Divisions 1 and 2 tertiary-educated executive and professional staff increased from 20% 
in 1959 to 35% in 1969. By 1976, the proportion of Divisions 1 and 2 officers had grown 
to 44% of the civil service workforce; conversely, Division 4 officers constituted only 
23%.14 Today, highly-educated administrative and executive Division 1 officers 
constitute more than 50% of the total establishment, while only a small 4.5% remains in 
Division 4. Rising educational levels among the Singaporean population, funded by a 
steadily growing economy over the years, allowed the bureaucracy to expand its 
executive and professional staff, and develop its leadership and long-term strategic 
capacity. With most public officers thus able to access knowledge and learning, the 
                                                          
12
 Australian Government, “Prime Minister and Cabinet, Portfolio Budget Statements, 2000-01,” 161, Table 
2.1, Output 2, Web 3 Feb 2014,  http://www.dpmc.gov.au/accountability/budget/1998-
2003/docs/pbs_2000-01.pdf; Public Service & Merit Protection Commission, Australia, State of the Service, 
Australian Public Service Statistical Bulletin, 2000-01 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001) 9, 
Web 2 Feb 2014, https://resources.apsc.gov.au/pre2005/SOSR0001.pdf. 
13
 Hong Kong Government, “Head 29, Civil Service Training and Development Institute,” 2000-01 Budget 
Draft Estimates, Web 3 Feb 2014, http://www.budget.gov.hk/2000/estimates/pdf/english/head029.pdf; 
Hong Kong Government, “Summary of Establishment,” 2000-01 Budget Draft Estimates, Web 3 Feb 2014, 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2000/estimates/pdf/english/sum_est_e.pdf. 
14
 SESL 1976: 7. Records ceased to breakdown the staff numbers according to Divisions from 1976.  
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‘reforms-through-training’ agenda could be pursued with greater ease, shorter timeline 
and possibly more effective outcomes.    
Table 10.7 Proportion of Civil Servants in each Division, 1959 and 2013 15 
  Total Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 
1959 28,253 1,200 4,628 9,841 12,584 
    4.25% 16.38% 34.83% 44.54% 
2013 80,128 44,631 26,202 5,689 3,606 
    55.70% 32.70% 7.10% 4.50% 
 
 Table 10.8 Personnel Structure of the Singapore Public Service, 2013  
 
 
Finally, the bureaucracy’s ability to inspire confidence as an institution of the 
state allowed it to pursue its reforms agenda through executive development and 
training. Reforms through the Political Study Centre were initiated by the PAP 
government at self-government, largely to change the colonial era organisational 
culture of the bureaucracy but also, to show civil servants ‘who’s boss’. But the political 
masters’ initial distrust for the bureaucracy gradually ebbed and, over time, turned into 
confidence as the reformed Public Service delivered the policies and services that 
strengthened the PAP’s credibility with the electorate. By the time the Civil Service 
College was marshalled to introduce PS21, the bureaucracy was demonstrating, 
                                                          
15
 PSC Report 1959 – 1960: 4; Civil Service College, “Professionalising  Adult Educators,” Web 4 Feb 
2014, http://www.wda.gov.sg/content/dam/wda/pdf/L325B/WS1a_Rinkoo%20Ghosh.pdf.  
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beyond its capacity for efficiency and effectiveness in delivering public services, a 
growing sophistication in training and reforms.  More significantly, the latitude granted 
the bureaucracy to pursue its ‘reforms-through-training’ agenda, without having to clear 
the PS21 initiative with the political leadership, for example, reflected the political 
master’s trust in the Public Service as an institution of the state.  
 
10.7 Summing Up 
 This chapter has taken the opportunity, after studying five successive phases of 
executive development and training in the Singapore bureaucracy, to analyse the 
whole 40 years of evolution as a distinct entity. In evaluating across the change-
continuity spectrum, the introduction of training as a tool of reforms in the Singapore 
Public Service in 1959 clearly broke with the colonial bureaucracy’s neglect for training. 
More significantly was the enduring continuity across the four decades: the role of the 
Administrative Service leadership élite to spearhead reforms across the bureaucracy 
and, most important of all, the constant quest for executive development and training to 
keep the bureaucracy relevant to the operating milieu.  
 The principal agent of change throughout the period was the political masters 
who, by virtue of the Westminster system of government, regarded the bureaucracy as 
an instrument to carry out the mandate of the government of the day. So long as the 
bureaucracy was able to inspire the confidence of the political masters, the latter were 
prepared to grant greater discretion to allow the Public Service to pursue its reforms 
agenda. But as the bureaucracy showed a growing vision of what was expected or 
desired of a high-performing Public Service, it was left to drive the ‘reforms-though-
training’ agenda. 
 The Singapore model that emerged is one that eschewed ideological or 
theoretical dogma but pragmatically adapts ideas selected for their relevance and 
adaptability to the operating context. On one level, the suddenly rapid and intense 
adjustments to remain relevant, and then following a period of stability a repeat of such 
frenetic pace of re-adjustment, make the Singapore model very much one of 
‘punctuated equilibrium.’ At the same time, the systematic progression from political 
socialisation to create a loyal and dependable bureaucracy, and then equipping it with 
the requisite technical competencies, before shifting focus on building up long-term 
future-oriented strategic capacity, pointed to a sequential needs model.  
 The Singapore experience certainly points to the role of executive development 
and training contributing significantly to the reforms of the bureaucracy, and in turn the 
country’s modernisation. Yet, this chapter has cautioned against such a simplistic 
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equation. While executive development and training did improve the Public Service’s 
performance and facilitated Singapore’s success, other factors also contributed 
towards reforms and modernisation.  
 This chapter ends by identifying, through the conceptual framework, factors 
facilitating the use of executive development and training in reforming the bureaucracy. 
Consistently strong political support is paramount, and an economy-first imperative can 
provide the resources to finance training and reforms. Social development, by providing 
higher capacity human capital, also helped the reforms-through-training cause. Finally, 
the ability of the bureaucracy to pursue training and reforms rests on its ability to 
inspire confidence in stakeholders, particularly political masters, as an institution of the 
state.  
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CHAPTER 11 
Conclusion: Professionalisation as a Means to an End 
“The public sector for the new Singapore must be a catalyst for change, a pace 
setter in change, and a standard bearer on change. …. the pursuit of the best of 
standards … demands first class training, extensive sharing of experience and 
a whole work environment conducive to the generation and experimentation of 
ideas. The Civil Service College plays a critical role in this.” 
- Lim Siong Guan, Head of the Civil Service, 2001 1  
It is evident that in 1959 the Singapore Public Service was in no position to 
propel the former colonial outpost that Singapore was then, into the modern vibrant 
city-state of today. The bureaucracy, at the threshold of decolonisation, comprised local 
leaders who were disconnected with the population and lower-level bureaucrats more 
preoccupied with rent-seeking than serving the public. This was a stark contrast from 
the Singapore Public Service of today: efficient and effective, not debilitated by 
corruption and ready to face and adapt to future challenges.  
The principal argument of this thesis is that the reforms of the Singapore Public 
Service, over the course of 40 years, were driven by training and development. This is 
the overall answer to the main research question in this study.  
11.1 Summing Up: Training & Development as Point of Reforms in Singapore 
The study began by posing the key research questions: why did the Singapore 
Public Service invest so heavily and consistently in executive development and training? 
How did the Singapore bureaucracy undertake training and development over the 
years? What were the defining features and characteristics of Singapore’s approach in 
institutionalizing training and development in its Public Service?  
From the outset of decolonisation, Singapore’s political leadership recognised 
the political value of the Public Service and the need to significantly train and retrain 
the bureaucracy to serve national goals and those of the political élite. From the 
beginning, formal and informal training was used to re-orient civil servants from a 
colonial-era organizational culture to an appreciation of the new operating milieu for 
state-formation and nation-building. When Singapore geared itself towards state-led 
development, training ramped up the management skills of senior officers to qualify 
them as the ‘economic general staff’ managing the developmental state. Similarly, the 
introduction of productivity and computerization reforms across the Public Service was 
1
 Lim Siong Guan, Head of the Civil Service, Speech at the launch of the Civil Service College Statutory 
Board, 8 Oct 2001. 
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pursued through the skilling-up of the leadership corps, before they then disseminated 
these reforms across the bureaucracy. Finally, the Public Service for the 21st Century 
initiative harnessed executive development and training as a catalyst to introduce and 
disseminate reforms more widely across the Singapore bureaucracy.  
The defining features of the Singapore development model underscore the 
positive effects of executive development and training upon the bureaucracy and 
Singapore’s modernisation. Key among these was the importance of strong political 
initiation and support for the bureaucracy and its reform agenda. Consistently strong 
support from the political leadership throughout the 40-year period provided the political 
authorisation necessary to engage in ambitious training exercises as well as the 
resource commitments and budgetary allocations to finance the Public Service’s 
training and reforms initiatives. Secondly, an economy-first imperative generated the 
resources to fund the bureaucracy’s programmes. The high-performing Singapore 
Public Service today had very modest origins and budgetary allocations at the time of 
self-government. The fruits of prioritising economic development, while taking some 
time to materialise, provided the wherewithal for the bureaucracy to develop, including 
growing its training initiatives, and to pursue reforms. At the same time, growth from an 
economy-first imperative also financed comprehensive social development, which in 
turn availed higher capacity human capital to staff the Public Service.  
The evolution of the Singapore Public Service charts out a trajectory of 
development for bureaucracies in nascent states. As an almost amateurish 
bureaucracy in the beginning, alienated from the public it was meant to serve, the 
Singapore Public Service attracted the intervention and guidance of the political 
masters to gain a new appreciation of the electoral constituency that was its clientele. 
By the time it was technically proficient in its primary role of delivering public policies 
and services in the 1980s, the direct hands of the political masters were no longer as 
conspicuous and the Public Service was allowed to grow and developed according to 
the courses senior civil servants charted for the bureaucracy. When the Public Service 
embarked upon reforms to prepare itself for the future, the PS21 movement 
anticipating change and preparing for change, the bureaucracy had clearly come into 
its own, confidently charting its own course without need of political intervention, and 
many would argue without fear of upsetting the political leadership.  
Distilling these defining features and identifying the Singapore model, amidst 
the background of Singapore’s successful modernisation and high performance 
reputation of its bureaucracy, leads to the inevitable question: can the Singapore model 
of executive development and training offer a template for countries aspiring reforms?
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11.2 A Template for Cross-Jurisdictional Replication? 
This dissertation does not seek to prescribe a template for replication in other 
jurisdictions, but offers some features for consideration. Singapore’s use of training to 
reform its Public Service and in turn to modernise the country hinged upon its particular 
island-wide context. Indeed, the background of the unfolding of this account highlights 
the exceptional context of Singapore – small physical size aiding governance, 
extended one-party rule providing political continuity, steady economic growth financing 
wide-ranging development, and a highly-educated workforce facilitating learning and 
development. It bears highlighting that these circumstances did not remain static but 
evolved and changed rapidly in the course of time. Accordingly, the strategy of using 
training and development to reform the bureaucracy also had to adjust and be adapted 
to the changing circumstances and context to remain relevant.   
The harnessing of executive development and training as a catalyst to reform 
the bureaucracy offers, at one level, an example that has helped modernise a colonial 
outpost into a developed state and high-performing economy. This, hopefully, can 
inspire other jurisdictions – particularly developing countries seeking to reform – an 
exemplar of the possible despite seemingly implausible odds.  
On a deeper level, specific aspects in Singapore’s approach towards ‘reforms-
through-training’ in this study can be decontextualized. In other words, these features 
are not specific to the Singapore jurisdiction alone, and can be explored across other 
jurisdictional-contexts. For any reform-aspirant, hence, these jurisdictional-neutral 
features offer some themes for consideration; at the very least, some food for reflection. 
Consistently strong political support features prominently in Singapore’s case. 
For any initiative to take off within the bureaucracy, the task of securing the necessary 
political authorisation and approval for funding from the limited budget will be 
challenging. Yet, as pointed out by Lim Siong Guan, who headed the PS21 reforms in 
Singapore, training and reforms improve the bureaucracy’s capacity to deliver public 
services: “you are doing something intended to raise the capabilities of the Public 
Service and raise the standard as well as the achievements and capabilities of 
Singapore.”2 Politicians whose careers depend on electoral votes can be persuaded 
that any improvement in public services ultimately ingratiates them, as the government 
of the day, with the electorate. Even in countries where different political parties are 
elected to power at each election, it can be argued that enhanced public services from 
improved training and reforms will strengthen the electoral position of the political 
leadership in government. Consistent support from the political masters, hence, will 
2
 Lim Siong Guan, Interview with Author, 20 Nov 2013. 
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provide the authorisation that will kick-start and sustain the drive to reform the 
bureaucracy through training and development.  
A strong fiscal position, arising from steady economic growth over the years, 
certainly provided the fiscal wherewithal to drive and sustain the training-for-reforms 
initiative in the Singapore Public Service. Economic growth and fiscal largess may not 
be readily available to most countries, especially developing economies most in need 
of reforming their bureaucracies, as well as financing other developmental programmes. 
The reality, hence, is an economy-first imperative, for the foundational years, in order 
to accrue sufficient resources to finance developmental projects.  
Improving the population’s standards of living often stands out as obvious and 
urgent developmental priorities, but setting aside budgetary appropriations to improve 
the bureaucracy has the consequential advantage of injecting  efficiency in social 
reforms.  Social development, indeed, contributes to the reform of the civil service 
since its personnel are drawn from the population. The knowledge and skills that are 
the foundational basis for post-recruitment training and development have their genesis 
in the educational system. The well-being of civil servants that constitute the 
bureaucracy’s human capital is a function of the population’s healthcare and standards 
of living. The values of civil servants – whether professing high levels of integrity or 
rent-seeking, service excellence or self-serving behaviour – are pre-shaped by the 
years of social norming as well as their induction into the bureaucracy. With citizens 
constituting the vote-banks of the politicians, allocating the yields of an economy-first 
imperative on social development needs no belabouring. But, focusing solely on social 
development and neglecting the bureaucracy risks undoing any progress in 
development. The key is drawing up a fine balance between investing in social 
development, wide-ranging as it may be, and executive development and training to 
reform the bureaucracy.  
These features stand out as factors that facilitated Singapore’s ‘reforms-
through-training’ experience. They are, as mentioned, by no means a definitive solution 
towards bringing efficiency and effectiveness to all bureaucracies. These are mere 
factors for consideration, in any reform-venture and – it bears reiteration – their 
relevance hinges upon the context for their application.    
11.3 Starting a Conversation: Areas for Further Study 
This dissertation does not aim to provide a prescriptive template for other 
developing nations as research outcome; rather, it seeks to start a conversation, 
particularly on current scholarship in the fields of the history and political science 
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applied to developing nations, the role of training and executive development in public 
administration, and the importance of reforms in the bureaucracy in development 
studies. This study, by drawing up an administrative history of training and executive 
development in the Singapore Public Service between 1959 and 2001, has plugged a 
gap in current literature on the Singapore bureaucracy, training and executive 
development vis-à-vis reforms in public administration, and the role played by the 
Public Service in the historical narratives of Singapore’s modernisation.   
More significantly, this study wants to raise for discussion, by contextualising 
the evolution of the Singapore Public Service against the country’s economic and 
social development, whether Singapore’s transformation from colonial outpost to 
modern city-state can completely depend upon the political leadership or, indeed, just 
one man? By tracing the impact of training institutions upon the Singapore bureaucracy, 
it surfaces for discussion whether training, learning and executive development have a 
broader scope in public administration beyond the current bounds of personnel 
management? Can the bureaucracy and training, learning and executive development 
be designed with a more significant and precise role in drawing up state-formation and 
nation-building strategies for developing countries?  
This dissertation is designed with a 10-year distance from the scope in order to 
desensitise the sources and ease access to information. This approach has worked 
well indeed, as demonstrated by the ready availability of crucial information, and can 
well be the basis for approaching future similar studies. When I began the thesis, I 
feared that I would be denied the cooperation of the key actors over the decades and 
not benefit from their observations and explanations, but this was not the case.3 A 
historical orientation (and distance from current politics) proved to be a successful 
strategy to get key officials to talk of their experiences and observations 
Be that as it may, events in Singapore affecting the Public Service and the Civil 
Service College since the period scoped for this study have evolved rapidly that an 
update will soon be timely. The Civil Service College underwent numerous changes 
since 2001. CSC underwent three leadership successions of Deans. A visioning 
exercise around 2006 tempered the performance-driven orientation with a greater 
emphasis on staff well-being. A broadening in the definition of talents by the Public 
Service Division, beyond the traditional bounds of the Administrative Service, led CSC 
to expand its stable of executive development programmes. This is a significant 
development given the longstanding emphasis on grooming only the Administrative 
3
 All the officials approached for this study agreed to be interviewed or answered my questions through 
email correspondences. 
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Service élite, and the constant dilemma between leadership development and broad-
based training.  
Structurally, CSC underwent several organizational changes since 2001, as its 
programmes and personnel strength grew to meet the new environment. Its main 
internal departments at the time when CSC became a statutory board have been 
renamed a decade later: the Institute of Policy Development has since become the 
Institute of Public Sector Leadership, and CSC Consultants evolved into the Institute of 
Leadership and Organisational Development, although IPAM has retained its original 
nomenclature. A new research centre had also been set up as the Institute of 
Governance and Policy. These are not mere changes in nomenclature but signal 
significant re-positioning in the role and importance of executive training in Singapore. 
Changes in the operating milieu of the Public Service, particularly after the 2011 
general election, are also requiring CSC to adjust itself in relation to the bureaucracy. 
The 2011 election has sharpened the impact of citizens upon politics, especially with 
access to internet technology and new media; the proliferation of views and the rapid 
snowballing of opinions on social media compress the time and space for policy 
responses. As the government continues to grapple with the complexity of emerging 
issues, such as an ageing population, healthcare financing, remaining economically 
competitive, trans-national terrorism and non-traditional security threats, just to name 
few, it has to set aside additional attention to engage with the citizenry.  
How the Civil Service College will respond to the inevitable changes that will be 
expected from the present Public Service in this newly emerging operating milieu 
should be the focus of a serious update to this administrative history or even a further 
dedicated study. Indeed, with tetra-speed of internet media compressing policy-making 
and response timeline, the ‘new normal’ will probably soon be succeeded, if not already, 
by a ‘newer normal’. The time-lapse needed to facilitate access to data can well be 
shortened in order for a more timely review. There is much scope for future research to 
follow-on from this study.  
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